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FOUR TWENTIETH CENTURY SATIRES: NOVELS OF
HAŠEK, BULGAKOV, ORWELL, AND VONNEGUT

by



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A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING 1978

ABSTRACT

The satirical novel is often characterized as a minor genre exhibiting such unappealing qualities as moral nihilism, pessimism, alienation, and a cynical, even hysterical tone. To correct this negative view of twentieth-century satire, and to assist in its recognition (for there is a certain reluctance to study modern satire), this thesis discusses four satirical novels: Jaroslav Hašek's The Good Soldier Švejk and His Fortunes in the World War, Mikhail Bulgakov's The Master and Margarita, George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.'s Breakfast of Champions.

In the Introduction, a brief preview of contemporary satire and satire criticism is followed by a discussion of the definitions of satire and the satirical novel, and of irony, parody, grotesque, caricature, and period terms. Then comes an exposition of the problem of targets and norms. The section closes with a justification of the choice of the four works.

Chapter II offers a study of Hašek's The Good Soldier Švejk as an anti-militarist satire. The targets of satire, the devices and narrative strategies are studied with the aid of Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of carnivalized literature, leading to the isolation of two types of satire: political satire and the satire of human nature. They issue from the purveyor of both—Švejk.

Chapter III advances a still controversial view that

Bulgakov's The Master and Margarita is a satire. This view is supported by an analysis—of the satirical targets and devices, and thematic elements—that leads to the novel's classification as a metaphysical satire.

Chapter IV identifies Orwell's 1984 as an anti-utopian satire that attacks totalitarianism but still exhibits a streak of misanthropic satire as well. It differs from other anti-utopias (We, Brave New World) because of its impassioned advocacy of rationalism.

Chapter V recognizes Vonnegut's Breakfast of Champions as a recent American attempt at serious satire largely overlooked by American critics. An anti-American satire in the tradition of Mark Twain, Ambrose Bierce, and Sinclair Lewis, the novel satirizes the American way of life and other evils. At the same time it documents, in the manner of a Bildungsroman, the narrator's ultimate victory over nihilism and fatalism.

The Conclusion relates the four satires to a model of satire implicit in the Introduction and based on a combination of criticism and humour. It also suggests a thematic classification of satire into sub-genres ("anti-militarist," "metaphysical," and so on). Finally, it rejects the claim that twentieth-century satire is negative, by demonstrating that the evidence of the four works points to the opposite conclusion. Twentieth-century satire, then, offers not only a diagnosis of what is wrong with the world, but also supplies

a prescription: the overcoming of evil with the help of
popular wisdom (Hašek), love (Bulgakov), sacrifice (Orwell),
and awareness (Vonnegut).

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Dr. Uri Margolin, and also Dr. Milan V. Dimić, for their valuable and constructive criticism.

I am also grateful to Mrs. Margaret A. Parker for editing the final draft. And very special thanks to Mrs. Ruby Toren for typing it.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

There are brilliant satirists today, whose names will be celebrated in the future.

— Quintilian

A. Purpose and Organization

The purpose of this work is to examine four twentieth-century satires from the point of view of recent satire criticism. These four satires, or satirical novels, are as follows: Jaroslav Hašek's The Good Soldier Švejk and His Fortunes in the World War, Mikhail Bulgakov's The Master and Margarita, George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.'s Breakfast of Champions.

In order to familiarize the reader with recent satire criticism, I start with a brief preview of contemporary satire and satire criticism, and with a discussion of some problematic issues of satire theory, such as the definition of satire and the problem of the satirical novel. This discussion is complemented by a clarification of terms that are often used in various ways by various critics: terms such as irony, parody, grotesque, caricature. I then proceed to clarify period terms, such as classical, traditional, modern, and twentieth-century. The following section concentrates on the problem of targets and norms in satire. Finally, I offer a justification of my choice of the works I studied, to close the introductory chapter. The four chapters that follow are comprised of studies of the four novels. In the concluding chapter, I apply the critical ideas discussed in

the introduction to the four types of satire, and summarize my findings.

B. Contemporary Satire and Satire Criticism: A Preview

"The satirical novel is a comparatively minor genre, and has never, perhaps, had a wide popular appeal."¹ James Sutherland is particularly disenchanted with the English satirical novel of this century, a time when "moral nihilism"² all but causes satire to become "inoperative."³ On the contrary, Northrop Frye tells us, it is the innate nihilism of satire, reactionary and wrong-headed,⁴ that our age "can put to a revolutionary use."⁵ And while recognizing that ours is a "satirical age,"⁶ Robert C. Elliott warns us that it could be hardly called "an age of great satire," and its great authors are not "preeminently satirists."⁷ Similar sentiments are voiced by Gilbert Highet⁸ and Leonard Feinberg.⁹ At the same time, all the above-mentioned authors contribute to the unprecedented critical interest in satire. The poetics of satire which has been worked out "to a large extent"¹⁰ is the work of recent decades. It is hardly surprising, though discouraging, that, in their works, scholars do not pay as much attention to twentieth-century satire as it warrants. Theirs are the pioneering studies of "the myths, the conventions, the schemata that underlie and even shape all satire,"¹¹ or the analyses of the "devices, the rhetorical tricks and subterfuges, the particular symbols and displacements," and of "the apologia, irony, various

personae, and elaborate fictions like that of the satirist satirized."¹²

The manifold approaches to satire (the archetypal, the historical, the rhetorical, and the anthropological) are described and evaluated by Gerald W. O'Connor,¹³ who concludes that no single approach "can fully accommodate the diversity and complexity of the genre."¹⁴ Consequently, he advocates a movement "away from critical monism to critical eclecticism."¹⁵ The main representatives studied by O'Connor are Northrop Frye, Edward W. Rosenheim, Jr., Alvin B. Kernan, and R. C. Elliott; they represent the four approaches.

Leaving now, for a while, Anglo-American criticism, we can supplement O'Connor's list of critics with Mikhail Bakhtin who, in a work about Dostoevsky,¹⁶ a classic structural study, has formulated a theory of satire (menippea, or menippean satire, as he calls it) in a broader framework of serio-comic genres and carnivalized literature. The more orthodox example of the class-approach of Marxist criticism is visible in Georg Lukács's Zur Frage der Satire (1932).¹⁷ Lukács believes that satire is not a species of literature, but a creative method (eine schöpferische Methode¹⁸). Furthermore, satire as a part of the general aesthetic category of the comical, modelled on older works (Meredith's Essay on Comedy and Bergson's Laughter), appears in the works of Marxist critics B. Dziemidok¹⁹ and Yury Borev.²⁰ However, the tradition of the linguistic, semantic, and structural studies initiated by the Russian Formalists has survived in

the work of Aleksander Bereza.²¹

In Germany the theoretical discussion of satire has been bound to the analysis of the satirical text. The generalizations about satire have been arrived at only after a close reading of satire or satires: Helmut Arntzen studies the satire of Robert Musil,²² Klaus Lazarowicz posits a crazy world of satire (Verkehrte Welt²³) on the basis of examples drawn mainly from the eighteenth century; he is criticized for his generalization about the crazy world by Ulrich Gaier in a work in which a profound analysis of satirical writings is preceded by studies of Neidhart, Wittenwiler, and Brant.²⁴

The last work successfully proves that aesthetic theories that so far have excluded satire from the closely guarded precincts of literary art are no longer valid.²⁵ The effort to make satire legitimate, to have a fresh look at the older works, and to provide guidance for the study of contemporary satire is the result of the last two decades (predominantly the 'sixties) of critical scholarship devoted to the study of satire. Our understanding of satire, and consequently our respect, has been enhanced to the point where Highet's or Feinberg's admissions ("satire is not the greatest type of literature") sound unnecessarily apologetic.

But could it be that the unprecedented outburst of critical interest in satire has been unrelated to the no less fascinating "revival" of satirical writing in our century?²⁶ Far from becoming "inoperative," as James Sutherland says, satire has revived in this century, Alvin B. Kernan believes,²⁷

"as first-rate authors began to work again in this genre."²⁸

The large, obvious, and dangerous target that caused this revival is, according to Kernan, "the fatuously simple belief in progress, progress based on some form of material improvement, on scientific achievements, and on wildly optimistic assumptions about human nature and history."²⁹

Thus, Kernan finds each satirical age devoted to the attack on a few varied and complex targets:

The prophet Jeremiah exposed the stiff-necked pride and worldliness of Jews; Aristophanes the dangerous reliance on human reason of the fifth-century Athenians; Horace and Juvenal the power-seeking and self-indulgence of the Romans of the early Empire; Erasmus and Rabelais the pomposity and muddledom of the scholastics; John Skelton and Ben Jonson the proud boast of Renaissance man to make of himself and his world whatever he willed; Dryden, Pope, Swift, and Voltaire the Enlightenment's unexamined belief in the inherent goodness of man and society; Byron the Romantic identification of man as a purely noble and spiritual creature for whom the body was only unimportant baggage.³⁰

We shall find that "progress" is by no means the only target of importance for the modern satirist, but it is hard to dispute its importance; in one form or another, explicitly or implicitly, "progress" turns up among targets attacked more frequently than any other.

Kernan does not mention the fact that some satirical ages inspire the critics more than others. Thus, for example, the brilliance of eighteenth-century satire still casts such a powerful spell over the critics that contemporary satire, twentieth-century satire, is shunted aside, or given less priority. This led Gerald O'Connor to say that,

unfortunately, the criticism of satire seems to have "taken up permanent residence in the eighteenth century."³¹ While this preference may be based on sound reasons, the deprecation of twentieth-century satire takes on, at times, an unreasonable tinge, as when a critic complains that works of Orwell, Waugh, Vonnegut, Auden, and others "appeal to a limited audience,"³² an astonishing assertion considering the phenomenal popularity of some of the authors. What is less encouraging still is that many satires go unrecognized as such, and are, consequently, not criticized as satires.³³ O'Connor calls for new criteria for critical judgement, so that writers like Albee, Burgess, Vonnegut, Donleavy and others can be recognized and criticized as satirists.³⁴ While a number of studies have appeared since the time of O'Connor's plea,³⁵ the task is far from finished. And the present work can be considered as one which tries to deal with the problem of broadening the field of study.

C. Issues in Satire Theory

1. Definition of Satire

While a student of literature can rejoice at the number and the quality of critical works that he can use for an analysis of a work of satire, he is at the same time driven to despair by the bewildering array of terms that seem to bear the mark of originality of their maker but also require of the same student obedient forgetfulness of etymology. Consequently, repetition, or stale imagery is often

a welcome relief. Thus Matthew Hodgart talks about "the Protean body of satirical literature,"³⁶ and Leonard Feinberg warns us that satire "is such a protean species of art that no two scholars use the same definition or the same outline of ingredients."³⁷ David Worcester has a chapter entitled "The Proteus of Literature."³⁸ And Ulrich Gaier, agreeing that satire is a Proteus, nevertheless identifies the author, Carl Friedrich Flögel,³⁹ who was the first to use the term.

Because, as Feinberg says, "no two scholars use the same outline of ingredients," it is hardly possible to escape the common courtesy of extending to the reader a clarification of my usage of some critical terms together with some information on the current usage of these terms. Such clarification will concern first of all the problem of the definition of satire; then, a related problem of fictional satires, or satirical novels; further, a discussion of key terms like "irony," "caricature," "classical," "traditional," "modern," "twentieth-century," and, finally, a brief discussion of the problem of the "norm," or "norms" in satirical literature.

Gerald O'Connor assumes that satire "exists as a literary genre, the real problem being not in finding it but in defining it."⁴⁰ And, according to R. C. Elliott, this is because no "strict definition can encompass the complexity of a word which signifies, on one hand, a kind of literature, and on the other, a spirit or tone which expresses itself in many literary genres."⁴¹ Under "kind of literature," Elliott

arranges the formal verse satire; consequently, satirical prose would fall under the category of "a spirit or tone which expresses itself in many literary genres." Elliott himself begins the definition with one written by Dr.

Johnson: "Satire is a poem in which wickedness or folly is censured," and adds that "more elaborate definitions are rarely more satisfactory."⁴² The opposite of the elaborate definitions is a working definition of the type offered by Feinberg: "Satire is a playfully critical distortion of the familiar."⁴³ It is also "an amorphous genre."⁴⁴ Northrop Frye takes it to mean "a tone or quality of art which we may find in any form,"⁴⁵ and posits the two things that are essential to satire: "One is wit or humour, the other an object of attack."⁴⁶ But Edgar Johnson believes that there is only one essential: criticism;⁴⁷ for even laughing satire is laughing-at, not merely irresponsible laughing."⁴⁸ It is "criticism getting around or overcoming an obstacle."⁴⁹

Edward W. Rosenheim, Jr., the representative of the "historical" approach, starts with the notion of "attack": "All satire is not only an attack; it is an attack upon discernible, historically authentic particulars."⁵⁰ And he uses the word "spectrum" to encompass satire which lies between rhetoric and comedy.⁵¹ In his Anatomy of Criticism, Northrop Frye enlarges upon his earlier definition:⁵² The word "satire" means "a structural principle or attitude, what we have called a mythos";⁵³ this is further equipped with a qualification, a distinction between specific literary forms

(prose and verse satire, both named "satire") and the mentioned attitude:

As the name of an attitude, satire is, we have seen, a combination of fantasy and morality. But as the name of a form, the term satire, though confined to literature (for as a mythos it may appear in any art, a cartoon, for example), is more flexible, and can be either entirely fantastic or entirely moral.⁵⁴

In The Plot of Satire, Alvin B. Kernan admits his indebtedness to Northrop Frye.⁵⁵ At the same time he respectfully declines to use Frye's terminology, preferring what he takes to be the "more traditional critical terms."⁵⁶ Therefore, Frye's "myths" are Kernan's "genres," and Frye's "genres" are Kernan's "modes."⁵⁷ However, Kernan parts with tradition himself, contributing to the criticism of satire a number of familiar terms that he continues to thoroughly requalify. Some of the key terms with which Kernan operates are plot, action, and dullness. "Dullness," we learn, is "that quality of mind and being which is the subject of The Dunciad."⁵⁸ It is not only "inertness, the ponderous movement, and the vacant stare; it is busyness, briskness, and pertness as well."⁵⁹ Kernan's "action" is an "essential active quality in a satire,"⁶⁰ it is a "verbal quality, anterior to any particular word and unlocalized in any single shape or substance."⁶¹ Finally, the meaning of "plot":

The term "plot" should not carry with it any prescription for a particular kind of agency, linkage of events, or type of action; it should only point toward that aspect of a literary work which involves movement and the relationship of parts occurring at different points of time.⁶²

The reader who is not impressed by Kernan's argument

for "plot," and who finds Kernan's parlance somewhat esoteric, might nevertheless be impressed by his "practical criticism." Kernan's design to capture the elusive movement, the flux of happening in a satirical work, his search for the essential are, no doubt, quite legitimate critical concerns, but why elevate "movement" to a position of the greatest importance for a satirical work, one might ask?

The rhetorical approach to satire often takes a blunter form of an inexorably logical statement: the art of the satirist is an art of persuasion; persuasion is the chief function of rhetoric; therefore, satire is a department of rhetoric.⁶³ So much for James Sutherland. Maynard Mack takes the same position, but goes further in identifying satire: "Rhetorically considered, satire belongs to the category of laus et vituperatio, praise and blame."⁶⁴ Consequently, the chief function of satire is to teach.⁶⁵ But the theoretical significance of Mack's approach is limited to formal verse satire.

Surveying the various definitions of satire, and the no less numerous arguments about the genre, Patricia Meyer Spacks asks:

Is satire a genre at all? Attempts to define or describe it as one frequently founder; descriptions which seem plausible in theoretical isolation turn out to be useless in dealing with actual satiric documents.⁶⁶

What is more, Alvin B. Kernan illustrates also that the opposite can be true: that implausible description may lead to an impressive analysis of a satirical text.

Under these circumstances it is hard not to pledge allegiance to a pragmatic statement of R. C. Elliott, one of the leading scholars of satire criticism, who in The Power of Satire excused himself from a thorough discussion of the definition:

Satire is notoriously a slippery term, designating, as it does, a form of art and a spirit, a purpose and a tone—to say nothing of specific works of art whose resemblance may be highly remote. My use of satire throughout will be pragmatic rather than normative; that is it will comprehend responsible uses of the term as I encounter them. I shall depend upon context and qualifying terms to convey the relevant sense of satire intended at any given time.⁶⁷

My own view of the problem of definition is akin to O'Connor's. I do think we are dealing with a genre; perhaps a peculiar genre, but a genre nevertheless. The fact that it is not possible (so far) to define this genre in a manner that would satisfy everybody does not seem to trouble those who, like me, embark upon the study of particular satires. However difficult the description, we are not really completely in the dark about the essentials of satire. These fall into two categories: criticism (Dr. Johnson's "censure," Frye's and Rosenheim's "attack," and Mack's vituperatio); and humour of the widest possible variety (from Frye's "wit" to black, or gallows humour). Admittedly, there are works where humour is rare, but in general these two essentials are not disputed. The agreement on those two essentials is a minimal requirement that can clear the way for the pragmatism announced by Elliott, or the eclecticism advocated by

O'Connor: positions which seem reasonable for the study of works "whose resemblance may be highly remote."

2. The Satirical Novel

Debate of an entirely different kind concerns the particular problem of satirical fiction, especially the satirical novel. In a novel, Leonard Feinberg tells us, satirists usually "subordinate the satire to the story."⁶⁸ Satire seems to require a light and closed form, and the novel is open-ended and large, Matthew Hodgart thinks;⁶⁹ and he draws a conclusion that "no full-length novel is likely to be satirical throughout, and indeed not one example among the classics comes to mind."⁷⁰ And Wyndham Lewis says that "no work of fiction, however, is likely to be only 'satire'," in the sense that a formal verse satire would be.⁷¹ Does this mean that it would not be possible to speak about a satirical novel as a satire? Not so. There are two possibilities: either we have a novel in which satire is truly only an element, when we talk about satiric "touches," or satiric "colouring,"⁷² or we have a satire, a genuine literary form, possessing its own "peculiar power," and some hallmark of its own—"in structure, substance, style, or motive—which allows us to classify the work in its entirety as 'a satire'."⁷³ A look at the identifying features of Rosenheim's "satire" tells us that we can realistically expect only the last one, admittedly the most nebulous of the four mentioned, namely the motive, to be present in every

satirical novel. For this reason, I would prefer Northrop Frye's "tone," "quality of art," "attitude,"⁷⁴ inasmuch as it would not exclude "all the writers who have ignored the models but have preserved the tone and attitude of satire."⁷⁵ If it be true that satire, like a disembodied spirit, "may take a literary form,"⁷⁶ then it may also take the form of a novel. Consequently, that novel may be called a satire.

Adopting R. C. Elliott's pragmatic approach does not conflict with O'Connor's "critical eclecticism," as Elliott's intimation of "following the text" shows: "Every work is entitled to its own donnée. Why not consider Gulliver in its own terms, sui generis, working out from the text its own presuppositions, its own assumptions?"⁷⁷ Still Elliott is reluctant to take the plunge, fearing the untold dangers inherent in the procedure. His timorousness can be checked with the help of Wayne C. Booth's temerity: "if we let the work (in its implicit genre) be its own rule-maker, we can be open to makings in all modes, without surrendering to complete relativism."⁷⁸

In my study of the four novels, I shall assume that I am dealing with satires (supported by the theory of Rosenheim and Frye), and shall discuss them accordingly, aided by the possibility of critical, perhaps even creative, eclecticism, in the pragmatic fashion initiated by Elliott. In my view, then, considering the novels as satires, I have to reject Feinberg's argument about the subordination of satire to the story: there are, after all, stories subordinated to satires

(or else 1984, to mention only one example of many, would be first and foremost the love story of Winston and Julia, which it is not). Hodgart's argument (no novel is satirical "throughout"), seems to me even less persuasive: for what does he mean when he says "throughout"? That there are chapters, or paragraphs, or even sentences which are non-satirical, "straight"? Does not, for example, Don Quixote have an underlying unity of satirical purpose (satire of chivalric literature, or chivalric ethos) which throws light on even the novel's digressive pastoral and allegorical elements? And what of the satiric attitude and motive? Granted that, as Lewis says, no work of fiction is likely to be "only" satire: could this not be said of other genres as well? And even if it could not be said of any other genre, it would still be a positive, rather than a negative feature. Having said this, I recognize the genuine concern of these critics for a more responsible use of terminology: their fears do contribute to a more discriminating approach. What follows, then, will deal with the usage of some more key terms.

3. Irony

Discordant variety is not owned exclusively by the larger problems of genre, definition, and the satirical novel. It is noticeable in the critical discussion of satirical devices as well. With regard to irony, which I am obliged to consider a satirical device (whatever else it may

be for any other purpose), we can depend on the excellent work of Wayne C. Booth, A Rhetoric of Irony. Basing his work on Norman Knox's The Word Irony" and Its Contexts: 1500-1755, D. C. Muecke's The Compass of Irony, and Kierkegaard's The Concept of Irony, among others, Booth mentions the many transformations of "irony." Before the eighteenth century, irony was a rhetorical device, and by the end of the Romantic period it had become a grand concept, a synonym for romanticism, even an essential attribute of God. In our century, it is a mark of all good literature, and Kenneth Burke has made it into a kind of synonym for comedy, the "dramatistic," and for dialectic. Finally, it has been used "to cover just about everything there is," Booth tells us.⁷⁹

Small wonder if satire criticism happens to reflect the general trend. We can see David Worcester, in The Art of Satire, reeling under the accumulated weight of meanings that have accrued to irony. He divides irony into two distinct groups: "Irony, the Ally of Comedy," and "Irony, the Ally of Tragedy." Among the former he includes "verbal irony," "irony of manner," and an ironic character, ingénu. Among the latter belong "dramatic irony," "romantic irony," and cosmic irony." For Worcester, irony is a flash that illuminates the "artifices of our author in accumulating a charge antagonistic to his apparent purpose."⁸⁰ With irony, then, "a third dimension is added to literature. One reading is never enough."⁸¹ Using fearlessly martial imagery, Northrop Frye tells us that irony "is a kind of intellectual

tear-gas that breaks the nerves and paralyzes the muscles of everyone in its vicinity, an acid that will corrode healthy as well as decayed tissues."⁸²

For Luigi Pirandello, irony is but a verbal contradiction "between what the writer says and what he wants understood";⁸³ that is, essentially, the first meaning of the word given by The Oxford English Dictionary: "A figure of speech in which the intended meaning is the opposite of that expressed by the words used"; here, it appears, little disagreement could be expected. However, irony, like the sublime, is a term "that can stand for quality or gift in the speaker or writer, for something in the work, and for something that happens to the reader or auditor."⁸⁴ Moreover, there are many kinds of ironies; Booth catalogues them, and divides them first into two main groups: stable and unstable ironies, each of those being further subdivided into stable-covert-local, stable-overt, and unstable-overt-local, unstable-covert-local. A group apart are the infinite instabilities. With this classification Booth deals with a thankless task, since the division of the various groups, or degrees of irony, is designed to account for the degree of recognition of irony by various readers. In order to do this, Booth reconstructs representative passages that illustrates the various types of intended ironies. Thus, my own need of reconstructing ironies in the satirical novels has been well served by W. C. Booth's excellent work.⁸⁵

4. Parody

Of no less import (although in this work I do not use all these terms), is the group of terms that deals either with "the device of incongruous imitation and deflationary treatment of serious themes for satiric purposes,"⁸⁶ that is, terms like "parody," "burlesque," and travesty," or with a group which deals with distortion of a different kind: "caricature" and "grotesque."

Parody, we are told, especially literary or critical parody, belongs "to the genus satire and thus performs the double-edged task of reform and ridicule."⁸⁷ Parody is sometimes used interchangeably with burlesque and travesty. Accordingly, David Worcester in The Art of Satire does not speak of parody, but of burlesque, which to him is "satire by comparison."⁸⁸ In the same chapter (that devoted to burlesque), he also discusses "grotesque satire."⁸⁹ In Gilbert Highet's The Anatomy of Satire, parody has a prominent place as well, as "one of the most delightful forms of satire, one of the most natural, perhaps the most satisfying, and often the most effective. It springs from the very heart of our sense of comedy, which is the happy perception of incongruity."⁹⁰ Nevertheless, he adds, "parody is not merely distortion; and mere distortion is not satire."⁹¹ That parody is imitation that strives toward a comical effect is indisputable, but parody can be seen also as stylization with a hostile tendency, a vehicle of re-interpretation and

re-evaluation, and as a catalyst of literary change. These further views were contributed by the Russian Formalists,⁹² who were "at their best in dealing with what might be called quotation mark techniques—with parody and stylization, 'laying bare' the artifice and destroying the illusion of reality."⁹³ The work of Yuri Tynianov,⁹⁴ Mikhail Bakhtin,⁹⁵ and also Viktor Shklovsky and Boris Eikhenbaum, is an important contribution to the understanding of parody: Tynianov, for example, studied parody as a catalyst of literary change, a "regrouping of the old elements."⁹⁶ For Bakhtin, parody is one of the "metalinguistic phenomena,"⁹⁷ and he explains a characteristic feature of these phenomena:

. . . in all of them the word has a double-directedness—it is directed both toward the object of speech, like an ordinary word, and toward another word, toward another person's speech. If we are not aware of the existence of this second context of the other person's speech and begin to perceive stylization or parody in the same way that ordinary speech—which is directed only toward its object—is perceived, then we will not understand the essence of these phenomena: we will mistake stylization for the style itself, and will perceive parody merely as a poor work of art.⁹⁸

Recently, when A. Morozov, a Russian scholar, called for the definition of parody as a genre,⁹⁹ J. G. Riewald complained about the continuing and interchangeable use of "parody," "burlesque," "caricature," and "travesty," which blurs and impoverishes the meaning of these words.¹⁰⁰

To date, the most satisfying attempt to clarify these terms is the work of Henryk Markiewicz, "On the Definitions of Literary Parody." Here, Markiewicz makes the following

distinctions:

PARODY SENSU LARGO: comical recast or imitation of literary model;

PARODY SENSU STRICTO: comical exaggeration and condensation of the features of the literary model;

LOW BURLESQUE: comicality of discrepancy between serious subject and low style;

HIGH BURLESQUE: comicality of discrepancy between common or trifling subject and high style;

TRAVESTY: close imitation of the plot with details and style changed, or close imitation of the pattern of style and composition of the model, with change in content.¹⁰¹

5. Grotesque and Caricature

Let us turn now to another pair of terms, "grotesque" and "caricature," that occur in satire criticism, as well as in my work. Here too, the Russian scholars contributed some of the most provocative studies, especially in throwing light on the term "grotesque." "Modern satire is permeated with the grotesque,"¹⁰² Leonard Feinberg tells us in a special section devoted to the phenomenon in his book. Among the examples of the grotesque in modern satire, he mentions the attempted rape of a wooden statue in Günter Grass's The Tin Drum, the corpses and funeral parlors in Evelyn Waugh's The Loved One, the horror of Nathanael West's Day of the Locust, Kafka's Metamorphosis, and other works. He also mentions Constance Rourke's definition of the grotesque as a "median between terror and laughter,"¹⁰³ and Ernst Kris's statement that the "psychology of the grotesque is based

largely on the sudden and surprising relief from anxiety which leads to laughter."¹⁰⁴

The grotesque style¹⁰⁵ is studied by Boris Eikhenbaum. Its requirements are as follows:

. . . that the situation or event being described should be enclosed in a fantastically small world of artificial experiences . . . that it be completely isolated from reality at large and from the true fullness of the inner life, and, second, that this should be done not with a didactic or satirical intent, but rather to make it possible to play with reality, to break up its elements and displace them freely, so that normal correlations and associations (psychological and logical) will prove inoperative in this newly constructed world, and any trifle can grow to colossal proportions. It is only in the context of such a style that the faintest flicker of genuine feeling can take on the appearance of something earth-shaking.¹⁰⁶

"It is a characteristic device of grotesque texture to set forth minutiae while pushing into the background things that would seem to warrant greater attention."¹⁰⁷ The disclaimer of "satirical intent," understandable in the work that Eikhenbaum actually analyzed,¹⁰⁸ can nevertheless be rejected on the grounds that the grotesque style does figure prominently in satirical works, that is, work with a satirical intent.

The narrowly centred work of Eikhenbaum can be contrasted with the all-embracing work of Wolfgang Kayser, The Grotesque in Art and Literature. Evolving from the specific meaning as a piece of ornamental art, "grotesque" became, by the end of the eighteenth century, synonymous with "odd, unnatural, bizarre, strange, funny, ridiculous, caricatural, etc.,"¹⁰⁹ says Wolfgang Kayser. We learn that the word, like

"irony," applies to three different realms: "the creative process, the work of art itself, and its reception,"¹¹⁰ and that Kayser's final interpretation of the grotesque is this: "AN ATTEMPT TO INVOKE AND SUBDUE THE DEMONIC ASPECTS OF THE WORLD."¹¹¹ He recognizes two basic types of the grotesque: the "fantastic" and the "satiric."¹¹² The individual and historical idiosyncracies can be defined only by means of structural analyses, and these would always find new material.¹¹³

A serious criticism of Kayser's views was advanced by M. Bakhtin in his book, Rabelais and His World. Seeing the twentieth century as the time of "a new and powerful revival of the grotesque,"¹¹⁴ Bakhtin notes two contradictory lines of development "of this genre":¹¹⁵ the first is the "modernist" form (Alfred Jarry), connected with the Romantic tradition, and under the influence of existentialism; the second is the realist grotesque (Thomas Mann, Bertolt Brecht, Pablo Neruda), related to the tradition of realism and folk culture, and reflecting at times the direct influence of carnival forms.¹¹⁶ Bakhtin finds Kayser's definitions altogether gloomy,¹¹⁷ and particularly unacceptable to him are the traits of the grotesque that Kayser found essential: "something hostile, alien, and inhuman."¹¹⁸ On the contrary, Bakhtin sees grotesque based on the "principle of laughter and the carnival spirit."¹¹⁹

Kayser tells us that caricature—"as well as satire (which is related to it)—has much in common with the

grotesque and may even help to pave the way for it."¹²⁰

Accordingly, he suggests not only a relation among the three, but also a kind of interpenetration which makes the job of identifying them quite difficult. And here is how Leonard Feinberg describes the operation of caricature:

Caricature in literature operates by choosing an objectionable quality, attributing it to an individual or a group, then describing the victim only in terms of that disagreeable characteristic. In carrying out this process, oversimplification is the basic requirement.¹²¹

Alvin B. Kernan goes further: "We never find characters in satire, only caricature,"¹²² to which Feinberg reacts with the statement that "the more profoundly a character is developed, the less likely he is to be a character suitable for pure satire."¹²³ In literature, as in pictorial art, we find that caricature can be divided into various degrees of distortion. Of this kind is the typology of Christoph Martin Wieland, worked out in 1775:

(1) true caricature, "where the painter reproduces natural distortions as he finds them," (2) "exaggerated caricature, where, for one reason or another, he enhances the monstrosity of the subject without destroying its similarity to the model," and (3) "purely fantastic caricatures, or grotesques in the proper sense, where the painter, disregarding verisimilitude, gives rein to an unchecked fancy (like the so-called Hell Bruegel) with the sole intention of provoking laughter, disgust, and surprise about the daring of his monstrous creations by the unnatural and absurd products of his imagination."¹²⁴

To summarize, my reaction to the definitions and usage of all these terms is an awareness of the complex nature of the terms: the kind of responsibility Elliott advocates for "satire" in the Introduction to The Power of Satire.¹²⁵

6. Period Terms

Before tackling the thorny problem of the norms in satire, a few words about my use of the terms for the periods: "classical," "traditional," "modern," and "twentieth-century."

Comparisons between (what I would call) traditional and modern satire were drawn by P. K. Elkin in The Augustan Defence of Satire:

The fundamental difference between the Augustan and modern approaches to satire is that whereas Pope and his contemporaries saw man as a free and responsible agent, capable of ordering his life and society in the light of reason, we tend to think of him instead as impelled by all sorts of forces from within and without, from his own personality and society, which he is powerless to control—at best he may slightly alter their direction.¹²⁶

To me "Augustan" is "traditional," that is, based on, or continuing with, or inspired by the "classical" satire of Horace, Juvenal, Persius, Petronius, Lucian, and Apuleius. While I would reserve the term "classical" for the latter group of satirists and their works, "traditional" would mean an ideal or "synthetic" type of satire distinct from "modern" and "twentieth-century." For Elkin's "Augustan" is also a synthetic type, encompassing the wide spectrum, the untidy satiric farrago of the Augustan Age.

In Elkin's usage, "modern" is what "we" tend to think of things, that is, the term reflects our contemporary approach. But when did "we" start to think "modern"? In the twentieth century? Or in the nineteenth? Or, perhaps,

really in the eighteenth? Because it is impossible to pinpoint "modern" with historical exactitude, I would use "modern" as Elkin does, in contrast with "Augustan" or "classical," or "traditional." All twentieth-century satires that I discuss are "modern." But not all "modern" satires were written in this century. The term "twentieth-century" is, fortunately, self-explanatory.

7. Targets and Norms of Satire

Since one of the purposes of satire is to criticize, it should be obvious to the reader what is being criticized. Satire should not have to be interpreted by the critic to the reader. Edward Rosenheim, Jr. insists that the reader should be able to point out the individual, group, institution, custom, belief, or idea which is under attack.¹²⁷ In satire, the fictional constructions have definite referents in the real world. For the targets of satires are not fictions. They or the objects they represent exist or existed in reality.¹²⁸ And the illusion of fiction is inevitably broken as the reader recognizes the satiric target.

But what are the implications of this (historical) approach? It is possible to attack a specific target from different vantage points, but the target is a priori an object worthy of satire as far as the satirist is concerned. The implications of this are twofold. First, the satiric target has a model, an ideal counterpart. For example, a

corrupt official who is the target of satire has a counterpart in a model official, a warm human being, an understanding man whose mission it is to serve people wholeheartedly. An unbearable political system has a counterpart, as in Orwell's 1984, in a humane political system, an unrealized (and perhaps unrealistic) idealized form of socialism, as Wyndham Lewis suggested.¹²⁹ Second, this counterpart is given normative value by the satirist.

The ideal counterpart is the norm from which the satiric target is an aberration. This point should be clear, but it seems it is precisely the area of the norm that creates difficulties for the student of satire. I believe that these difficulties spring partly from the satirists' uncertainty and ethical relativism, and partly from what Wayne C. Booth terms the morality of elitism,¹³⁰ found in some satirists, critics, and interpreters of satire.

Satire Newsletter,¹³¹ a magazine that readily responded to the controversial issues of literary criticism of satire, organized a symposium in 1964 to deal with the problem of norms in satire.¹³² The participants were asked to respond to this question: "Is reference to moral norms essential to satire?" Fourteen scholars took part, including most of the well-known critics of satire. Disregarding the predictable, obligatory range of opinions, one is nevertheless struck by the confusion generated by this question. While it is true that the question was posed in a way that could encourage misunderstanding, some representative

responses are included here to illustrate how the critics grappled with the question of norms.

R. C. Elliott¹³³ answered the question by turning on the word reference: "Reference to the moral norms is not essential to satire." A commonsensical opinion. After all, in his A Modest Proposal, Swift never says that cannibalism is wrong on moral grounds; it is understood. Instead, the question should have been: Are moral norms essential to satire? And indeed, judging by their responses, most scholars understood the question in this way. Therefore, Norris W. Yates said:

True, "norm" is a tricky word; it may legitimately mean either "average performance" or a model of what ought to be rather than what is. . . . Controversies over whether a satirist has or has not used a norm usually arise from differences on extraliterary grounds over whether his norm is valid . . . theoretically, a norm may be non-moral and wholly implicit; in actuality, satire nearly always involves morality and therefore its norms must be moral norms.¹³⁴

Yates's answer made it evident that without norms satire would not exist. "Norm makes the satire satiric," as Northrop Frye says.¹³⁵ But Edward Rosenheim, Jr. suggested that:

There are also some satirists whose "norms" or assumptions do not lie in the substratum of common belief—however modest the "commonality" may be—but whose satiric performance follows from premises that are novel, totally unorthodox, even terrifying. To make such premises clear and even minimally sympathetic is a very tough job. Satirists rarely tackle it, and even more rarely succeed. (Swift, for one, brings it off in the ninth chapter of A Tale of a Tub—which is what makes that chapter so difficult and so triumphant.) It is not surprising that most satirists are content to

exploit the standards which they and their readers implicitly share. It is not surprising that they address themselves to an audience which is able to recognize folly and vice by the simple exercise of good sense and an instinct for decency.¹³⁶

A more contemporary example of the type of satirist that Rosenheim is talking about is William Burroughs, whose work is filed under the category of The Nauseating Wallowing by Wayne C. Booth.¹³⁷ Burroughs' work pretends to be satire, but it is a pretension that is nevertheless to be taken seriously. The norms there are homosexuality, drug-taking, extreme anarchism, and so on. But granted such unorthodox satirists exist, they are not the main reason for the difficulties the critic encounters. Ellen Douglas Leyburn sensed the difficulty in the change of the satiric mode of writing:

It seems to me that the difficulty for the critic comes from the fact that the disturbed sensibility of our time is producing a superficially satiric mode of writing which is fundamentally different in purpose from most of what has been embraced by even so catholic a term as "satire." We are confronted with a body of works which seem to be cast in the tone and manner of satire and yet not to have at all as object the judgement which satire has hitherto implied.¹³⁸

Leyburn's observation harks back to Elkin's belief that there is a lack of saeva indignatio in modern satire. Although it would seem that even a superficially satiric work cannot avoid judgement, since passing judgement is inherent in satire, Leyburn found that the change of satiric morphology makes the job of identification especially problematic. This is an important point. Roman satire,¹³⁹ which had such

great influence in the eighteenth century, does not have for us the status of a model or paradigmatic example, one that could standardize satiric expressions. And so it becomes possible to ask of a work: Is this a satire?

It is possible to understand "norm" as an alternative to an evil shown in satire. This is the view of Philip Pinkus,¹⁴⁰ who has in mind a "visible moral norm"¹⁴¹ in the sense of, apparently, a positive example juxtaposed to the evil shown in satire. He goes on to say that satire "is not in the reform business. Its purpose, ultimately, is the same as that of any other art, to bring awareness. For that purpose moral norms are not absolutely necessary."¹⁴²

There is a consensus among the critics that satire is no longer in the "reform business." That much is clear from Leyburn's, Elkin's, and Pinkus's statements. But to contend, as Pinkus does, that moral norms are "not absolutely necessary" indicates a misunderstanding of the whole issue. Alvin Kernan,¹⁴³ like Pinkus, has also confused norms with positive examples presented in satire:

Our definition of satire should not, I believe turn on the presence of norms but rather on patterns of futility and grotesque shapes created by the actions of dunces who relentlessly believe that they have achieved the opposite.¹⁴⁴

The symposium would have unanimously projected a sense of helplessness had it not been for the brief contribution of Northrop Frye.¹⁴⁵ Without Frye, one would have been left with the mistaken impression that a moral norm is some sort of positive example introduced into satire in much the same

way as Gogol, in Dead Souls, shows the successful landowner Kostanzhoglo; Cervantes, the Gentleman in Green; or Swift, Don Pedro of Gulliver's last voyage. Frye clarified the issue:

Of course the moral norm is inherent in satire: satire presents something as grotesque: the grotesque is by definition a deviant from a norm: the norm makes the satire satiric. This is a very different thing from saying that the satirist must "put something in" to represent a moral norm. It is the reader who is responsible for "putting in" the moral norm, not the satirist. The satirist may simply be representing something as grotesque and appealing to the reader's sense of the norm in seeing it as such. Or the satirist may be opinionated, wrong-headed, or malicious, in which case we may accept some of his moral norms and reject the rest.¹⁴⁶

If, as I have suggested, the norm is the counterpart of the satiric target, it is possible to imagine that a reader could dispute the positive value of this inherent, implicit counterpart. For that particular reader, such disagreement would then nullify the satiric value of the target, the satiric attack. If, in Goncharov's Oblomov, the idleness of the main character is the traditional satiric target, but at the same time this very idleness (under a more acceptable name, say, non-involvement) appeals to us as readers, we are bound to side with Oblomov against his fictional counterpart Stolz. It will be Stolz who will seem to us to be a more deserving satiric target. His unfeeling practicality will personify the evils of rationalism, and of the now unfashionable expansionary industrialism, while his counterpart, Oblomov, will personify the virtues of serene

contemplation of the universe.

In The Critical Path,¹⁴⁷ Northrop Frye voices his idea of the use to which a reader can put any literary work. This idea is tied to what he has to say about the moral norm, but it amplifies somewhat his previous statement;

Nobody's work is inherently revolutionary or reactionary, whatever the writer's own views in his lifetime: it is the use made of the work which determines what it is, and any writer may be potentially useful to anybody, in any way.¹⁴⁸

Why was it so important to bring the symposium on norms into this study of satire? What is the practical significance of the problem of the norm? Wayne C. Booth tells us about the "fantastic explosion of controversies about readings that has occurred in the last few decades."¹⁴⁹ Satire happens to be one of the more fertile grounds for controversies, disputes which stem from the decoding or reconstruction of irony. For modern satire relies almost exclusively on irony. If we do not know or are unsure of the norm that is implied in the text, we have to rely on the narrator. But the reliability of the narrator has become questionable; not only of obviously unreliable narrators, but also of those who until recently were considered quite reliable.¹⁵⁰ Consequently, an understanding of the problem of the norm is essential to the student who struggles with the complexities of modern satiric writing. But essential as no doubt it is, the same scholars who are not quite sure about the norm are still able to write perceptive and helpful studies of satire. This indicates that misunderstanding

one element (albeit an essential one) in a complex satiric work does not necessarily invalidate a particular reading.

While cracking the code is not a very happy metaphor, the reconstructions of satires very often resemble, in the unravelling of ironies, this complex and cryptic activity. At the same time a truly great satire is more than the sum total of finely-read ironies; it is the expression of a basic dissatisfaction with the state of things, a dissatisfaction conveyed in an art form in a most forceful way. It is, therefore, the opposite pole to the aesthetically pleasing and rapturous pole of literature.

D. The Works to be Discussed: Justification of Choice

In studying the satirical novels of Hašek, Bulgakov, Orwell, and Vonnegut, I had two purposes in mind: to recognize these works as satires and, secondly, to study them with the awareness of the recent accomplishments achieved in the criticism of satire. None of the four novels is unknown, or requires justification for study; indeed, they all have sufficient intrinsic merit to warrant a close study. However, not all are known predominantly as satirical works (particularly Bulgakov's The Master and Margarita and Vonnegut's Breakfast of Champions), and not all have been criticized in a manner that took into consideration the recent offering of the various approaches to satire (particularly Hašek's The Good Soldier Švejk, but partly the other novels

as well). It is true that in this century, so rich in satires, I could have chosen other works too. Yet each of the four novels represents a wider trend in twentieth-century satire: the anti-militarist, the metaphysical, the anti-utopian, and the anti-American.¹⁵¹ And, underlying these trends is the important fact that each of these satires is addressed to a crucial period in the history of this century. Thus, Hašek's novel appears after the Great War, an event that, according to many, ushered in the "modern" age; Bulgakov's novel was finished after the time of the Great Terror, a time that is still growing in significance; Orwell's novel emerges from the painful awareness of evil demonstrated by the Second World War; and, finally, the novel of Vonnegut, our only contemporary writer who speaks for our time, appears toward the end of the American involvement in Vietnam, a war with great consequences in the political life of Americans.

But while some of these descriptions might embrace a clear trend, the four satires by no means exhaust (nor do they attempt to) the rich variety of twentieth-century satire. That satire in this century has become highly individualized and also highly personal is a fact that we have to come to terms with. If there is something else that unifies or ties together these satires, it must be, despite their various origins and epochs that estrange them, the importance that they have already demonstrated, their almost palpable achievement as masterly models or pioneering

ventures: an achievement to which the best testimony is the growing critical and popular interest.

Stephen Jay Greenblatt, in Three Modern Satirists: Waugh, Orwell, and Huxley, concludes that despite the fact that all three satirists have "witnessed the same historical developments, lived through the same national and international crises, been influenced by the same culture, grown up in the same society,"¹⁵² their works reflect "a remarkable diversity of interest, prejudice, and temperament."¹⁵³ All that unites them is their conviction that "there is something dreadfully wrong with society"¹⁵⁴—a statement that, of course, would apply to my selection of satirists as well.

Hardly less important, the four novels, in their own satirical way, also sketch a fragmentary but nevertheless often penetrating picture of the intellectual history of our time. However, whatever other virtues these works possess, and whatever other approaches have been or could be made to them, the starting point for my studies is satire: It is, therefore, the satiric function of these novels that is of the greatest import to me.

This last point, then, leads me to restrict my study to a basically two-pronged inquiry: what is being satirized (a study of the targets of satires and the views of human nature implicit in them), and how it is satirized (a study of devices, narrative strategies). Consequently, the last chapter will take into consideration these factors in order to establish whether or not the four satires have anything

in common (group characteristics or individual distinction), and what is new ("modern") in them, and finally, what is modern satire's view of the human situation based on the four works.

CHAPTER II

JAROSLAV HAŠEK'S THE GOOD SOLDIER ŠVEJK:

ANTI-MILITARIST SATIRE

Jaroslav Hašek's unfinished novel, The Good Soldier Švejk and His Fortunes in the World War,¹ emerged from the aftermath of the Great War as one of the greatest satiric novels of this century. It is an anti-militarist satire, written after the anti-militarist novel of Henri Barbusse,² but before the novels of Erich Maria Remarque and Louis-Ferdinand Céline.³ One of Hašek's chief concerns is to ridicule the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, a concern shared by Robert Musil⁴ and Franz Kafka, his compatriots in the Austrian Empire. Hašek's work presages much of modern satire, and it is not surprising that his name crops up in discussions of Joseph Heller's Catch 22⁵ or Vladimir Voinovich's The Life and Extraordinary Adventures of Private Ivan Chonkin.⁶

The stature of Hašek's novel in world literature can be measured by the number of translations and adaptations, and the number of comparisons, as a literary type, that Švejk stimulates. As for the latter, not only have similarities been suggested to Dostoevsky's Prince Myshkin,⁷ and Sancho Panza, but also to Goncharov's Oblomov.⁸ Švejk's folksy character has been compared to Tyl Ulenspiegel and Nasreddin, and the narrative manner has been likened to that of Tristram Shandy⁹ and Fielding's Tom Jones. Švejk's speech reminds some of Dickens' Sam Weller, and as a comic type he is likened to Hanswurst, Falstaff, Lazarillo de Tormes, Gil Blas, and others. In its attitude to war and other momentous historic events, The Good Soldier has also been compared to

Grimmelshausen's Simplicius Simplicissimus, as well as to Voltaire's Candide. The latter work, together with Diderot's Jaques le fataliste, is mentioned in relation to philosophical aspects of Hašek's work. Then, too, the exaggerations of Švejk's comedy bring to mind Swift's Gulliver; and the scatology is reminiscent of Rabelais' Gargantua and Pantagruel. Finally, Švejk has also been compared to such tragic characters as Faust, Hamlet, Don Juan, and others.

The translation that brought the novel to the attention of the outside world was Grete Reiner's translation published in 1926 in Prague for the considerable German community established there.¹⁰ Max Brod, the biographer of Kafka, had the highest praise for the novel¹¹ and, together with other German writers of Prague—Egon Erwin Kisch, F. C. Weiskopf, Louis Fűrnberg, as well as the Marxists Karl Kreibich and Kurt Konrad—brought it to the attention of German readers and thus guaranteed its unusually early success abroad.¹²

It seems that the novel is eminently suitable for dramatic adaptations: the first dramatization and performance took place in 1922, after only a few installment had been published.¹³ The dramatization by Erwin Piscator (1927)¹⁴ and also Bertolt Brecht's Schweyk in the Second World War (1943)¹⁵ illustrate both the attraction of the novel as a potential theatrical play and the deep interest exhibited by German readers and theatre-goers.¹⁶

In the context of Czech literature, The Good Soldier

is a worthy addition to the vigorous tradition of satiric writing that began with the fourteenth-century satiric adaptations of the Decalogue¹⁷ and the seventeenth and eighteenth-century Satire on Four Estates (Satira na čtyři stavy).¹⁸

During the tumultuous period of national revival in the nineteenth century, a number of satirists appeared, sharing a common revivalist goal: the establishment of an autonomous Bohemia with the implied dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. An epigrammatic form of satire containing virulent and vitriolic attacks on the Monarchy and the Church was developed by Karel Havlíček Borovský (1821-1856); he and Jan Neruda (1834-1891) appear to be the fathers of modern Czech satire. Near the end of the 'eighties appeared Josef Holeček's anti-militarist novel Bloodless Pictures from the War (1887), with some similarity to The Good Soldier.¹⁹

As some of his stories show,²⁰ Hašek, a voracious reader, could not remain unaffected by his favourite authors, Maxim Gorky and Mark Twain.²¹ But the greatest single influence on The Good Soldier was without any doubt the Great War itself. This war ushered in the modern age and set the stage for the debut of a truly modern kind of satire. The rapid whirl of change transformed the world and this whirl, a short but explosive era of transition, became the focus of Hašek's attention, particularly the change as reflected in the consciousness of the Czech people whom he knew so intimately.

That Hašek managed to contribute to Czech literature

—and possibly even to world literature²²—an original type of literary character, an "idiot of genius" ("geniální idiot"),²³ was noted by Ivan Olbracht. This character's popularity and influence "spilled over" into real life, giving birth to the sociological phenomenon "Švejkism" (švejkovina), a term which refers to the peculiar ability of the Czechs to sabotage an authoritarian regime by imitating Švejk (as they were said to be doing during World War II, under the German Protectorate). The contemporary "work-to-rule" campaigns of the labour movement are extensions of the "Švejkism" concept. In order to do a good job, everyone has to do a little more than the rule requires. The system breaks down when the rule is followed to the letter.²⁴

At first glance, Hašek's work seems so removed from that of Musil and Kafka²⁵ that there seems to be no reason to introduce these names into this discussion. However, one view holds that there is a basis for comparison, namely, their modernism. This view is supported by growing efforts to place The Good Soldier among the isms which originated after the war: dadaism, futurism, and expressionism.²⁶ Moreover, the Hašek-Kafka parallel is not only "external," Bohumil Doležal tells us,²⁷ it is "internal," if only on the basis of imperfections.²⁸ Radko Pytlík goes even further and places Hašek's novel among the works of what he calls the "literature of the critical disillusionment": T. S. Eliot's The Wasteland and Joyce's Ulysses, works which, Pytlík stresses, were published almost simultaneously with Hašek's.²⁹

In an earlier work, Pytlík also refers to Karl Kraus's Last Days of Mankind as the only work that comes close to Hašek in its encyclopaedic satire of ignorance, petit-bourgeois stupidity, false "heroic" megalomania, and the monarchy before its collapse. Despite the brilliance of this work, Pytlík informs us, it is dry, monotonous and dull.³⁰ And finally, Hašek's "black humour," his tendency toward grotesque caricature, evokes connection with Alfred Jarry and his Ubu.³¹

It is hardly surprising, then, that a number of critics take the grotesque picture that Hašek paints, along with the "black humour" and cynicism that is a part of it, and make it a point of departure for a negative evaluation of the novel. The great Czech critic Arne Novák has left us an unflattering characterization of Švejk:

Amidst crowded scenes of popular and sharp, although crude, caricatures one observes a truthful albeit sorry type of clown and coward, idiot and glutton, cynic and babbler, who quite obstinately and successfully rejects not only war, but also the state, manly valour, heroism, and patriotism.³²

Novák noticed Švejk's cunning and gave credit to the touch of genius visible in this work, yet could not but give a negative appraisal of the ideology inherent in the novel. He pointed out that the main character represents the lumpen-proletariat, conceding that he also personifies the "passive resistance of the people, and corporeal health threatened by world madness."³³ The main fault of the work, Novák believed, is that the novel is a "true statement of a sorrowful period,

biased for Sancho Panzas who rebel against and abandon the idealistic Don Quixotes."³⁴

Novák's criticism has been superseded by another view that glorifies Hašek as a satirist who strove for an objective criticism of various unnatural aspects of the social life of the time.³⁵ In this later period of criticism, the question of cynicism is skirted. But years had to elapse after the appearance of the novel before critics of the post-war period recognized The Good Soldier Švejk as a work that had appeared ahead of its time, as M. Jankovič said,³⁶ "not because of its theme, which was topical and immediately understood, but because of its conception and manner of expression, which elevated a novel about the breakdown of the Austrian army into a picture of the transition between two epochs."³⁷ That this view is by no means automatically accepted can be seen in René Wellek's Essays on Czech Literature,³⁸ in which he supports Novák's conclusions:

The book is not much of a work of art, as it is full of low humour and cheap propaganda; but the type of the foolish, smiling, cowardly Czech Sancho Panza who goes unscathed through the military machine of the Empire is difficult to forget, however unheroic and uninspiring he may be.³⁹

Wellek also points out that it is a "grotesque picture"⁴⁰ painted by a "cynical Hašek."⁴¹

I believe that the study of modern satire through the medium of Hašek's novel can be further advanced if undertaken on the basis of Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of carnivalized literature as set forth in his Problems of Dostoevsky's

Poetics.⁴² Bakhtin's theory centres on the serio-comic genres to which satire (menippea, or menippean satire) clearly belongs. Bakhtin distinguishes three characteristics common to all serio-comic genres. First, their starting point for understanding reality is the present: an object of serious presentation is represented without any epic or tragic distance. Second, the serio-comic genres are not based on legend but are consciously based on experience. Legend is to be criticized, unmasked, robbed of its mystery and sanctity. Third, within a single work there may be both a variety of and deliberate discordance of genres: a mixture of high and low, of the serious and the comic. The writer may use introductory genres: letters, manuscripts, parodistic quotations. He may employ slang and dialect. The represented work (izobrazhennoe slovo) appears alongside the representational word (izobrazhayushchee slovo), signalling a new attitude to the word as the material of literature.⁴³

Another important aspect of Bakhtin's theory that applies to Hašek's novel is carnivalization. By carnivalization, Bakhtin means the adoption, by a literary genre or by an individual work, of the essential categories or attitudes of the carnival: free, familiar contact, the carnival *mésalliances*, profanation, making light of symbols of authority.⁴⁴ While carnivalization may be a general characteristic of modern satire, different satirists "carnivalize" to different degrees. Hašek's and Bulgakov's novels fit Bakhtin's

criteria for carnivalized literature while, for example, Orwell's 1984 does not.

Indeed, Bakhtin's theory accounts for almost every aspect of Hašek's complex, if careless, novel. Hašek's satire is definitely rooted in the post-war period during which he wrote the novel. The specific events and institutions that he satirizes (particularly the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and its bulwarks) may have already been consigned to history, but Hašek's perceptions of what he considered to be distortions of the past are products of the modern consciousness. Consequently, Bakhtin's first criterion—that the present be the starting point of understanding reality—is fulfilled by Hašek in that he writes about an issue that had already been practically resolved (the monarchy was abolished, together with the entire Empire) but that still dominated the consciousness of a world unprepared for events as shattering as the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was for its subjects.

Another of the requirements of Bakhtin's theory—that the serio-comic genre be based on experience—is fulfilled by Hasek's almost documentary description of the Austrian war effort, his portrayal of the morale of the soldiers, and the folksy, often true-to-life portraits of individual soldiers, whom Hasek often placed directly into his novel without bothering to disguise their identity.

His satire demolishes legend, that is, the official picture of events, by exposing the corruption, the deliberate

deception, and other sins which he, rightly or wrongly, ascribed to the Monarchy that exhibited them so blatantly in the war.

Thirdly, we find in the novel an amazing variety, a mixture of high and low, as well as the use of introductory genres: letters (a number of them, written by soldiers and a general to their respective wives), documents, military orders, manuscripts, parodied quotations (for example, the conversation between a dying soldier and Marshal Radecký that appeared in a 1915 calendar, and which is parodied on pages 448-450). Hašek's use of dialect and slang expressions also fits into the framework of Bakhtin's theory.

With respect to carnivalization, Hašek seems to have done everything that the genre requires. Profanation is achieved by his venomous attacks on the Catholic Church. His translator, Cecil Parrott, remarks in his introduction that these attacks on the Church and on religion are so numerous that the reader "soon becomes surfeited, if not nauseated" (p. xvii). As is only natural in satire, authority is denigrated, but the anarchic and nihilistic attitudes soon become obvious and the indiscriminate ridicule of authority has the unfortunate end effect (as Novák's and Wellek's criticism suggests) of undercutting the point and validity of particular criticism.

Carnival *mésalliances* are constantly created in the novel by Švejk's almost miraculous propensity for chattering with soldiers, chaplains, officers, and generals alike,

often in circumstances in which the latter are clearly at a disadvantage.

The most typical features of the carnival—the light-headed comedy, the all-pervading humour, the unrivalled laughter—are also the most characteristic traits of Hašek's novel. In fact, the success of his satire arises from the enormous success of his humour. One is tempted to say that he is a better humorist than satirist. He is clearly the most humorous of the modern satirists discussed in this work, but his humour is employed in the service of satire. And it is his humour, his often playful⁴⁵ interest in the narration, that helps him bridge the many gaps created by his inconsistencies.⁴⁶

As we see, Bakhtin's theory can provide a systematic perspective for Hašek's satire. However, to discover how Hašek's satire works, one has to examine his satiric technique, his humour, and its employment in the service of the satire, as well as to explain the role of the "black humour," the cynical and grotesque comedy in this satire.

Apart from the situational humour presented, for example, in the episode of Švejk's anabasis in the České Budějovice region, and the humour that results from his sabotage or overfulfillment of orders, the biggest single medium of humour in the novel is the great number of stories (nearly two hundred) told by Švejk, and other characters, to various audiences.

While these stories have an "anecdotal construction"⁴⁷

(E. Frynta believes they exemplify the pub story, die Gasthausgeschichte⁴⁸), they differ from an anecdote proper since, unlike the anecdote, they are not exhausted by relating a simple plot, free of digressions and directed toward a comical point;⁴⁹ it is precisely the digressions, comical contrasts, unexpected reversals, "free" play of the imagination, word association, the "avalanche of comical contrasts and reversals,"⁵⁰ that are so typical of Hašek's story.

The stories told by Švejk and other characters are of a great variety. For example, in order to relieve the guilty conscience of Chaplain Otto Katz (who plays the part of a "lovable rogue"), an inveterate drunk who lost his batman Švejk in a card game, Švejk tells a story about a card game in a pub (pp. 158-161). In this story, a tinsmith by the name of Vejvoda has an endless streak of luck which attains absurd proportions and ends only after the players owe Vejvoda millions and the police break up the game. The humour of this story is of the "absurd" variety. Its function is to serve as a counterpoint to the chaplain's losing streak, which Švejk tries to mitigate. It is also an example of supplying a story for the occasion, a proof of the admirable associative quality of Švejk's mind.

Another example of gratuitous humour is the story of Švejk's expertise in the dog-selling business, recounted by him to Lieutenant Lukáš (pp. 173-175). And yet even here we can read the story as a gentle satire on aristocracy, the hereditary nobility:

There are really very few dogs existing which could say of themselves: "I'm a thoroughbred." Either its mamma forgot herself with some frightful monstrosity, or its granny did, or else it's had several papas and inherited a bit from each. From one its ears, from another its tail, from another again the tufts on its snout, from a third its muzzle, from a fourth its hobbling legs and from a fifth its size. And if it had had twelve such papas, you can imagine, sir, what such a dog looks like (p. 173).⁵¹

The use of the absurd and grotesque is also apparent in the description of the end of detective Bretschneider. Ordered to familiarize himself with Švejk so that he can break down Švejk's defences and find proof of his treasonable activity, Bretschneider is obliged to buy dogs from him:

Švejk diverted the deftest political conversations to the curing of distemper in puppies and the most cunningly prepared traps always ended in Bretschneider bringing back another unbelievable mongrel monster.

And that was the end of the famous detective Bretschneider. When he had seven monsters of this kind in his flat, he shut himself up with them in the back room and starved them so long that they finally gobbled him up (p. 54).⁵²

The detective Bretschneider is a character so dehumanized as to remind one of the negative characters to be found in fairy tales: he is the wicked witch who always meets a grotesque end. The absurdity of the demise of the otherwise cunning detective exemplifies the shadowy side of Hašek's humour. Here the humour is part of the satire of political persecution in which policemen of Bretschneider's type were active.

Hašek's use of authorial comment to satirize contemporary practices is evident in a passage where Lieutenant

Dub sees Švejk explaining something to a group of soldiers. The subject of the discourse is a number of abandoned chamberpots. This junkheap leads Hašek to a brief meditation upon the practice of archeology:

And under the embankment there was indeed lying provocatively a rusty chamberpot of beaten enamel among chips and fragments of other pots. All these articles, which were no longer suitable for domestic use, had been stacked up here by the station master as material for discussion for archeologists in future ages who, when they discover this settlement, will be quite crazy about it and children in the schools will be taught about the age of enamel chamberpots (p. 601).⁵³

The black humour, or gallows humour, of the novel is often apparent in Švejk's comparisons and illustrations:

It's just the same thing as the medico Houbička always used to say, that when you cut someone up in the pathological institute it comes to the same thing whether he hanged or poisoned himself (p. 605).⁵⁴

But in order to see how Hašek develops Švejk's pub story style, and how the humour and satire work in it, one has to consider the context from which a story appears, and see the story in its entirety. A group of soldiers is discussing the topic: "It's not allowed, but it can be done," and the result is a story exemplifying an outwitting situation (a familiar pattern of many folk tales, a pattern found also in Decamerone). Švejk usually starts to weave his tales when inspired by a particular topic suggested during the course of a conversation:

Or consider another case which happened in our street five or six years ago. A man called Mr Karlík was living on the first floor. One storey above there lived a good man called Mikeš who was a student at the conservatoire. He was very fond of

women and among others began to run after the daughter of Mr Karlík, who had a carrier's business and a confectionery shop as well as a bookbinding firm under a completely different name somewhere in Moravia. When Mr Karlík learnt that the student was running after his daughter he went to see him in his flat and said to him: "You're not going to marry my daughter, you gutter-snipe. I shan't give her to you!" "All right," Mr Mikeš replied, "if I can't marry her what do you expect me to do? Do you expect me to break myself in half?" Two months later Mr Karlík called on him again and brought his wife with him. They both said to him with one accord: "You bastard, you've robbed our daughter of her honour." "Of course I have," he answered them. "I've taken the liberty of making a whore of her, madam." Then Mr Karlík started shouting at him quite gratuitously that he'd told him that he must not marry her and that he wouldn't give her to him, but Mr Mikeš answered quite correctly that he was not going to marry her and that at that time they had never discussed what he could do with her. There had been no bargaining about that. He would keep his word and they shouldn't worry as he wouldn't marry her. He was a man of character and not a straw in the wind. He would keep his word because when he said something it was sacred. And if he were persecuted for it it wouldn't matter to him because he had a clean conscience. His late mamma on her very deathbed had asked him to swear that he would never tell a lie in his life, and he had given her his hand of honour in promise and an oath like that was a valid one. In his family no one at all had told lies, and at school he had always had the best marks for moral conduct. And so you can see from that that lots of things aren't allowed but yet can be done, and that "though our ways may be different, let our endeavours be the same" (pp. 611-612).⁵⁵

Švejk's story begins with the mention of locale. The stories are usually set in a pub which Švejk has frequented, but in this case the location is the street where he lived. Then comes the presentation of two characters whose verbal exchange forms the entire story. The story is close to an anecdote, a modern counterpart of the fabliau told in prose. Where it starts to differ from the common anecdote is in the

excessive description of Mr Karlík's activities. Here we see almost protocolar attention paid to the three businesses of Mr Karlík. Is the fact that Mr Karlík's bookbinding firm in Moravia is registered "under a completely different name" important? What does it contribute? It establishes Mr Karlík as a man of means, of better than middle-class status. The fact that his firm in Moravia is registered under a different name indicates an amount of business acumen that immediately calls forth an image of a cunning businessman, a no-nonsense man who should be a more than adequate match for his opponent, Mr Mikeš. The sparse characterization of Mr Mikeš, who is presented simply as a "good man" and a woman-loving conservatory student, puts him clearly in the underdog position even before the verbal exchange starts. This is an important point in the overall narrative strategy of this typical Hašek story. Hašek usually makes a feint similar to this in order to achieve a more powerful climax with his delayed punch line.

The punch line arrives in a perfectly polite and elegant sentence addressed to Mr Karlík's wife. Both the formal politeness of the address (as opposed to its content), and the fact that it is addressed to a lady, increase the shock value of the statement: "I've taken the liberty of making a whore of her, madam."

After this climax, when the reader knows that it is unlikely that Mr Mikeš would marry a whore, the purpose and consequently the tone of the story change. Here we meet with

Hašek's innovation, a shift from the emphasis on the action of the story (the verbal exchange) to the emphasis on Mikeš's glibness and its exploitation for the sheer fun of word-play. In this connection, Milan Jankovič writes about the "parodistic shift from the narration of an event to the play with the narration";⁵⁶ and Bakhtin's note about the represented and the representational word⁵⁷ characterizes this technique as well.

The value of this technique is that it is really the medium for a more sophisticated type of humour (more sophisticated than the scatological or the black humour which appear alongside it, producing "cheap" laughter). We can start charting this playful humour from the time Mr Mikeš turns from admitting the violation of Mr Karlík's daughter to insistence on the impeccability of his credentials as an honorable person. This in itself is an enormous leap and, as stated, commands very little logic of its own. It is entirely to Hašek's credit that he could equip the fictional Mr Mikeš with the verbal means to bridge the chasm with some semblance of logic.

Mr Mikeš never argues that he would marry or wants to marry Miss Karlík. Since, according to both men, the act of "making a whore of her" does not constitute marriage, the student is innocent, as "they never discussed what he could do with her." Consequently, Mr Mikeš has kept his word and, having said this, he sets out to prove that he is "a man of character" as is indeed his family's tradition. His word is

"sacred," he has a "clean conscience," and he has always had "the best marks for moral conduct." Hašek's great coup here is that Mr Mikeš fights with his opponent's weapons, so to speak. For the student's playfully cynical harangue is a parody of a typical businessman's argument about an oral contract. It is just too bad, Mr Karlík failed to specify...

Švejk's story ends with: "though our ways may be different, let our endeavours be the same." The statement (a call for national unity) comes from Jan Kollár's The Daughter of Slava (Slávy dcera, 1821-1824), a great poem of the nineteenth-century cultural and national revival, and its appearance here is another example of the playfulness of Hašek's humour. It is a satiric jab at contemporary attempts to create a "Pantheon" of national heroes. In 1921-1923, when The Good Soldier was first published, the foundations of the first Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1938) were shaky. A national identity was being created, national heroes were sought. Jan Kollár was one of those heroes. To make fun of Kollár by letting Švejk quote from his major work shows Hašek's considerable detachment from the nationalist aspirations of his contemporaries.

We can gain an insight into the overall plan of Hašek's novel by knowing how a typical story works, by knowing its internal complications (a tension between the the story and its representation), and by seeing how it relates at the same time to one of the main satiric themes of the novel.

The satiric plan of the novel follows the same pattern that we find in each individual story or episode. Each episode illustrates a particular idea, sometimes an absurd one, sometimes an incongruous one. Each episode in its turn adds its weight to the variety of illustrations aimed at exposing the wrongs of monarchy as a social organization, of the Austrian war effort, of corruption and human greed in general. There is a hierarchy of ideas that corresponds to a hierarchy of satiric targets. In an episode like the one above, Mr Karlík represents a disgruntled parent first, and a man of means representing a particular class second. But in the overall satiric plan, the same episode represents a battle of wits between the anarchist student and the bourgeois Mr Karlík (that is, a surrogate class-warfare). As the effect of the episodes accumulates, the reader switches from one plane to another.

We have seen that it is difficult to divorce Hašek's humour from his satire. Even when we find examples of gratuitous humour, humour that at first glance seems devoid of satiric intent, it is almost always possible to see them as integral to the satiric plan. What follows is an example of a passage that at first glance seems to have no purpose beyond its own internal comedy. Švejk is a batman assigned to Lieutenant Lukáš. Another batman, Mikulášek, is with him when Lukáš staggers in drunk. Mikulášek is paralyzed with fright and does not answer Lukáš's queries, whereupon Lukáš orders Švejk to load and hand him a revolver so that he can

shoot Mikulášek down from the table where he remains frozen, contrary to military regulations. Because Švejk has to save Mikulášek's life, he acts:

Humbly report, sir, we haven't got any cartridges and it'll be difficult to shoot him down from the table. May I be permitted to add, sir, that he is Mikulášek, Major Wenzl's batman. He always loses the power of speech when he sees one of the officer gentlemen. He's too shy to speak. I tell you, the thing's a complete milksop and it's still wet behind the ears. Major Wenzl always leaves it standing in the corridor, when he goes anywhere in the town, and it always moons about miserably from batman to batman in the barracks. You could understand it if it had some reason to be startled, but really, you know, it hasn't done any mischief at all (p. 354).⁵⁸

What is happening here? After Švejk introduces Mikulášek, there is a sudden shocking change of pronoun from "he" to "it." Mikulášek is dehumanized in order to solicit compassion from the drunken Lukáš. The passage is a triumph of humoristic invention. In Czech, the "milksop" Mikulášek is "mláďe," which could be better rendered in English as the "puppy" Mikulášek, in view of the description that follows. Švejk's expertise in the dog business, and Lukáš's demonstrated fondness for pets, strengthen the preference for "puppy." To reconstruct Švejk's reasoning: Lukáš is fond of pets, especially of dogs. He might shoot a paralyzed Mikulášek, but he would not harm a puppy dog. The comedy is heightened by the reader's knowledge that Lukáš still considers Švejk an idiot. The fact that Mikulášek is present and helpless to object to Švejk's disparaging remarks about him adds an extra edge to this already sharp comedy.

The situation is ludicrous. Lukáš is drunk, Mikulášek is paralyzed, and Švejk is saving the day by means of his superb wit, which probably goes over the head of the drunken Lukáš. So this would seem to be a purely humorous incident. Yet, in it Hašek introduces the plight of the army batman (p. 162), explains how miserable he is, how he is mistreated by his officer. Mikulášek will seem less funny and more pitiable if we see him also as a victim and an instrument of Major Wenzl's corruption: Wenzl sends Mikulášek for supplies that belong to the military hospital; the Major keeps the supplies for himself.

Švejk's dehumanization of Mikulášek is also a mark of contempt, a sign of Švejk's displeasure with the soldier who acts as an accomplice in his officer's thievery. So the neuter pronoun "it" comes from one who is conscious of his superiority. In this light, the dehumanization of Mikulášek is both a positive and a negative feature: positive in the sense that it saves Mikulášek from Lukáš's drunken anger, and negative in that it is a sign of true contempt. Švejk excludes Mikulášek from membership in the human family: "You're a fart," he tells him, "sit on the doorstep and wait until your Major Wenzl comes" (p. 354).

Here, too, we see how Hašek employs humour in the service of satire. In the second half of the novel, Švejk is aided by Marek, a former student of Classics, a character whom most critics consider to be the spokesman for Hašek. Marek and Švejk get along very well, having first met in

prison. They collaborate in ridiculing the corporal who escorts them in the prison car on the train; they focus on the corporal's ignorance, as in the following example of humorous improvisation, in which they make fun of his ignorance of geography:

"Well, then, look at the map," the volunteer [Marek] put in. "There really does exist a land of our most gracious monarch, the Emperor Franz Joseph. According to the Statistics the only thing on it is ice which is exported from it on ice-breakers belonging to the Prague ice works. This ice industry is highly prized by foreigners, because it is a profitable, if dangerous, enterprise. The greatest danger occurs during the transport of the ice from Emperor Franz-Joseph-Land across the polar circle. Can you imagine it? . . . This one and only Austrian colony can supply the whole of Europe with ice and it is an outstanding national economic asset. Colonization is proceeding slowly of course, because colonists partly don't volunteer and partly get frozen to death. None the less, with the help of an adjustment of the climatic conditions, in which the Ministries of Trade and Foreign Affairs have a great interest, there is hope that the great areas of the icebergs will be appropriately exploited. By building several hotels heaps of tourists will be attracted. It will of course be necessary to lay out tourist paths and roads between the ice floes and to paint tourist signs on the icebergs. The only difficulty are the Eskimos, who make the work of our local authorities impossible. . . . The bastards won't learn German" (p. 313)⁵⁹

We are told that the corporal is an ignorant peasant who wants to make the army his career. He is no match for Marek and Švejk. Such expressions as "national economic asset" and "adjustment of the climatic conditions" are beyond him and he fails to see how nonsensical they are. This also makes the humour of the passage a little less powerful than it would have been were the corporal slightly more intelligent. But the value of this passage lies in its lightness,

the free rein of the comic imagination and invention that usually occurs only in an improvised, spontaneous situation. Here, intact, is preserved the flavour of such an improvisation. The technique involves the presentation of a completely nonsensical idea (the importation, by the Prague ice works, of ice from the polar regions) and its interpolation with legitimate expressions that pertain to the matter under discussion (trade, economics, tourism), in order to give it a semblance of rationality and legitimacy. The effectiveness of this technique depends, of course, on the subject's dependability as a dupe who accepts this pseudo-discourse. For the corporal is an easy prey: his gullible nature propels Marek and Švejk further into the Absurd, testing the corporal's seemingly bottomless ignorance:

"The Ministry of Education, corporal, built a school for them [Eskimos] at great expense and sacrifice. Five of the builders froze to death..."
 "The bricklayers survived," Švejk interrupted him, "because they kept themselves warm with the pipes they lit." "Not all of them," said the volunteer. "Two of them unfortunately forgot to puff and their pipes went out" (p. 314).⁶⁰

Marek and Švejk play with the corporal and both seem to compete to make the joke ever more elaborate. The corporal swallows even Marek's assertion that it may be necessary to send an army to restore order among the Eskimos who are resisting with the help of "tame polar bears."

Yet this humorous conversation satirizes the self-aggrandizement of the Austrian monarchy. The passage parodies the power of the Monarchy, its military might, by

exaggerating it into a caricature. Similarly, some characters who are little more than caricatures become surrogates for larger targets: the latrinengeneral (pp. 533-538) personifies the alleged senility of the Emperor himself and the anachronistic nature of the Austrian monarchy, just as Chaplain Otto Katz represents the alleged hypocrisy and meaninglessness of the Church, and so on. That exaggeration by caricature is central to Hašek's technique of characterization is demonstrated by the fact that most of the characters are little more than caricatures (Lieutenant Dub, Chaplain Otto Katz, General Fink von Finkenstein, detective Bretschneider). This caricature status is shared by other characters in the novel, even the characters otherwise treated with a modicum of sympathy (Lieutenant Lukáš, the sapper Vodička, the batman Baloun, and even the volunteer Marek and Švejk himself).

The humorous stories, those that ensure the lasting popularity of The Good Soldier, are in fact no less satiric than those in which the satire is more overt. Hašek's satiric intent is most clearly visible in his authorial comments in which, instead of comedy, he often gives us realistic descriptions of cruel incidents just slightly tinged with irony:

A little further away a Hungarian gendarme was amusing himself with a priest. He had tied his left foot with a cord, held the cord in his hand and forced him with his rifle butt to dance a csardas. Then he tugged at the cord, held the cord so that the priest fell on his nose, and as the priest had his arms tied behind his back he could

not get up but made desperate attempts to turn on his back, perhaps to be able to raise himself from the ground. The gendarme laughed so heartily at this that tears ran from his eyes, and when the priest tried to get up he gave another tug at the cord and the priest was on his nose again (p. 573).⁶¹

This account of human cruelty on a small scale is combined with horrifying descriptions of the destructive force of war on an enormous scale. For war savagely attacks and mutilates nature itself:

On the way to Medzilaborce the whole valley was furrowed and the earth piled up as though armies of giant moles had been working there. The road behind the river was dug up and destroyed, and alongside it could be seen the vast trampled expanses left by the armies which had rolled over them.

Storm and rain had uncovered the torn shreds of Austrian uniforms lying on the edge of the shell craters.

Behind Nová Čabyna entangled in the branches of an old burnt-out pine there was hanging the boot of an Austrian infantryman with a piece of shin-bone (p. 592).⁶²

Švejk's frolicking and the obvious humour of the novel are interrupted by such passage as the above, although rarely. But it is enough to remind us of the author's attitude, of his satiric concern that underlines the novel as a whole. Despite the openly satiric passages, most of the satire is indirect, that is, arrived at through skillful manipulation of the main character who slowly, through stories often unrelated to the topic of anti-militarist satire, makes the entire Austrian war effort laughable. But it is precisely here, in Hašek's attempt at indirection, that one can observe an intentional ambiguity which, far from being a failure, enhances the value of the novel by pulling it away from

straightforward preaching, didacticism, and dogmatism. This ambiguity is often noticeable in Hašek's black humour, and it gives rise to speculation about his cynicism, his nihilism and anarchism. How to see this ambiguity from the perspective of satire?

Hašek's sympathies seem to fluctuate in the course of a single passage. It is this phenomenon that needs to be explained on the basis of his anti-militarist satire. The following is an example of this type of ambiguity:

When I was in the army half of a company of us were sometimes locked up together. And how many innocent people used to be condemned! And not only in the army but in the civil courts too. I remember once a woman was sentenced for strangling her newly-born twins. Although she swore an oath that she couldn't have strangled twins, when she'd given birth to only one little girl, which she had succeeded in strangling quite painlessly, she was sentenced for double murder all the same. Or that innocent gypsy in Záběhlíce, who broke into a greengrocer's shop on Christmas Day in the night. He swore that he'd gone there to get warm, but it didn't help. Once it gets into the hands of courts it's bad (p. 18).⁶³

Where does the irony lie? As we read the passage we are sure that Švejk's exclamation: "And how many innocent people used to be condemned!" means what it says. All the indications so far tell us that we are dealing with a satiric novel, written "on behalf" of the many innocent people who used to be condemned. But the example that follows forces us to reevaluate an apparently literal statement and realize its ironic content, that is: Few innocent people used to be condemned! Yet such a statement runs contrary to the first principle of satire, which is that it is directed against

someone or something, and therefore is also written on behalf of someone or something. The unexpected irony forces us to forsake precisely those truly innocent people who are the basis, the positive principle, the "norm" of satire. So this passage interrupts the satiric flow of the novel by suspending what I call its positive principle. It is a brief interruption, but not the only one. Whatever the author's reason (and I have tried to advance one, namely the use of ambiguity as an antidote to preaching, didacticism, and dogmatism) for this interruption, its effect is to keep the reader in doubt, and this leads to an increased awareness of the use of irony: a boon for the reader of a satire.

But quite apart from these considerations, and also apart from the consideration of the fact that this ambiguity occurs very early in the novel—preparing the reader, so to speak, for a quite new, original experience—is the value of this passage as comedy. The punch line of the joke comes in the murderess's defence which is no defence at all: ". . . she'd given birth to only one little girl, which she had succeeded in strangling quite painlessly." This example of black humour, no doubt, is calculated to produce laughter. But the absence of sentiment (a necessary absence, to be sure, in black humour), and even more the fact that the victim referred to is a baby, a type of victim which in other contexts in the novel figures without ambiguity, could have led to the conclusion that cynicism is at work here. But we have to consider that we are still at the beginning of the

novel: the main character, Švejk, is just establishing himself as a raconteur whose output, rich and varied, will of necessity contain a number of stories and anecdotes of black or gallows humour.

Finally, the most misanthropic and nihilist statements come from the one-year volunteer Marek. It is he, and not Švejk, who is supposed (by the critics) to represent Hašek's views. This means that what Marek says is a standard, a norm (or close to it), according to which the reader should judge the satire. Does the text justify this view? And how does Marek's attitude fit this satire?

Marek is introduced as a chatterbox of the Sancho Panza type (incomparably more so than Švejk), who has the advantage of some education, as becomes immediately and painfully apparent in his use and choice of platitudes, maxims, and sententiae. Marek has been having a good time in the hospital as a malingerer, but he has become too bold and has spent much time outside, where he has accidentally found himself in trouble with an officer. As a result, he has been sent to prison, where he meets Švejk. He describes his encounter with the officer and its aftermath:

Then came that fatal mistake at night on the square beneath the archway, a mistake that clearly showed that no trees grow all the way up to heaven, old man. Pride goes before a fall. All flesh is grass and all the glory of man as the flower of grass. Icarus burned his wings. Man would like to be a giant—and he's nothing but a shit, old man. Don't trust to chance but pinch yourself morning and night to remind yourself that discretion is the better part of valour and that nothing's more harmful than excess. After debauches and orgies there always

follows the moral hangover. That's the law of nature, old man. . . . Carthage fell. Nineveh was reduced to ruins, old man, but thumbs up! Don't let anyone imagine that when they send me to the front I'll fire a single shot (p. 288).⁶⁴

The reference to the Requiem Mass ("All flesh is grass . . ."), the avalanche of platitudes, the many cultural echoes, are used to build a comical contrast of two kinds: "perennial" wisdom versus the vulgar, elementary and scatological (Icarus, man the giant—shit); and the formal language of the maxims versus the language of informal discourse (Carthage fell. Nineveh was reduced to ruins, old man, but thumbs up!). These contrasts, of course, are well within the general satiric plan of the novel, based as it is on the contrast of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the world of aristocracy and the generals, with Švejk, a commoner and a private in the Austrian army, with his stories from the world of lumpenproletariat. In his cell, the perennial wisdom quoted by Marek becomes, during the war that overturns established values, that overturns an established world, a reminder of the burnt-out cinders of a world of the irrevocable past. Marek is Hašek's disillusioned man, a character type that frequents the novels of the period after the Great War (like Céline's Ferdinand). As the world in Voltaire's Candide constantly refutes the views of Pangloss, the war in The Good Soldier constantly refutes the views of the world of aristocracy and generals in favour of the world of Švejks and Mareks.

In the conversation with the corporal (when Marek and

Švejk amuse themselves by baiting him), Marek attacks him several times with his cynical wit. Since the corporal is also a representative of the ignorant peasantry, Marek's sadistic wit takes on the proportions of an attack on humanity itself: it becomes, in a word, a misanthropic satire, out of proportion to the corporal's individual significance:

Nature has denied many breeds and families of animals any intelligence whatsoever. Have you ever heard talk of human stupidity? Wouldn't it have been better if you'd been born some other kind of mammal and not got the idiotic name of human being and corporal? It's a great mistake for you to think that you're the most perfect and most developed creature. If they take your stars away from you you're a mere cipher to be shot dead in any trench and on any front without anybody caring. If they give you another pip and make you into an animal that's called an "old sweat" it still won't be all right with you. Your mental horizon'll get still narrower and when somewhere on the front you lay down your culturally underdeveloped bones there won't be anyone in Europe to shed a tear for you.
 . . . You're a piece of defunct grey matter (p. 330).⁶⁵

In such a passage, the satire of a military machine served and run by people like the corporal gets out of hand to become, momentarily, a misanthropic satire. Then, what is under attack is not the war machine, nor the individual corporal (however deserving of censure), but man's place in nature, his legitimacy as master of the planet, even his raison d'être. For the moment we come close to what Jean Paul termed "satanic laughter,"⁶⁶ and Marek approaches the "satanic narrator" of Bonaventura's Night Watches (1804) who asks: "What the devil is this whole earth with its sentimental companion, the moon, good for except to be mocked?"⁶⁷

This belittling of man finds a particularly powerful expression in the final misanthropic outburst of Marek against the same corporal"

What are you really in comparison with the universe, when you consider that the nearest fixed star is 275,000 times farther away from this army train than the sun and its parallax can make one second of arc? If you were a fixed star in the universe you'd certainly be too minute for even the best astronomical instruments to identify. Your insignificance in the universe defies definition. For half a year you'd make in the sky a tiny arc, in a year a tiny ellipse which would be too small to be expressed in figures. Your parallax would defy measurement (pp. 337-338).⁶⁸

In this passage, by pointing out his insignificance in the universe, Marek successfully ridicules the petty attempt of the corporal to assert his importance. And he does so in a genuinely funny manner: by using the specialized terminology of astronomy, whereby he achieves a comical effect rather than that of general, "philosophical" contemplation of man's place in the universe. In Turgenev's Fathers and Sons (1861), the nihilist Bazarov also contemplates man's place in the universe:

While I think: here I lie under a haystack. . . . The tiny bit of space I occupy is so minute in comparison with the rest of the universe, where I am not and which is not concerned with me; and the period of time in which it is my lot to live is so infinitesimal compared with the eternity in which I have not been and shall not be... And yet here, in this atom which is myself, in this mathematical point, blood circulates, the brain operates and aspires to something too... What a monstrous business! What futility!⁶⁹

In this contemplation, the nihilist Bazarov also expresses the feelings of a disillusioned man, but we can note an

utter lack of humour if we compare it with Marek's speech. And yet they both manage to create, by their separate means, an expression of futility, monstrosity. Their conclusion is the same. It is the direct opposite of the expression of wonder which the same contemplation inspires in mystics; it is foreign even to a layman's contemplation on the same topic found, to mention only one example, in Marcus Aurelius's Meditations.

I mention the misanthropic element because in recent years the anti-militarist satires which follow Hašek have come increasingly under fire. These include Joseph Heller's Catch 22 (and its televised counterpart, M.A.S.H.). In Heller's work, its similarities to Hašek are striking. Heller admitted reading Hašek's work, and it is in the spirit of the novel, in its unbridled anarchism, in its inability to distinguish between right and wrong causes (a kind of ethical blindness), that Catch 22 surpasses The Good Soldier. An anonymous reviewer found this quality intolerable:

It follows a fashion in spitting indiscriminately at business and the professions, at respectability, at ideals, at all visible tokens of superiority. It is a levelling book in the worst sense, levelling everything and everyone downward. It is chilling to observe the compulsive love of destruction that has gone into this presumed protest against the destructiveness of war. The only surviving values are self-preservation, satisfaction of animal appetite, and a sentimental conception of "goodness of heart." The "sane" view is "live-and-let-live," as if it were as simple as that, and men had never died so that others might live.⁷⁰

The reviewer has something in common with Arne Novák, and most of the criticism aimed at Catch 22 would apply to

The Good Soldier as well, with this important distinction: the war depicted by Hašek was between two equally imperfect powers, while the war depicted by Heller (World War II) was between imperfect democracies and undisguised, total evil. Consequently, Catch 22 is even more anarchistic than The Good Soldier.⁷¹ After all, in his satire, Hašek never leaves us in doubt about his attitude; when his characters play a card game, he comments: "And while here they were smashing the king with the ace, far away at the front the kings were smashing each other with their serfs" (p. 463).⁷² On the other hand, Heller's characters live in a haze of ethical blindness that makes the world totally absurd: Hitler and the concentration camps remain outside the novel.

Can we, reversing our approach by looking at Hašek's misanthropy and cynicism (such as are communicated to us through his characters) from the point of view of Heller's novel, consider them modern? The example of Swift shows that misanthropy is not unique to modern satire. It would be perhaps more accurate to say that disillusionment (created as in Voltaire's Candide by the clash of the vulgarized philosophy of Leibnitz with the reality of, for example, the Lisbon earthquake; and in Grimmelshausen's Simplicius by the horror of the Thirty Years' War), which often breeds cynicism and misanthropy, results from the sudden transition, the "future shock" that occurs as a new age is thrust upon an unprepared humanity.

If Hašek's Good Soldier is in fact a seminal work in

the tradition of the anti-militarist satiric writing of Swift, Grimmelshausen, and Voltaire, how is this to be reconciled with the popular perception of Hašek's novel as a light, predominantly humorous novel?

There are, in fact, two types of satire running parallel to each other throughout the novel. One is the political satire aimed at the obvious targets of militarism, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, together with a number of secondary targets that are tied to the two primary ones (the satire of the Church as the crutch of the Monarchy, and the satire of the petit-bourgeois hypocrisy and convention expressed in the topos épater le bourgeois).

The second type is the satire of human nature (hence the cynicism and misanthropy). The second tends to undermine the effectiveness of the first, but both are necessary for the success of the novel. Without the satire of human nature the novel would be strictly political, too doctrinaire, and more tame (the black humour and the scatological humour would be absent). Without the political satire the novel would be an unimpressive compendium of beer-parlour humour and diatribes against human frailty.

These two types of satire issue from the purveyor of both: the good soldier Švejk, whose prototype appeared some ten years before the novel. He, then, is the unifying element of the novel. His essential importance makes him a natural target for speculation and leads to a temptation to view him as an enigma. The question arises: Who is Švejk?

In the epilogue to Part I, Hašek records his disappointment:

I do not know whether I shall succeed in achieving my purpose with this book. The fact that I have already heard one man swear at another and say "You're about as big an idiot as Švejk" does not prove that I have. But if the word 'Švejk' becomes a new choice specimen in the already florid garland of abuse I must be content with this enrichment of the Czech language (p. 216).⁷³

Švejk is defined by the characters from his own milieu. In contrast to the impulsive and truly explosive temperament of the sapper Vodička, Švejk appears to be thoughtful and calm. When faced with the cowardice of the batman Mikulášek, Švejk demonstrates his contempt for the cowardice. The batman Baloun's gluttony moves Švejk to attempt, unsuccessfully, a cure of the greedy Baloun. These and other characters who come from the same milieu act as reflectors who define Švejk. And the Švejk of the satiric masterpiece, thus defined, becomes possessed, if only indirectly and by implication, of certain values: his clowning begins to make sense; and he assumes a certain dignity. Yet it is essentially this dignity, his meaningfulness, and his complete sanity, that readers and critics often deny him. But as he, the supreme tool of Hašek's satire, slowly, incident by incident, story by story, destroys the satiric targets, his corrosive satiric force can never be denied.

And so, Hašek's unfinished masterpiece enters into the reader's consciousness through the medium of its main character, Švejk. For the anti-militarist nature of this

satirical novel also stems from the fact that Švejk is the antithesis of a military man; but this, as we have seen, does not limit the satire to ridicule of the military, because, perhaps, the underlying attitude, easily perceived, subordinates the horrors of war to the victorious cunning and folk wisdom of Švejk. The satire in its entirety, then, encompasses not only its anti-militarism but also the victory of the cunning and wisdom of Švejk over hypocrisy and convention, and also the attack on the imperfections of human nature. This blending of topical and traditional satire is an additional reason for the success of this lasting masterpiece.

CHAPTER III

MIKHAIL BULGAKOV'S THE MASTER AND MARGARITA:

METAPHYSICAL SATIRE

"Bulgakov became a satirist just at the time when real satire (satire that penetrates forbidden zones) became absolutely inconceivable."¹ These words, written by Bulgakov himself, do explain why it was impossible earlier to publish his masterpiece, The Master and Margarita.² But they do not tell us anything about the work itself. There is, however, a voluminous literature about Bulgakov and his work,³ and my contribution to this literature is this: The Master and Margarita is a satire, and as a satire it points to an aspect of Bulgakov which is still "undiscovered."

Fortunately, there is now a number of excellent studies that provide the much-needed commentary on the novel; of the many studies, I have decided to choose those that combine attempts at interpretation with efforts to identify the sources and the tradition of the novel. Consequently, this chapter will be concerned with the discussion of the tradition, the sources on which Bulgakov based his novel, and the themes and devices of his satire.

The works of Lakshin,⁴ Proffer,⁵ Jovanović,⁶ and Milne⁷ each make a number of discoveries and venture an interpretation. While finding Bulgakov contemplative, naive, and weak,⁸ Lakshin defends the author as a seeker after truth, a believer in the inexorable law of justice and progress whose "deity" is history.⁹ And while noticing a certain tendency to mysticism, Lakshin defends Bulgakov by saying that the novel is connected to religiousness and mysticism in the same sense as is Dante's The Divine Comedy

or Goethe's Faust. For Lakshin, there are only echoes of "eternal" topics known to the literatures and folklore of many countries.¹⁰ As for satire, he acknowledges the effort of A. Vulis,¹¹ who called the novel a menippean satire, after M. Bakhtin, but he rejected this effort as well as other labels by asking: "Does this help us in any way in understanding the book itself?"¹² I will, of course, argue that it does. But the main value of Lakshin's study, to my mind, is that it suggests the avenues of approach by pointing out parallels with native and foreign literary traditions. He mentions Dostoevsky¹³ (the devil of Ivan Karamazov) and Chekhov¹⁴ (the story "Student"), and mainly the rich Faust tradition: that is, not only Goethe's Faust, but the "Faust-books" of Spies (1587) and others, suggesting the merging of Mephistopheles and Faust in the character of Woland.¹⁵ I understand that Lakshin is defending Bulgakov from the attacks of some more dogmatic critics¹⁶ and wants to make him "legitimate"; therefore, he says that the main idea of the novel is "the judgement of history," "the irony of history,"¹⁷ which he connects to the idea of relentless progress for the better. In this way he presents to us a Bulgakov stripped of religion and mysticism, a Bulgakov with an awareness of the doctrine of historical materialism.

Ellendea Proffer identifies the Master with Bulgakov,¹⁸ but her main concern is with the composition of the novel. She tells us how the two narratives (the Jerusalem and the Moscow narrative) fit together, demonstrating this with

examples of thematic and formal parallels.¹⁹ She considers the novel unusual not only in the context of the Soviet literature of the time, but in general: "It is like a technicolor extravaganza in the time of black and white."²⁰ Although at one time she considered the novel as a satire in the earlier work,²¹ following Vulis, Bakhtin, and Frye, she now rejects this view. The novel, then, is a meeting place of all "Bulgakov's themes and talents."²² The realistic and lyrical author, the gay and mocking feuilletonist, the satirist, the fantasist, and the tragedian all meet in the person of the author of The Master and Margarita.²³

The most thorough and the most impressive work to appear so far is, without doubt, Milivoje Jovanović's Utopija Mihaila Bulgakova. His thesis is that Bulgakov's novel further develops ideas and themes found in his earlier works (starting with White Guard, 1925).²⁴ Furthermore, it connects these literary themes and philosophical ideas to the heritage of Gogol, and argues that Bulgakov joins his philosophical critique of everyday life with the existentialist philosophy exemplified by Kierkegaard.²⁵ He applies to the novel the concept of the novel of secrets elaborated by Viktor Shklovsky²⁶ and known to Bulgakov.²⁷ Jovanović is particularly interested in the "demonological line"²⁸ and therefore in the genealogy of Woland,²⁹ in connection with whom he mentions Eblis (or "Iblîs," Koran, XV, 33-40) and Hermes.³⁰ Though Hermes, together with Plato's "wise demon," is mentioned in passing as Woland's ancestor, the choice of

Hermes is perhaps of crucial importance: both "Hermetism" and "hermeneutics" are derived from the name³¹ and, therefore, it would be more fitting to speak about Hermetism than "religion and mysticism and freemasonry" since freemasonry still suggests Royal Art, a hermetic term.³² But more importantly, the concept of Hermetism makes sense of the (so far) puzzling ambiguity of Woland and his suite, their dual (positive-negative) character, and the hermetic cosmology explains with its concept of the "intermediary world"³³ the conclusion of the novel: the ascent of the Master and Margarita to a Limbo (in fact the description posits a kind of lower extreme of the Empyrean, the "area" of "peace") through dalliance with Satan, with whom they part in the same intermediary region (the grotesque demons being changed into "archetypes"). It was, of course, tempting to call this satire "hermetic," but "metaphysical"³⁴ better describes the work in its entirety.

While Lakshin mentions freemasonry as a possible source for some particulars relating to the Master, Jovanović supplies a whole bibliography of masonic literature.³⁵ He also properly situates Bulgakov among Pilnyak and Platonov, and provides (among countless other insights and informative items too numerous to mention) two further concepts helpful to our understanding of the novel: the concept of poetic justice³⁶ and Pushkin's concept of "secret freedom." After examining world literature for likely examples of the different kinds of poetic justice, Jovanović follows the

"Shakespearean" branch to Russia, namely to Dostoevsky who, together with Pushkin, forms the model for twentieth-century Russian literature. Bulgakov, then, follows the tradition of Pushkin and his concept of "secret freedom" expressed in one of his later poems: Iz Pindemonti (1836).³⁷ In it, Pushkin rejects "freedom" in the political sense: "I need another, better freedom:/ Whether to depend on the Tsar, or on the people/ Is it not all the same to us? Good riddance to both";³⁸ one is responsible first and foremost to oneself. Blok, Mandelstam, and Pasternak all follow this tradition of Pushkin. To this is also connected the theme of the artist's mission, and the relationship of the artist to the world, formulated in the early Renaissance by Petrarch and Leonardo.³⁹ To sum up, Jovanović's work invested the study of Bulgakov's novel with the sophistication and awareness of complexity which previous research always suggested but rarely answered in a convincing or informed manner.

The approach of Lesley Milne differs from Jovanović's in that Milne believes that the "combination of the sacred-sublime with the carnival-profane has its roots deep in the folk traditions and can be examined on a philosophical and anthropological plane."⁴⁰ Consequently, Milne's work is based on Mikhail Bakhtin's Rabelais and His World, concluding that the novel is a "comedy of spiritual victory over the material world and death."⁴¹ Like many other critics, Milne notices the contradictory nature of the novel: "the novel does not cohere intellectually, yet works aesthetically in a

most complete and satisfying way."⁴² To resolve this contradiction, and at the same time to supply an explanation for the "novel within a novel," Milne points to the concept of figura introduced by Erich Auerbach,⁴³ a concept used in antiquity for interpretation of a distant event by means of a new one and vice versa (the interpretation by the New Testament of events recorded in the Old Testament). For figural interpretation

. . . establishes a connection between two events or persons in such a way that the first signifies not only itself but also the second, while the second involves or fulfills the first. The two poles of a figure are separated in time, but both, being real events or persons, are within temporality. They are both contained in the slowing stream which is historical life, and only the comprehension, the intellectus spiritualis, of their interdependence is a spiritual act.⁴⁴

Accordingly, Milne notes parallels between the events and characters in Jerusalem and Moscow. The conversation about the existence of God among Woland and Berlioz and Bezdomny (Ch. 1) has a parallel in the conversation between Pilate and Yeshua (Ch. 2).⁴⁵ These conversations, according to Milne, parody the law of "the Negation of the Negation" (the previous state is simultaneously negated and preserved), known as one of the fundamentals of Marxist "dialectical materialism."⁴⁶ Another example of a figura is the connection between the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Eve, Satan's Ball, and the events of the 1930s in Russia (themselves described as a sort of "Witches' Sabbath").⁴⁷ To sum up, Milne's figural interpretation establishes a vertical

connection through all three planes of the novel: the historical, the contemporary, and the fantastic.⁴⁸ And in doing so, it is evidently helpful for the consideration of the satire. It is, however, less helpful in making the connections between the various characters. The Master, for example, is connected to Yeshua,⁴⁹ but also to Pilate,⁵⁰ and even to Woland.⁵¹ Milne resolves the contradiction by listing the Master, Woland, and Bezdomny as "aspects of the one creative personality."⁵² Taking a cue from Makarovskaya and Zhuk,⁵³ Milne calls Woland a satirist, "the sardonic Prince of Satirists," noting the traditional nature of this identification (quoting Jean Paul who called the devil "the greatest humourist and whimsical man").⁵⁴ Speaking about "poetic justice," Milne—unlike Jovanović—refers only to the folk- and fairy-tales, while, at the same time, making a distinction between "retributive justice" (Woland) and "redemptive justice" (Yeshua).⁵⁵ Finally, Milne argues with Lakshin, who called the conclusion of the novel "purely illusory."⁵⁶ My own argument has to start with this point.

Lakshin's labelling of the resolution as "purely illusory" is an attempt to ignore an integral part of the novel that is, in the words of Milne, "so fundamentally anti-materialistic."⁵⁷ And, I would like to add, so fundamentally satirical. For we are presented with a choice: either we are dealing with a satire in which, by definition, something is criticized (the author takes a definite position) and we can identify the satiric targets, or we are not dealing with

a satire, in which case many incidents will not make any sense whatsoever. When Lakshin says that the resolution is "purely illusory," he is either unable or unwilling to make sense of a crucial part of the novel. It is not that the existence of satire in the novel is denied;⁵⁸ rather, the richness of the novel encourages interpretations that, obviously, may profitably view the novel in ways in which satire is assigned a rather lowly position, with consequent distortions. For example, commenting on a satirical incident in which Woland, the Prince of Darkness, tempts the Muscovite women with fashionable clothing and perfumes which, to the horror of the ladies, disappear and leave them naked, Nadezhda Mandelstam says:

It was not very clever of Bulgakov to make fun of the poor women in the days of NEP rushing to get new clothes because they were tired of going around in old castoffs, or in outlandish dresses made out of a pair of father's trousers. Of course they were sick to death of poverty . . .⁵⁹

Nadezhda Mandelstam knows whereof she speaks and there could be no better witness to the times but, like many other commentators, she chooses to speak of the satire of "byt"—of everyday life, the quotidian satire—which quite rightly makes Bulgakov open to a charge of cruelty. But what if his design was grander? What if, as Jovanovič has shown, his design concerns a philosophical criticism of everyday life on a much higher level: that is, his prime concern is not those gullible but excusable ladies, but ideas—ideas about the nature of progress, the revolutionary process, even the

Great Evolution?⁶⁰

Accepting the latter view, we see a satirist that differs markedly from his fellow satirists, notably Il'f and Petrov;⁶¹ Val Bolen tells us that "it may be reasonably assumed that Bulgakov intends The Master and Margarita to be a polemic sequel to Il'f and Petrov's satires . . . showing the error of their optimistic prognosis for the Soviet State."⁶² Even so, in his critical attitude Bulgakov was not alone: Zamyatin, Pilnyak, Platonov, and Zoshchenko all produced very critical and often unorthodox satires, but the combination of Hermetism and satire, fantasy, philosophy, and history is entirely his own. While Soviet satire can be characterized in general as attacking "the survival of the old (bourgeois) mentality," Bulgakov's satire attacks the new Soviet mentality (or, in other words, puts in doubt its celebrated "newness").

If the unorthodox nature of Bulgakov's satire is responsible, on one hand, for a certain reluctance on the part of scholars to analyze it in depth, it is also, on the other hand, responsible for another extreme: the willingness to uncover hidden meanings through "cryptography."⁶³ This approach is taken by Elena N. Mahlow⁶⁴ who considers the novel as an allegory:⁶⁵

Beneath the surface story of The Master and Margarita and "Pontius Pilate" (structurally, a novel-within-the-novel) lie subcontexts constructed by means of stylistic devices. . . . Taken together, all characters and images constitute a code, which, once it is deciphered, reveals the meaning of the novel.⁶⁶

The results of this attempt at deciphering are the following substitutions: Pilate represents the dictatorship of the proletariat, Yeshua is the proletariat, Caesar is Stalin, Caiaphas is the Communist Party,⁶⁷ while the Master is the Russian intelligentsia of the spiritual and idealistic current of thought, and Margarita is Russia whose cultural and spiritual roots are in the pre-Revolutionary past.⁶⁸ Such an interpretation points beyond the novel to a peculiar rehearsal of recent Russian history. Consequently, if we were to accept the allegory, we would lose more than we would gain, since this "subcontext" and the new "meaning" of the novel can hardly be considered an improvement over the more literal reading of the novel. My objection to Mahlow's approach is very simple: if one can find satire in the "surface story," why plunge into "subcontexts"? But a more serious objection could be made too: by deciphering the novel in terms of recent Russian history, Mahlow also narrows down the applicability of Bulgakov's "message." What could be of universal validity is turn into a limited, local validity: the result is an impoverishment.

It is clear that if the novel claims universal validity or, more modestly, validity outside the boundaries of the USSR (a question of relevance), some distinction will have to be drawn among the kinds of satire; consequently, some will be relevant, some will not. This, in turn, suggests a division into main groups of satiric targets that comprise the individual satiric incidents depicted in the

novel. Hence, starting with the satire of everyday life, the following targets are satirized: the housing crisis, the queues, the lack of essential goods, the general ignorance, the cheap, popular entertainment (Variety Theatre), the medical profession (Dr Kuzmin), the bureaucracy (an empty suit continues to produce documents), the weaknesses of human nature, and the "poshlost",⁶⁹ which could, perhaps, be characterized as banality with the capacity to plumb metaphysical lows. Next, a more ominous group: the satire of the police regime: the often mystifying mass arrests of the 1930s (the "disappearances"), the confinements in the insane asylum (of the Master, the poet Bezdomny, and the chairman of the house committee Bosoy), the exploits of the police in its behaviour toward suspects, and its modus operandi in general. A group quite apart from these is the satire of the literary establishment: MASSOLIT (the writers' professional organization—in fact the writers' only employer), Griboyedov House (the location of the same organization—representing Herzen House), the way literary activities are conducted (the pressure of Berlioz on Bezdomny, the gossip, the corrupting atmosphere of MASSOLIT), the prosperity of the talentless (partly Bezdomny, wholly Ryukhin, Bogokhulsky, and others), the failure of the talented (the destruction of the Master by the cabal of the critics Latunsky, Lavrovich, and Ariman). A more general target, the relationship between the artist and the state is also suggested by this list. And, finally, a group of

targets responsible for attributing to the novel terms like "philosophical," "mystical," "religious," "hermetic," and others: metaphysical satire: the achievements of the Revolution, the New Man, the Great Evolution, the materialism ("spiritual man confronts materialist man").⁷⁰ It is understood that the last group subsumes the other groups, since there is a hierarchy of principles and the higher ones—of an all-embracing philosophical (or metaphysical) nature—include, as illustrations or otherwise, the lower. That this list does not exhaust all the targets is understandable, but it is a fair sample of the main groups of the satiric targets and incidents illustrating them. Biblical, legendary, and historical personages and the "Moscow of today," together with a rich throng of characters, and a completely improbable turn of events—such is the stuff of the novel.

But for all the "newness" or, in other words, the "unexpected" quality of the novel, some of the most important devices as well as the premises from which the satiric attacks are launched are not quite so new, specifically because they can be found in the earlier work of Bulgakov.⁷¹ Therefore, my examination of the devices of Bulgakov's satire will start with a brief mention of some earlier works, which—with the notable exception of Jovanović—are generally neglected.

The notion of opposition or contrast is essential to satire, since the satirist is formulating his work in opposition to ideas or phenomena. In The Master and Margarita,

we can find oppositions or contrasts on several levels. "The devil in Moscow," if such is a description of the novel on the most superficial level, exemplifies this contrast, this opposition: an "unreal" character in a real city; a Biblical character in a historical setting; a timeless being confronting the temporal (mortal, decaying creation); a personification of the concept of Evil confronting an evil with an ideology of its own that, like a cancerous growth, threatens to displace the original or traditional Evil personified by Woland. Other contrasts are between Woland (in Moscow) and Yeshua (in Jerusalem), that is, Moscow and Jerusalem; and between the fantastic occurrence as the result of supernatural tampering (diabolus ex machina) and the fantastic occurrence as a fact of everyday life in Moscow of the 1930s. On both a smaller and a larger scale there is, then, on several levels, the notion of contrast as perhaps the dominant vehicle of satire or, if speaking about devices, as a contrasting device. On one hand, then, there is the "known" and the "real," and on the other, a mixture of Biblical, legendary, literary, and historical characters that can be disguised, though equipped with some feature that acts as a reference or an allusion (for example, Koroviev-Fagot's checked pants taken from Ivan Karamazov's devil, Frieda recognized as Goethe's Gretchen). Already in "The Adventures of Chichikov" (1925), Bulgakov uses the same device when he lets a crowd of literary characters invade Soviet Russia:

A bizarre dream... It was as if a joker-satan had opened the doors to the kingdom of shades—over the entrance to which an inextinguishable lamp inscribed "Dead Souls" flickers. The kingdom of the dead started to stir, and an endless line filed out of it...

And the whole band headed into Soviet Rus, and then astonishing events occurred there.⁷²

Although this exploit is organized by a "joker-satan," he does not take an active part. The curious mating of the bureaucratic and the infernal (a bureaucrat is seen as an infernal being) appears in "Diaboliad" (1925).⁷³ But it is White Guard (published in part in 1925) that helps us to explain some puzzling features of The Master and Margarita. There is the contrast between the peacefulness of Kiev before it is ravaged by the pilfering bands of various armies and the threat that, like a snowstorm, will inevitably obliterate the peacefulness in order to transform it. This inevitability is expressed by references to the stars: Mars acting as a dominant symbol of Divine wrath (the red planet prefigures the red legions: the fusion of the blood and the flag, and so on). But not only this contrast seeks our attention. The painfully naturalistic description of a slippery, overcrowded mortuary (where one can see the model for Hella in a beautiful female corpse⁷⁴) is contrasted with the clear miracle of Alexey Turbin miraculously healed by the prayer of his sister, a prayer which is witnessed by the apparition of Christ. Then, too, the nobility and traditional heroism of Nay-Turs—who, saving an inexperienced corps of fresh student recruits, dies in a hail of bullets—is set

against the "poshlost'" of Tal'berg, Vasilisa (clearly a prototype of Bosoy), and Skoropadsky. But the wistful and at times even nostalgic evocation of the "old times," the peacefulness and comfort symbolized by the green lamp, the stove, and the library of the professor of theology, and the sudden, unlikely identification with the Tsar, all point toward a peculiar resolution. According to Bulgakov, it is the inevitability of the doom, coupled with its acceptance in the spirit of reconciliation.

The effort to see everyday events in terms of literature (literary events) leads to formulation of the connection between the negative aspects of reality and the infernal. The fictional reality is then made up from the "opaque" material of everyday reality (satiric targets) and the "literary" material (the Biblical, the legendary, the historical, and the literary) which, in relation to the "opaque" material is transparent in the manner of a symbol, or a figure. On the other hand, the satiric target can be disguised, but still recognizable (Griboedov House—Herzen House). The satire moves through a series of exposés, discoveries, "unveilings" (for example, "Who is Woland?" "Is Christ a legendary character?" "Can human nature be rationally engineered?") and pseudo-exposés ("Black Magic Revealed"—when Bengalsky anticipates seeing how the magic works and becomes one of its victims instead). Here the notions of the "novel of secrets" as formulated by Shklovsky are very helpful.

According to Shklovsky, it is characteristic of the type of secret that it is akin to the device of inversion, that is, transposition.⁷⁵ There is a "comparison, the displacement of one element (object) by another."⁷⁶ The ways in which inversion works in this novel are often quite complex. There is the parallel, the figural relationship between Moscow and Jerusalem. Seen from the point of view of Moscow, the happenings in Jerusalem are expected to be "less real," "fabled," "legendary." Moscow, at the same time, is the intimately-known city that is made real by the narrator's familiar tone that suggests or takes for granted our acquaintanceship (however passing or superficial) with the city. Nevertheless, this natural expectation of the reader is frustrated by the change of focus introduced by Woland. The Moscow-Jerusalem axis is on a collision course with the Woland-Moscow axis. For Woland challenges not only Moscow as such, but Moscow as a New Jerusalem (Moscow is also known as a "Third Rome"), suggesting a third relationship: New Jerusalem-Jerusalem. After all, for a great number of people, Moscow in the 'thirties was the New Jerusalem, the functioning Utopia, Paradise. The implications of the devil in Moscow are therefore more far-reaching than those of the devil in London or Paris or New York. When the Prince of Darkness collides with Moscow (we get a foretaste of this collision in the first chapter when Woland engages Berlioz and Bezdomny in conversation) he unmaskes the apparent Jerusalem as a sham. Needless to say, the exposé continues

even when Woland is absent. Woland is also a bridge that connects the Jerusalem and Moscow narratives, that binds many distinct elements as well as characters together: this is his structural role, closely aligned to his thematic and philosophical (or metaphysical) roles. Woland—enigmatic character that he is—points to the parallel between Moscow and Jerusalem, a parallel that is yet another enigma. It is at the same time a device that Shklovsky calls "parallels as a secret": "the device of several simultaneous actions of which the relationship is not indicated by the author at once."⁷⁷ The many disparate lines of development are resolved in the conclusion. As a satirical device, Woland provides a fresh point of reference for comparison with the earthly government of Russia in the period of the novel (written between 1928 and 1940).⁷⁸ Judging from the accounts of the period by Robert Conquest,⁷⁹ Hannah Arendt,⁸⁰ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn,⁸¹ and Nadezhda Mandelstam,⁸² Bulgakov's devil appears to be rather timid and humane. For Sinyavsky, he is in some respects a positive character: "People became devils, and the chief devil became a Maecenas."⁸³ He is a tool, a device of satire, not its target, despite the persistent identifications with Stalin (mentioned also by Sinyavsky: Moscow theosophists considered Stalin to be an incarnation of Manu, the Great Teacher of India).⁸⁴ In accordance with the thought expressed in the motto of the novel taken from Goethe's Faust ("Say at last who art thou?"/ "That Power I serve/ Which wills forever evil/ Yet does

forever good."⁸⁵), the devil manages to wreak havoc in the service of good instead of evil, thereby serving the ultimate power. Thus, we sense the ironic tension between the explicit and the implicit: the apparently evil, the supernatural and fantastic, which in reality serves the good, is set against the mundane, everyday reality, which is far more disturbing than anything in the realm of the supernatural, precisely because it is the work of human power. And from this tension, sustained throughout the novel, emerges its satire.

If from the point of view of satire it is possible to see the role of Woland in Moscow for what it is, how can we account for the "historical" narrative of events in Jerusalem, a narrative which we also learn from Woland (Chapter 2)? Stenbock-Fermor asks too: "Why did Bulgakov use for his satire of Russian society after twenty years of Communist rule elements from the events described in the Gospels and elements from Goethe's tragedy, together with the popular legends which gave birth to it?"⁸⁶ It is, she explains, because the novel about Pontius Pilate⁸⁷ is the raison d'être of the book.⁸⁸ And while she admits that "cowardice" ("cowardice as one of the worst human sins"—p. 322) does not appear in the New Testament, it is present there implicitly, she says.⁸⁹ By talking about cowardice and conscience, "Bulgakov managed to write his novel without speaking of Communism as an idea or a political principle."⁹⁰

The importance of Pontius Pilate is also stressed by

the anonymous author of "The Execution of Pontius Pilate: On M. Bulgakov's Novel The Master and Margarita,"⁹¹ who thinks that Pilate is the main character of the novel.⁹² Deeming it necessary to "decipher" the novel, the author of the article gives us his "structural analysis."⁹³ He suggests the scheme of a cross: the upper and lower poles of the vertical axis are occupied by Christ and the devil, respectively. On the right side of the horizontal axis is the Master; on the left the little, or petty, demons (ordinary people in spiritual darkness). The centre of this cross is occupied by Pilate: "The story of Pilate means more than the other, concrete narrative."⁹⁴

Pilate personifies the conflict between cowardice (the worst sin) and conscience. As to the tremendous importance of cowardice in particular, we can turn to White Guard, in which the cowards Tal'berg, Vasilisa, and Skoropadsky are singled out for special treatment. In addition, Bulgakov's play Flight (1928) includes a character who acts the role of a personified conscience. The sick General Roman Khludov orders the execution of the soldier Krapilin, an orderly, who returns to haunt him as an apparition seen only by Khludov, who is a prefiguration of Pilate. Like Pilate, he is sick: "I'm sick, I'm sick. Only I don't know what it is."⁹⁵ Consequently, Pilate combines the cowardice with the pangs of conscience that appeared, separately, in Bulgakov's earlier works. From the point of view of satire, the significance of Pilate lies in the emphasis on conscience;

Pilate is a device that exposes the underhanded manner in which the problem of conscience was treated by the official ideology.

Not only conscience, but also the religiousness one can find in Bulgakov's other work, as well as in the novel under consideration, is often mentioned by the critics without, however, any indication as to how this "religious element," so readily recognized, influences the satire. Since the time of Aristophanes and the Greek parodistic theatre, Western literature abounds in examples of the trivialization of the supernatural, but it also includes works in which religion, and even mysticism, combine with satire. After all, The Golden Ass of Apuleius works on this principle with great success. Religion and satire, then, do not exclude each other.

Where do we find religion in Bulgakov's novel? Not only in the Jerusalem narrative adapted from the Gospels, but in the religious apologetics of the first three chapters. Bulgakov is here defending religion as such; he is not advancing any specific kind of religion. He defends the religious view of the universe. After all, he once referred to himself as a "mystical writer."⁹⁶ This would explain the satirical incidents like, for example, the "punishment" of the poet Rusakov (White Guard), who composes a blasphemous poem and is thereupon stricken by syphilis (poetic justice again). Rusakov makes amends by becoming a religious fanatic who interprets the world in apocalyptic terms (he sees

Trotsky as Abaddon). The writer Bogokhul'sky (bogokhul'-stvo—blasphemy) is also probably guilty of the same sin (the use of a name as a satiric device is common in Russian literature, and Gogol, Bulgakov's favourite writer was especially adept in the art of choosing appropriate names for his gallery of rogues). Also, the critic Ariman's name confirms him in his role as the servant of darkness, since Ariman (or Ahriman) is the Zoroastrian spirit of darkness and evil.

Another device is the use of reasoning: the argument that Woland has with the editor Berlioz and the poet Bezdomny, whose name is a parody on a famous pseudonym (Bezdomny itself is a pseudonym meaning "homeless" parodying the pseudonym Bedny—"poor," chosen by a revolutionary poet). The argument is a device by means of which Bulgakov questions the deterministic, materialistic, atheist perception of the world. Woland is overjoyed upon finding that the two Muscovites do not believe in God, but becomes furious when he finds out that they do not believe in the devil either. Then, in a paradox that opens the way for countless other paradoxes, Woland the devil acts as an advocate of Jesus when he assures the two men that Jesus is not a legendary character but a real one. But in addition to the two main physical locales that are introduced to us by means of the argument, and through the agency of Woland (Moscow and Jerusalem), there is a third, immaterial, purely spiritual land where, according to Edyth Haber, a "different level of reality is in force."⁹⁷ It is the beyond, the meeting-place of characters who could

withstand temptations, a place that raises doubts about the ultimate importance of reality, of events taking place in Jerusalem and Moscow. There, the "factual event as such is irrelevant; only movements of the spirit are important."⁹⁸ This world is also the reason for the great emphasis on conscience.

Woland's argument (continued when he exchanges words for action) suggests the basically twofold division: the philosophical and the practical. The practical is concerned with exposing the cheat, big and small; the philosophical, with attacking the ideas of the day and official dogmas as, for example, the dogma of the New Man. One of the tenets of this dogma is the belief that quantitative change⁹⁹ leads to qualitative change: that is, as the social system is changed, the quality, the moral nature of the human individual will undergo a change too. This belief is not limited to Bulgakov's period of history; it exists today under the name of Soviet Man. When Bulgakov satirizes this homo sovieticus, he shows that this creature is not superior to homo sapiens. Tongue in cheek, he ridicules the doctrine of Great Progress by showing how irrelevant it is to man, whom he defines as a creature of choice, who uses or misuses free will. And this definition applies to all his characters, whether they are in Jerusalem or Moscow. Changes in time or environment do not change man's moral nature. And different social systems have little effect when the time comes for an individual to make the crucial choice between good and evil. Inasmuch as

the ideas satirized here claim recognition and insofar as they achieve success, Bulgakov's satire will remain alive.

Turning now, for a while, to the practical level, we see that Bulgakov is also concerned with the methods used to enforce the aforementioned ideas or dogmas. And immediately we are confronted with another inversion: what to us would seem to be the weightiest reason for satire, and certainly the most important theme, the Great Terror, enters here only very inconspicuously, and through allusions such as the hint of some unaccountable fear that grips the Master and causes his breakdown, sending him finally to the insane asylum. Quite correctly, Lakshin distinguishes this fear from the cowardice of Pilate.¹⁰⁰ The device that Bulgakov uses in order to satirize the reign of terror is indirection.

In Chapter 7, entitled "The Haunted Apartment," there is an account of the daily occurrences in Bulgakov's Moscow—the sudden arrests, the "disappearance" of people. Of course, to call an arrest a "disappearance" is itself a macabre pun containing a charge of ironic understatement. But how do these "disappearances" occur? A policeman calls, and asks a person to accompany him to the police station "for a minute or two to sign a document" (p. 85). The person goes out, and vanishes forever. Sometimes the policeman vanishes too. Who is responsible? Answer: the apartment. And in the background there is the official madness: "elimination" and "liquidation"—pallid euphemisms for a bloody fate: a shot in the back of the head, or an even more

merciless death in the camps. But instead of blatant didactics, the author gives us wry humour. By alluding to tragedy with humour, he effectively underlines the horror. The apartment causes the disappearances, we are told. A policeman is making an arrest, but he is an unusually gentlemanly policeman. He wears white gloves (as if symbolizing innocence) and asks an unnamed lodger (unknown victim, a symbol of countless victims of the period) to come with him to the police station "for a minute or two to sign a document" (a transparent, classical device for making quiet arrests). Although the policeman and the man he arrested leave the apartment, the narrator quite absurdly continues to charge the apartment with causing the disappearances; the incongruity continues as more and more lodgers "disappear." The author comments: "Witchcraft once started, as we all know, is virtually unstoppable" (p. 86). To whom is this addressed? Are there any serious believers in witchcraft, a majority of readers even, as the statement suggests? Obviously not. I realize that this is a stable irony, but the attempt by the authorities to fight ideas with terror is surely, in its naivety and ignorance of history, akin to primitive magic: it is "witchcraft." And Bulgakov offers another four arrests, to create in the reader's mind a strong impression of the epidemic scale of the disappearance-arrests. We never learn the exact circumstances of these arrests, but we are told that they differ in each case. The gentlemanly policeman with white gloves does not reappear.

Solzhenitsyn says that arrests are "classified according to various criteria: nighttime and daytime; at home, at work, during a journey; first time arrests and repeats; individual and group arrests."¹⁰¹ Hence, it is clear that Bulgakov offers a fair sampling of various kinds of arrests. Moreover, the insistence on the guilt of the apartment, together with the volume and variety of arrests, emphasizes the irrationality of the terror. The narrator does not tell us whether or not the people who disappear are guilty. And, as the list of arrests grows larger, the deadening sense of irrationality grows too. Bulgakov presents each arrest as if it had no more meaning than points in a game, a cruel, vicious game.¹⁰²

When Woland makes the same apartment his residence, the putatively haunted apartment will become haunted in reality, and the Moscow police will be frustrated in their "heroic" attempts to catch Woland or anyone from his suite. But this duel of the police with Woland's suite is pure slapstick; it is also an example of poetic justice: what could be more pleasing than to see those Moscow stalwarts, responsible for the terror, so utterly helpless and frustrated?

For Bulgakov is not loth to add a touch of humour where another satirist might be content to leave only stark irony. This does not mean that there exists a sharply-defined dichotomy between humour as a sympathetic, convivial device, and irony as an antipathetic and alienating device.

Bulgakov alternates irony and humour, employing them more liberally in places where his narrative focuses on the targets of his satire, and more sparingly when he concentrates on advancing the story line.

The humour of his satire ranges from playfulness to grotesque, black comedy.¹⁰³ And so, in the satire of the housing problem, an incident occurs in which written pleas are submitted by hopeful applicants for the apartment:

They contained entreaties, threats, intrigue, denunciations, promises to redecorate the flat, remarks about overcrowding and the impossibility of sharing a flat with bandits. Among them was a description, shattering in its literary power, of the theft of some meat-balls from someone's jacket pocket in flat No. 31, two threats of suicide and one confession of secret pregnancy (p. 104).¹⁰⁴

The reader is bombarded with a variety of reasons that people use in their attempts to obtain the apartment: besides the threat of suicide, the secret pregnancy and the theft of meat-balls from a jacket pocket are the obviously grotesque ones.

While these desperate ploys might strike us as exaggerated in their grotesqueness, readers contemporary with Bulgakov would certainly have attached some verisimilitude to them. But in the world of fiction, particularly in the domain of satire, their value is transformed: the humorous and almost poetic catalogue of the methods of blackmail is an example of the satire of byt, of mundane reality. Yet the target is not only the deviousness of the people, but also the system that permits such a deplorable

state of affairs. For the decision to name the future tenant rests with Nikanor Ivanovich Bosoy, who gives the apartment to the highest bidder, as in an auction. Even in this example of the satire of byt, Bulgakov is more concerned with Nikanor Ivanovich than with the housing problem (the strongest statement, as we shall see, is made by Woland). What will Bosoy, nominally a homo sovieticus, do when offered a large sum of money by the "foreign consultant" Woland? What will Pontius Pilate do? What will the Master and Margarita do?

Thus, we are dealing with a many-layered satire, and these layers are related to the heart of the individual—the conscience, the repository of the decision-making "I". At this deepest level, we are dealing with metaphysical satire, not in the sense that concerns of this kind of satire are otherworldly, esoteric, and unrelated to physical life in the Soviet Russia of the period, but in the sense that these concerns are central, ultimate. There is nothing beyond them. Lakshin senses this when he tries to explain away the failings, the choice of evil, the disregard for conscience: "Once the faith in God, the Second Coming, the fear of punishment kept people from committing wrong acts. Freedom from restriction did not find everyone morally ready. 'If there is no God, everything is allowed,' the heroes of Dostoevsky thought."¹⁰⁵ An astonishing apology this, coming from a Soviet critic.

If we can be aware of the metaphysical character of

this satire when dealing with phantasmagoria in Moscow, the parallel narrative about Pontius Pilate presents the same issues to us in heightened form, and also provides this satire with a norm. Furthermore, it can be argued that the story of Pilate endows this novel with a certain timelessness, and provides an unlimited time-span for the eventual effect of the satire. One also has to turn to the Jerusalem section to examine more closely the satire of the New Man, since in the character of Yeshua Ha-Nozri we are shown that rare character, the perfect human being.

Compared to the most fantastic and unbelievable supernatural happenings caused by Woland and his suite, and the no less fantastic undercurrent of Soviet reality, the four chapters concerned with the Biblical history of the apprehension and execution of Jesus and the role of Pontius Pilate force a stark and sombre impression on the reader. This impression is reinforced by a different narrative style. The narrator, only too visible in the other parts of the novel, disappears in these chapters.¹⁰⁶ When he is present, he often changes personality: he is, in turn, friendly reporter, cranky storyteller, lyrical first-person narrator, honest narrator, funny narrator, and even an outsider.¹⁰⁷ As a result, the contrast between the two narratives is considerable. And while the Moscow section is written in a feuilletonistic style (administrative clichés, substandard or colloquial expressions, and detailed descriptions of humans) and a realistic-cinematic style (Margarita's flight,

the ball, the flight of the Master and Margarita to the other world), the Jerusalem section is distinguished by an exotic lexicon and rhetorically-balanced prose. Descriptions of sight and smell are more detailed and noticeable here.¹⁰⁸ So even on the formal level there is an inversion. What was considered purely legendary and fantastic in Bulgakov's Russia,¹⁰⁹ namely the existence of Jesus, is given a very realistic and psychological treatment. How do we account for this inversion?

Bulgakov sets himself an almost impossible task and performs it brilliantly: he introduces an ideal character who plays the role of the norm in the satiric plan of the novel. All the other characters will be measured by comparison with him. Of course, the enormous difficulty of succeeding with this character lies in the fact that he, as Jesus, is so universally known. And further, Yeshua Ha-Nozri (the name is helpful too) is brought into the narrative indirectly through Pilate. Our attention is preoccupied with Pilate when Yeshua, very unobtrusively, appears; he is not a miracle-working Jesus but, after all, the time of miracles is over and the time of trial is ahead. The reader is struck by Yeshua's tolerance and his humanity.¹¹⁰ How are we to understand the humbleness of Yeshua? asks Solzhenitsyn.¹¹¹ Is he a "Utopian philosopher,"¹¹² or "an innocent idealist . . . framed by Caiaphas"?¹¹³ Or is he, rather, the "ragged vagabond . . . weak, vulnerable, even mildly comic,"¹¹⁴ that E. Haber presents to us—only to say, on the

next page, that the seemingly weak Yeshua possesses a hidden power as well as "truly remarkable intuitive powers which allow him to perceive truth hidden from the ordinary eye"?¹¹⁵

Are his humanity and tolerance the product of an entirely human "wondering philosopher"? Is Yeshua nothing more than an ordinary human being possessed by an idea? Bulgakov's novel does not admit such a facile picture of Jesus. Pilate does everything to make Yeshua cooperate with him. Pilate even takes a liking to him (a marvel in itself), but Yeshua, quite unnaturally, and from a human point of view quite senselessly, makes his own execution necessary. Let us have a close look at Yeshua's humanity,¹¹⁶ since this is an important point: Yeshua is, after all, the positive standard and, as a literary character, an uncharacteristically perfect human being. He does not waver; he does not even utter a wrong word. And, in a novel where choicemaking is so important, so central, he makes only right choices.

When Pontius Pilate, known in Jerusalem as a "raving monster" (p. 25), is shown the prisoner Yeshua, he substantiates his reputation by having Yeshua flogged for calling him a "good man." When the interrogation is marred by Pilate's hemocrania and his thoughts about suicide, Yeshua reads his thoughts, and correctly points out to Pilate his isolation from his fellow human beings and the fact that he loves no one but his dog. He also predicts that the pain will stop.

Surely, mind-reading is not generally accepted as a

natural human characteristic, nor is the correct prediction about the cessation of pain. But stranger still is the attitude of Yeshua. He cuts the interrogation short by adopting a caring, almost parental attitude toward the man who a short while ago had him whipped and who would later order his execution. And he speaks with authority. A reader who peruses this section without questioning the humanity of Yeshua has failed to recognize an essential element of Bulgakov's satire. For Yeshua is an anchor; he secures as a unity the phantasmagoria of the whole novel. He is the ideal and, as such, he is miles apart from even the most accomplished characters in the Moscow section—the Master and Margarita.

Yeshua and the Master are given almost equal space and, as they are both martyrs, we can compare them and evaluate their achievements. Such comparison would see the Master fall behind, because there is not a speck of doubt about Yeshua's integrity; for his achievement, in human terms, is not natural: it is ideal. Can there be any doubt about this achievement in the light of what occurs during the interrogation? Pilate, the "raving monster," is quite helpless when Yeshua starts to lecture him, saying with a smile: "Your life is a cramped one, hegemon" (p. 31).¹¹⁷

My conclusion is that Bulgakov, in his borrowing of the Biblical story, has played a trick on his readers. Knowing the attitude of his contemporaries toward the miracle-working Jesus, he presents a Jesus who at first

sight seems a very common, ordinary-looking man. Purposely omitting scenes of Jesus working miracles amidst huge crowds, he shows us Jesus as a prisoner, a lonely man facing his imminent death in isolation. And his only disciple is shown as an unreliable witness. But through this lonely, supposedly ordinary man, Bulgakov smuggles into the novel, almost unrecognized, that greatest miracle—a perfect human being—and proceeds to juxtapose him with the New Man, homo sovieticus. When we realize this strategy, we can retrace the steps in our reading and see the device in its nakedness. The perfect human being is, by definition, divine.

Bulgakov, therefore, does not change the essence of the Biblical story. Instead, he adapts it for his own age, and specifically for his Soviet readers, who witnessed the de-sacralization of Jesus. But a word of caution is needed here: Bulgakov's Yeshua believes in the essential goodness of men, but in Bulgakov's time the believers in the New Man were taught that good and evil are not absolutes; they were conditioned by the belief that questions about good and evil were to be decided by the great leader either once and for all, or on a day-to-day basis. Most important, the problem was no longer their (the people's) problem, no longer their responsibility. These are some of the implications of the Jerusalem chapters of the novel. Although Pilate is won over, he is unable to save Yeshua's life because his cowardice holds him back. Trying to appease his conscience, he takes vengeance on Judas in a conspiratorial manner which,

itself, satirizes the high intrigue, the politically-motivated murder.

Within the satiric plan of the novel, the Jerusalem sections reinforce the satire found in the Moscow sections by providing a strong moral background, a norm: if Pilate's cowardice is not forgotten, if his choice has such importance, are the goings-on in Moscow to remain unpunished? The answer is "No," of course. We come, then, to the satiric tour de force, Chapter 12, entitled "Black Magic Revealed" (it contains the passage that occasioned Nadezhda Mandelstam's impassioned comment).

This is the unique episode in which the devil, as Woland, reveals himself personally to the Moscow public to test them by tempting them. At the same time, it is an opportunity for the satire of Progress, the achievements of the Revolution, the New Man, the housing crisis, the hypocrisy, the poshlost', and so on. Woland asks: "Do you find the people of Moscow much changed?" (p. 132).¹¹⁸ And again: "Have the Muscovites changed inwardly?" (p. 133).¹¹⁹ The Master of Ceremonies, Bengalsky (whose name suggests the falsity and theatricality of the Bengal light), understands what Woland is talking about before the public does. But when Faggot, a member of Woland's suite, produces "real" money as a part of the "black magic entertainment" and distributes it to the audience, the rational edifice crumbles and, in the unnatural atmosphere created by the magic, Bengalsky insists, despite evidence to the contrary, that

an illusion is taking place. The audience is angered, and when Faggot offers the people the power to punish Bengalsky, a stern voice says: "Cut off his head!" (p. 136).¹²⁰

Behemoth,¹²¹ a member of Woland's suite who appears in the form of a black cat, twists off Bengalsky's head. Seeing the blood, the audience screams. It is at this point that an utterly unlikely and wholly grotesque thing happens:

The head moaned desperately:

'Fetch a doctor!'

'Will you go on talking so much rubbish?' said Faggot threateningly to the weeping head.

'No, I promise I won't!' croaked the head (p. 136).¹²²

The devil's spell is suddenly broken by a shout of mercy from the audience which even Woland is powerless to withstand. Thereupon Woland reflects about the result of his test:

They're people like any others. They're over-fond of money, but then they always were... Humankind loves money, no matter if it's made of leather, paper, bronze or gold. They're thoughtless, of course . . . but then they feel compassion too. . . they're ordinary people, in fact they remind me very much of their predecessors, except that the housing shortage has soured them... (p. 137).¹²³

In these passages, the devil speaks directly or through his assistants to the Muscovites, who are nominally New Men. But the abyss that divides them from the paradigmatic new man, Yeshua, is enormous. It becomes evident in this key chapter that the performance of magic is a device that ridicules the reigning ideas (the Great Progress, the New Man); the poor women who rush to get the new clothing are not a target of the same importance.

In this episode the theatre is used as a microcosm of

sorts, representing Moscow and the entire Soviet Union. Bulgakov was deeply involved in the dramatic world, as an important playwright and as an assistant producer and literary advisor of the Moscow Art Theatre. But this theatre is an object of satire too (as it was in the unfinished Theatrical Novel). We see cheap, circus-like entertainment: the bombastic master of ceremonies, the acrobats, the clowns in the wings, and so on. The place reeks of poshlost'. Such vulgar entertainment is ideologically beyond suspicion and preferable to more dangerous, intellectual entertainment. At first glance, the theatre seems a location poorly suited for Woland's purpose, but the crux of the matter is that Woland—since he is, after all, in the working man's paradise—wants to face the New Men from amongst average men, working men. The cream of this new society is satirized in the Griboedov sections; suffice it to say that the materialistic heaven of Griboedov House, the retreat of writers, the "engineers of human souls," is depicted as a hell.

But still, how does the satire during Woland's performance proceed? The metaphysical satire is at first very subtle indeed. Woland appears to go along with the official picture of Soviet propaganda, which always takes great pride in showing off the development of heavy industry and housing construction, and which also generally measures progress in the quantitative terms of industrial production, of the GNP (and insofar as other societies do the same, they too are the targets of this satire). This official picture

is underlined, of course, by a belief that material and technological progress will produce the New Man. Bulgakov's satire, on the other hand, starts with the unstated assumption that human nature is an infinitely more complex thing.

Therefore, when Woland says: "The Muscovites have changed considerably... outwardly, I mean... as, too, has the city itself..." he still appears to conform to official belief, because, according to official dogma, any outward change is synonymous with an inner, or qualitative change. This is one of the reasons why the audience does not react immediately to Woland's speech and still assumes it to be a "prelude to some magic tricks" (p. 132). Only when Woland makes it clear that he is interested not so much in technological progress as in the inward change of Muscovites, does Bengalsky turn purple. Woland then tempts the audience with money, and they succumb to this ancient test, a figura of the Biblical temptation of the paradigmatic man. Unlike Him, the audience fails, and shows once for all the false claims of the Soviet ideology. Bengalsky, the Master of Ceremonies, is aware of the Emperor's nakedness, and makes a desperate attempt at a cover-up, significantly washing his hands (his habitual gesture) in the manner of Pilate, a feature that for the moment establishes a figural connection between Bengalsky and Pilate in their cowardice.¹²⁴ Because he refuses to accept the reality of what he sees in the theatre, he is literally and symbolically killed on stage. And a fellow New Man pronounces the sentence. This "killing" and

"resurrection" are a traditional feat of magic,¹²⁵ and the reason for the punishment, as in other cases, is the fact that Bengalsky is "damned."¹²⁶ Also, we can say that while Woland's magic works, Bengalsky's does not.

If we extend the line of "demonological" reasoning to that which the satirist opposes, we can talk about the duel of competing systems of magic or witchcraft. But can we speak of a duel of magicians? Who would be the leader of the establishment that Woland challenges? Perhaps Stalin, but he does not enter into consideration here; rather, I would like to mention the power that defeats evil of all kinds, and leads to the metaphysical resolution of the satire, namely, love.

There are three main kinds of love depicted in the novel.¹²⁷ Earthly, selfless love is illustrated by the relationship of the Master and Margarita.¹²⁸ In accordance with Russian literary tradition, Margarita is the stronger, more active character and, evidently, also a "liberated" character, to use more recent terminology. It is her plea that moves the Powers to grant both the Master and Margarita their coveted peace. Her plea also saves the damned Frieda. Margarita risks her soul in order to save other souls and thereby proves the saving quality of love. But she is no Beatrice, nor is she Goethe's "Eternal Feminine"¹²⁹ that could lead the Master into the higher "spheres of the immortal spirit."¹³⁰ Rather, she is the essential earthly woman whose unabashed sensuality and vivacity sharply

contrast with the aloofness of her passive Master. Her energetic qualities complement the Master's contemplative character: she is also his mystical twin whose arrival creates a superior "one body." Her activities remind some of de Coster's Tyl Uelenspiegel,¹³¹ and her vengeful, invisible cavortings, in particular, of H. G. Wells.¹³² But she will be remembered as the prime mover of the action in this novel, a feat achieved through her earthly, selfless love.

The second kind of love is illustrated by Pilate's love for Banga.¹³³ It is an earthly, but closed love. It is closed, and perhaps even selfish, because it is directed toward an animal. Pilate's aversion to roses (which symbolize love) indicates that this misdirection or avoidance of love is the consequence of his general distrust of people. By blocking the development of love, Pilate forfeits the chance to save Yeshua, since only love is powerful enough to overcome his cowardice.

Finally, there is the divine love of Yeshua. It is represented by his often misunderstood insistence on calling everyone a "good man." This is misunderstood by Lesley Milne, who characterizes Yeshua's philosophy as "anarchism" and interprets it in this way: "If people are evil it is because they have been made so by circumstance and not because they are so."¹³⁴ In other words, Milne sees Yeshua as a determinist. If circumstances are responsible for evil deeds, there is no place for conscience; and, as for Pilate's

(and the Muscovites') dilemmas, they would not exist! But if, as I believe, Yeshua's love represents agape, then his appeal to the "good man" is an appeal to man's conscience: to the good in man. Only then does the satire make sense.

Love does not only defeat evil: it is also the most important motivation of characters. Pilate's dilemma is the consequence of Yeshua's love. The Master's life is fulfilled when he meets Margarita; this in turn generates more action, and so on. Woland himself acts because of his love of power, that is, Satanic love symbolized by a "strange globe, lit from one side, which seemed almost alive" (p. 269).¹³⁵ The globe, a symbol of power and imperial dignity,¹³⁶ is "so cleverly made that the blue sea shimmered in waves and the polar cap was of real ice and snow" (p. 271).¹³⁷ As such, Satanic love is in a category of its own, because it is not an earthly love and also because it is a perversion of divine love. However, Woland is a tool of satire, not its target. He maintains his dignity to the very end, and his suite, transformed in the conclusion, also gains in stature by this transformation.

Let us turn now to the "purely illusory" conclusion. It too has some satiric significance. The location is the beyond: the fringe of the Empyrean, or Limbo, is suggested. The topography of this setting includes massive rocks that give way and clear the way for Pilate, who walks over to the "Heavenly Jerusalem" in order to join Yeshua. As for the Master and Margarita, there is a house, a Venetian window, a

climbing vine, parties, candlelight, and Schubert (pp. 402-403). This is peace, even as the Master desired. So on the one hand, the Master gains something that he desires ("to each his own"), but on the other hand, this in itself is a punishment: "peace," but not "light." Bulgakov connected "light" with the West and remarked, in a letter, on his inability to travel there.¹³⁸ The Master wished to travel, too: "I, for example, wanted to travel all over the world" (p. 161). In addition, the death of the Master and Margarita is also an implicit condemnation of the Soviet system, particularly if they choose to die for something illusory, as Lakshin has it, rather than to remain in their basement apartment.

A final question: Who is the Master? The novel is autobiographical in the higher sense of the word.¹³⁹ That would suggest that, even if the Master is not to be identified with the author completely, the character still communicates to us the essential Bulgakov. In what way? The Master is readily taken to symbolize the artist in distress, a topic that, for historical reasons, is increasingly important. But if he is the artist battling the state, then he is a very peculiar sort of artist. What kind of art is he engaged in? His "art" does not resemble even remotely anything produced by his supposed colleagues, members of MASSOLIT. His "novel" about Pontius Pilate has no chance of being published and, what is more remarkable still, it is understood that the novel is a precise recreation of a part

of history: that is, a supernatural feat! More than anything else, his art resembles the "work" of an alchemist, which would be in agreement with the metaphysical character of the novel; why else would Woland ask the Master: "Don't you want, like Faust, to sit over a retort...?" (p. 402).¹⁴⁰ After all, not every book causes a reaction in the heavens: Pilate is released from his torment on account of the Master's novel. Could it be that Bulgakov entertained thoughts about his novel similar to those of the Master? If so, we would also have, side-by-side with "poetic justice," the "poet's justice." The latter means that the poet will get what he deserves and so will his enemies. "Manuscripts do not burn" (p. 303),¹⁴¹ and neither did Bulgakov's celebrated novel. The critics it satirizes are easily recognizable as writers paid by Pravda and Komsomolskaya Pravda.¹⁴²

"Relationship to the literary tradition is bounded by two ideal concepts: the treasury (thesaurus) and the tabula rasa."¹⁴³ This statement by E. R. Curtius is applicable to Bulgakov because, by choosing the treasury, Bulgakov, in the words of Stenbock Fermor, "used all the devices of an old and still living literary genre to reach through satire of contemporary life into the sphere of eternal problems."¹⁴⁴ As a result, tradition is linked with satire and metaphysics. And, consequently, from the point of view of satire and metaphysics, the novel suggests a picture of the "undiscovered" Bulgakov, an author who differs from the general expectations. For he was not an enigma for all. Il'f said of him that "it

was pointless to expect revolutionary fervour from a man who still had difficulty in reconciling himself to the emancipation of the serfs in 1861."¹⁴⁵ And in his letter to the government, Bulgakov admits deep skepticism about such sacrosanct matters as the "revolutionary process," the "Great Evolution," and he vows "to battle censorship of any kind, under any government,"¹⁴⁶ asking, as well he might, "Am I conceivable in the USSR?"¹⁴⁷ Certainly, these remarks and admissions are fully in harmony with my interpretation of The Master and Margarita.

In conclusion, the import of Bulgakov's contribution to modern satire lies in his creation of a metaphysical satire. For he creates a peculiar world in which we recognize the world he knew so intimately: Soviet Russia, its society, and its institutions. He then imbues this world with theistic philosophy and peoples it with literary and legendary characters. Further, his satire blends fantasy, religious apologetics, philosophical arguments, a love story, and an adaptation of the Gospels in order to ridicule an ideology and an oppressive system the rigidity and terror of which it seeks to anathematize. And this metaphysical satire is, perhaps, Bulgakov's most valuable achievement.

CHAPTER IV

GEORGE ORWELL'S NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR:

ANTI-UTOPIAN SATIRE

In his "Introduction to 1984," Stephen Spender says that

Utopias, or counter-Utopias, are chimeras: made up of ideas drawn from many sources and put together in combinations that produce Yahoos, Man Friday, Musical Banks, Doublethink and Newspeak—to mention only a few.¹

George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949)² is such a chimera, classed, as it was, by Northrop Frye as a "utopian satire"³ together with Evgeny Zamyatin's We (1924) and Aldous Huxley's Brave New World (1932). The influence of the last two works on 1984 is the subject of a number of essays⁴ that trace (through Zamyatin's We) the origin of some ideas found in 1984 to Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor, to Shigalev of The Possessed, and to the narrator of Notes from Underground. Apart from this "Russian connection" there is, of course, a voluminous body of utopian and dystopian works in English literature and a still larger body of utopian writings in European literature. However, utopian satire, as Frye says, "is a product of a specifically modern fear, the Frankenstein myth of the enslavement of man by his own technology,"⁵ best exemplified by satires like We or Brave New World. These, together with 1984, attack the belief expressed in Edward Bellamy's words that "the Golden Age lies before us and not behind us, and is not far away."⁶ In contrast with this general agreement among the three works is the disagreement about the objective of Revolution (a fait accompli in the three novels). Here the modern writers take issue with the nineteenth-century visionaries. In the particularly rich

English tradition of utopian writing, William Morris's News from Nowhere (1890) sets out to "correct" Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward (1888). Both are hedonistic utopias, but Bellamy's Protestant ethic and his advocacy of industrialism are unacceptable to Morris, who substitutes for them a Ruskinian neo-medievalism, a vision of a pastoral future which appreciates Renaissance arts and crafts. "What is the object of Revolution?" asks a character in News from Nowhere:

Surely to make people happy. Revolution having brought its foredoomed change about, how can you prevent the counter-revolution from setting in except by making people happy?⁷

Morris envisions a kind of stasis that rests on the basis of happiness. The modern satirist acknowledges this final revolution, but asks probing questions about the nature of this stasis: questions such as, Is it happiness? Consequently, an opposition of freedom and happiness is formulated in the new anti-utopian works. Happiness is a priori excluded by the satirist, and acceptance is enforced by a lobotomy-like operation in We, conditioning and drugs in Brave New World, and terror in 1984. The buoyant spirit of News from Nowhere, and its enthusiasm, contrast with the bathos of Franz Kafka's Trial and In the Penal Colony.⁸ 1984, Chad Walsh suggests, is "something close to the composite dystopia. Most of the horrors that other books have predicted are here combined and synthesised into 100 per cent nightmare."⁹ Thus, Spender can say that "1984 is closer to Samuel Butler's Erewhon than to Kafka or Wells or Huxley,"¹⁰ while Wyndham Lewis says

that "1984 is Wellsian in form, Wellsian in the style of writing, Wellsian in the colourlessness and anonymity of personae."¹¹ Winston Smith, the protagonist of 1984, is described after his breakdown as dirty, stinking like a goat, recalling "Swift's description of the revolting Yahoos in Gulliver's Travels."¹² Nightmarish elements so pronounced in 1984 can nevertheless be found in Wells's The New Machiavelli, The Shape of Things to Come, When the Sleeper Wakes, and The Island of Dr. Moreau; "Orwell's work contains scarcely a topic related to politics and social systems which cannot be found in Wells's books," says William Steinhoff.¹³ Then, too, The Iron Heel of Jack London foreshadows the worship of power: "Power. Not God, not Mammon, but Power."¹⁴ The peculiarities of the seduction of Winston Smith for a fictitious conspiracy by an ambiguous double-agent appeared in G. K. Chesterton's The Man Who Was Thursday, a novel that also presents the division of the conspiratorial party into an inner and an out one, as does 1984. A further peculiarity of The Man Who Was Thursday is the appearance of the equation $2+2=4$ which haunts anti-utopian fiction from Dostoevsky to Orwell.¹⁵ Of an entirely different kind are books like Arthur Koestler's Darkness at Noon, and Boris Souvarine's Cauchemar en U.R.S.S., that describe contemporary events in Stalinist Russia by documenting the practice of the victorious revolutionaries (Koestler's work is a fictional account of the famous staged trials). Finally, Hilaire Belloc's The Servile State, and James Burnham's The Managerial Revolution,

The Machiavellians, and The Struggle for the World all share an anti-utopian view of the future based on the theoretical projection of present trends. Orwell knew and discussed these works and there is evidence of the deep impression they made on him.¹⁶ His Homage to Catalonia (1938) shows that he was intimately acquainted with the complexities of Communist methods during the Spanish Civil War. Consequently, the works which influenced him only provided documentation for his already experienced contact with the ideology and terror satirized in 1984. The full expression of his loathing of particularly Soviet revolution, however, is his Animal Farm (1945). In this Aesopian animal-fable satire Orwell tries to salvage the idea of socialism by destroying the "belief that Russia is a Socialist country and that every act of its rulers must be excused, if not imitated."¹⁷ He also sets out to destroy "the Soviet myth,"¹⁸ which he finds necessary for the "revival of the Socialist movement."¹⁹ Similarly, after the publication of 1984, he found it necessary to point out that his novel was "NOT intended as an attack on Socialism or on the British Labour Party," adding, "I do not believe that the kind of society I describe necessarily will arrive, but I believe (allowing of course for the fact that the book is a satire) that something resembling it could arrive."²⁰ Animal Farm—to a greater extent than 1984—depends on "outside knowledge"²¹ because it is "essentially allusive."²² Therefore, Zwerdling believes, "too many intelligent readers had failed to grasp

his didactic purpose."²³ And, one might add, his satire, which as a matter of course depends wholly on this "outside knowledge." As a result, a man innocent of this "outside knowledge" can, as Laurence Brander did,²⁴ paint a "charming but wholly inaccurate picture of Animal Farm,"²⁵ written by Orwell when "the gaiety in his nature had completely taken charge . . . writing about animals, whom he loved."²⁶ Naturally, the reader with knowledge of Soviet history will read the work as a satire; he will readily substitute the targets of satire for the animal characters (Major = Lenin, Napoleon = Stalin, Snowball = Trotsky). The degree of "transparency" will be proportionate to the degree of the reader's ability to recognize allusions. As Brander's case shows, nevertheless, this dependence on allusion does not disqualify Animal Farm as a work of literature for those who are unable to read it as a satire. The converse also seems to obtain, particularly for a serious utopia; as Northrop Frye said: "We may note that what is a serious utopia to its author, and to many of its readers, could be read as a satire by a reader whose emotional attitudes were different."²⁷ As an example, Frye offers Bellamy's Looking Backward. But the pattern starts in antiquity, when Plato's utopian ideas are satirized in dystopian reaction by Aristophanes in The Ecclesiazusae.²⁸

Despite the fact that 1984 depends less on the knowledge of particular historical events, the story of the critical reception of 1984 also documents a certain amount

of confusion. Is it because "1984 is Animal Farm writ large and in purely anthropomorphic terms"?²⁹ Harold Nicolson in a review written for The Observer noted the essential ambiguity of 1984, which could be "approached either as a novel embodying a political argument or as an indictment of materialism cast in fictional form."³⁰ Daniel Bell, in his review for the New Leader (1949) adds that Orwell, "actually, is not writing a tract on politics but a treatise on human nature,"³¹ and a "morality play which preaches the absolute truth that man is an end in himself."³² Finally, to give another example of views that identify 1984 as other than a political satire³³ or rather go beyond the commonplaces, Golo Mann's review of 1949 states: "it is not the kind of anti-Russian book of which we already have more than enough, but a conservative book."³⁴

The earlier critical interpretations of 1984 did not lack the knowledge that the novel satirizes the totalitarianism that appeared in Germany and the Soviet Union. But this seems insufficient to Gleb Struve:

For us, Russians, his supposed picture of the future reflects the Soviet reality in only a lightly distorted mirror. The American and English critics writing about Orwell's novel could not or did not want to understand this.³⁵

Not entirely fair, this view reflects the surprising likeness of the fictional society of Oceania to the Soviet reality, something that only those who knew it intimately could notice. Thus, Czeslaw Milosz wrote in The Captive Mind:

Even those who know Orwell only by hearsay are

amazed that a writer who never lived in Russia should have so keen a perception into its life. The fact that there are writers in the West who understand the functioning of the unusually constructed machine of which they themselves are a part astounds them and argues against the "stupidity" of the West.³⁶

The most recent trend in the interpretation of Orwell's work is to consider him as a religious writer or thinker. Alan Sandison's The Last Man in Europe: An Essay on George Orwell³⁷ treats Orwell as a thinker in the rich tradition of English Protestantism; this approach is not farfetched if one considers that Orwell himself thought his socialism very close to the "ethical, quasi-religious tradition, deriving ultimately from evangelical Protestantism."³⁸ More interesting from the point of view of satire is another book in this trend, Christopher Small's The Road to Miniluv: George Orwell, the State, and God.³⁹ Small tells us:

. . . it is impossible not to see 1984 as a religious parable, or rather as a monstrous parody of one. The Party is God, Big Brother the divine "embodiment" or incarnation. His tabernacle and dwelling-place is the Ministry of Love; his priests and messengers, the legions of his angels, are the agents of the Party, and the Thought Police, ubiquitous and all powerful; in himself, as his servant O'Brien teaches, he is immortal, all-seeing, all-knowing, and omnipotent. Through the device of "collective solipsism" he is literally able to do anything, with absolute power over "the laws of Nature." The Party can alter these "laws" at will, and perform the impossible: in such terms $2 + 2 = 5$ is simply the formula of a miracle.⁴⁰

However, Small is unable to say whether it is "a parody of religion in terms of the totalitarian State or of the State in terms of religion."⁴¹ An answer to this question asked in 1975 was provided in 1946, curiously enough, before the

publication of 1984, by Frye in his review of Animal Farm:

A really searching satire on Russian Communism, then, would be more deeply concerned with the underlying reasons for its transformation from a proletarian dictatorship into a kind of parody of the Catholic Church.⁴²

What follows, then, is a look at the satire of 1984, mindful of the role that the tradition of utopian writing, Orwell's knowledge of totalitarianism (through reading and experience), and the personal predilection for mordant satire played in the creation of the novel.

Granted the fact that there is a well-documented consensus that 1984 is a satire, and an anti-utopian satire, one might nevertheless want to ask in what sense it is a satire, if only because this fact is taken so much for granted. The most general and obvious thrust, to speak in satiric terms, is aimed at totalitarianism. Consequently, inasmuch as the utopia is equated with totalitarianism, we have an anti-totalitarian rather than an anti-utopian satire. This would explain Orwell's eclecticism in his choice of particular targets, chosen first of all for their value as representatives of totalitarian practice, ideology, or even a tendency toward totalitarianism. Hence the often disparate mixture of elements drawn from such different and even opposing sources: Marxism, English Socialism—and Nazism, Russian Communism—and the parody of the Catholic Church. In presenting us with a self-contained satiric fictional universe, a "world" of 1984, Orwell satirizes not the alien, unrealized horror of 1984 with its telescreens and

mindreaders, but the yet unrealized though potentially realizable actuality. In this sense, the entire novel is a whole and integrated satire of an unacceptable alternative, potential "world." As a vision of an unacceptable utopia, it is, in the words of Paul Tillich, "a hovering, a suspension, between possibility and impossibility."⁴³ Such a hovering and suspension imply a tension: 1984 is a "warning," a "prophecy." What is actually attacked? The world embryonically present in the institutions of Orwell's time, in the paraphernalia that symbolize the world he is unable to accept:

To say "I accept" in an age like our own is to say that you accept concentration camps, rubber truncheons, Hitler, Stalin, bombs, aeroplanes, tinned food, machine guns, putsches, purges, slogans, Bedaux belts, gas masks, submarines, spies, provocateurs, press censorship, secret prisons, aspirins, Hollywood films, and political murders. Not only those things, of course, but those things among others.⁴⁴

This statement of refusal, then, is transformed in 1984 into a satire of the kind of world which makes use of almost all the nightmarish inventions catalogued in Orwell's list. His essay, therefore, gives us a preview of the satiric targets we find in 1984. Other parallels between Orwell's essays and 1984 may be seen, in the view of language, in "Politics and the English Language" (1946);⁴⁵ of sex as a political act, in "The Art of Donald McGill" (1941);⁴⁶ and of a world inhabited by proles, in "England Your England" (1941).⁴⁷ What confronts us, then, is a utopia satirized through modern inventions that are misused or used for evil ends by

megalomaniac leaders. Was Orwell's ability to point out the megalomaniac tendency of Oceania's rulers pathological, as Isaac Deutscher⁴⁸ suggests? Or did "the aloofness and insincerity of radical leadership, the failure to abandon ruthless measures, the attempt to establish a perfect system,"⁴⁹ really exist in Orwell's world? Today, few would argue that Orwell was a bad diagnostician.

And so, based on sound diagnosis, the satire of this unwanted Utopia proceeds as follows: at first, the fictional world of Oceania is created through the activity—literal and practical—of Winston Smith, the main character. Then, the action is complicated by the inclusion of Julia, who seduces Winston and precipitates the tragedy. We learn about the political system through two essays, "The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism," and the appendix, "The Principles of Newspeak." Finally, we discover much about the actual working of the system through one of the leaders, O'Brien, who patiently explains to Smith the purpose and aim of the Party.

The unobtrusive beginning is characteristic of this novel which never goes beyond the possible, hovering, as it does, between what we intimately know from observation of our own world and what could conceivable develop but is yet strikingly absent from our world:

It was a bright cold day in April, and the clocks were striking thirteen. Winston Smith, his chin nuzzled into his breast in an effort to escape the vile wind, slipped quickly through the glass doors of Victory Mansions, though not quickly enough

to prevent a swirl of gritty dust from entering along with him.

The hallway smelt of boiled cabbage and old rag mats. At one end of it a coloured poster, too large for indoor display, had been tacked to the wall. It depicted simply a enormous face, more than a metre wide: the face of a man of about forty-five, with a heavy black moustache and ruggedly handsome features. Winston made for the stairs. It was no use trying the lift. Even at the best of times it was seldom working, and at present the electric current was cut off during daylight hours. It was part of the economy drive in preparation for Hate Week. The flat was seven flights up, and Winston, who was thirty-nine and had a varicose ulcer above his right ankle, went slowly, resting several times on the way. On each landing, opposite the lift-shaft, the poster with the enormous face gazed from the wall. It was one of those pictures which are so contrived that the eyes follow you about when you move. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the caption beneath it ran (p. 5).

Very soon we learn that "this was London, chief city of Airstrip One, itself the third most populous of the provinces of Oceania" (p. 6). By the time we get to the exotic Oceania, the fictional reality of the future London is accepted. It is somehow familiar, and this familiarity is achieved through the employment of well-tried devices. One of these is the use of numbers, half a dozen of them in the first two paragraphs. The numbers make it easy for the reader to imagine the environment; they have the force of statistics in persuading the reader of the reality of a statement, as Swift demonstrated in A Modest Proposal. And although the day is bright, it is blighted by cold, by the fact that the clocks strike thirteen, by the "vile wind," and the "swirl of gritty dust." The olfactory sense then takes over, and we can smell the nauseating combination of

boiled cabbage and old rag mats. When the awe-inspiring but intimidating portrait of Big Brother appears at the end of a hallway, the moustache of the dictator reminds us of Hitler and Stalin. Because the electricity is cut off, the lift does not work. A varicose ulcer festers on Smith's leg, and the eyes of Big Brother are watching him as he begins his ascent. The symbolism of pained ascent watched by the ubiquitous Big Brother is accentuated by the mention of Hate Week. The contrast is obvious: Victory Mansions and the smell, the non-functioning lift. Do we want this "victory"? The satire in all its unobtrusiveness works by presenting as victorious a wholly unacceptable future, a picture of moral and physical breakdown. As soon as the clocks strike thirteen, the "unlucky" number, we have the sense that the whole picture is askew.

In opposition to the "ascent" of Winston Smith, in his search for knowledge, truth, and love, is his descent—to the cellars of the Ministry of Love, to the fateful Room 101, where his selfhood is destroyed. (The symbolism of this descent is supported by the horror of the notorious cellars of Lubyanka, where many political prisoners of Stalin met their end.) The "economy drive" suggests the emergency war economy, with its queues and shortages, features of any totally planned economy. In such an economy, products are invariably of ersatz quality, according to the internal logic of the narrative. The VICTORY GIN gives off "a sickly, oily smell, as of Chinese rice-spirit" (p. 8), and the VICTORY

CIGARETTES that Smith smokes have to be held horizontally, otherwise the tobacco falls out. The irony of this discrepancy between the official picture and the shabby reality has a cumulative effect, as the satiric picture of the world of 1984 is built, brick by brick, from the material of irony. Thus, the Ministry of Truth concerns itself with the propaganda of lies, the Ministry of Peace conducts war, and the Ministry of Love practises the apprehension and execution of people who think independently. To follow this distorted logic, the Ministry of Plenty reigns over the chaos, the shortages and the poverty of the economy. (The British emergency economy during the war, its propaganda effort, Goebbels' propaganda machine, the Soviet Pravda ("Truth"), the Gestapo, the SS, and the OGPU figure among the likely sources of the government of Oceania.) The effect of this world on the reader is (through this familiarity with the likely sources) markedly different from that of either Zamyatin's We or Huxley's Brave New World. Instead of projecting potentially dangerous scientific developments into a distant future (a millenium in Zamyatin and six hundred years in Huxley), Orwell projects the political tendencies of his present into the very near future (three and a half decades). It was through the developments in the politics of his age that he "came to question and satirize 'the implied aims of industrial civilization'."⁵⁰ In particular, he was dismayed, Spender tells us, "by considerations of the support given to one kind of totalitarian system (Stalinism) by European

intellectuals when it was opposed by another totalitarian system (Hitlerism)."51

Orwell was particularly successful in producing a satire that, as distinct from Zamyatin's and Huxley's works, is remembered

. . . not so much as a book (with plot, characters, and the rest of the machinery of fiction) but rather as a Gestalt, as a coherent world whose entire outline immediately comes to mind whenever one of its elements is discovered in the real world.⁵²

This immediacy, this kinship with the real world is missing in both Zamyatin's and Huxley's novels, despite the truly remarkable likeness that 1984 shares with them. It would not be entirely unfair to say that in the satiric plan of the novel the similarities of plot are secondary to the requirements of satire, and that though all three novels satirize the present, it is a different present that they satirize. Unlike the other two, Orwell does not include in his work "the orgiastic vision of the Marquis de Sade."⁵³ Instead of mutual bodily availability, de Sade's favourite idea from La Philosophie dans le boudoir, we find in 1984 "sadism which has been carried to its logical conclusion by going beyond sex and denying it."⁵⁴ It is a different Smith that emerges from the cellars of the Ministry of Love: different from the Bernard Marx of Brave New World, whose punishment is exile to an island of his choice, and from D-503, of We, who is punished by the removal (by radiation) of his faculty of imagination. The difference is that Smith yields consciously to brute force. Torture breaks down his

determination to uphold the truth:

He gazed up at the enormous face. Forty years it had taken him to learn what kind of smile was hidden beneath the dark moustache. O cruel needless misunderstanding! O stubborn self-willed exile from the loving breast! Two gin-scented tears trickled down the sides of his nose. But it was all right, everything was all right, the struggle was finished. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother (p. 238).

Bernard Marx does not have to love Mustapha Mond, and D-503 cannot love the Well-Doer, since love is an irrational thing and D-503 is, after the operation, only a rational human robot. The point Orwell makes is that much of modern politics has an irrational basis. While the irrationality of Nazism is so obvious that it does not have to be recounted here, the irrationality of Marxism is not so obvious, but it has been sufficiently demonstrated.⁵⁵

While Swift casts doubt on the supremacy of the reasoning faculty in the rational animal, Orwell suggests a more disturbing possibility: that rationality itself is only a transitory, culturally-conditioned phenomenon, a state subject to influence and change by psychological means. This possibility—and 1984 explores it in detail—is more than a sinister variation of Swift's invention: it is a step beyond and, at the same time, the final step. It is the end of the road, for after the passing of the rational perception of the world, the very possibility of communication dies, and the autonomous human being, bereft of the Cartesian attribute, perishes with it. We enter the world of automata.

In a letter to Pope, Swift relates:

I have got material toward a treatise, proving the falsity of that definition animal rationale, and to show it would be only rationis capax. Upon this great foundation of misanthropy, though not in Timon's manner, the whole building of my Travels is erected;⁵⁶

Orwell's achievement, as far as modern satire is concerned, lies in the further elaboration of Swift's treatise: in doubting the very capacity of man to be rational as a matter of course; and in believing rationality to be characteristically associated with a certain tradition—with what he called liberal-Christian culture.⁵⁷ For rationality is impossible without the free operation of reason, that is, without the freedom permitted in Western liberal-Christian culture. But in pursuing his belief, Orwell goes beyond satire. His doomed hero in his helplessness, as well as the Party with its sadistic omnipotence, illustrates a fault that, we suspect, lies in man's nature. The repulsion Winston Smith feels for Julia after his return from the ordeal of the Ministry of Love parallels the disgust of Gulliver with his Yahoo wife after his ordeal described in Book IV of Gulliver's Travels. The effect of this repulsion on the satire of 1984 is that by the end of the novel Winston Smith becomes a target of the misanthropic satire. Far from a speculation, this view is supported by Orwell's uncertainty about the ability of human nature to guarantee liberty. In 1939, in a review of a book on Russia, Orwell writes:

In the past every tyranny was sooner or later overthrown, or at least resisted, because of "human nature," which as a matter of course desired liberty. But we cannot be at all certain that "human nature" is constant. It may be just possible

to produce a breed of men who do not wish for liberty as to produce a breed of hornless cows. . . . The radio, press-censorship, standardized education and the secret police have altered everything. Mass-suggestion is a science of the last twenty years, and we do not yet know how successful it will be.⁵⁸

The degree of uncertainty is illustrated by the hesitant use of "human nature" as an arbitrary and vague term. The misanthropic element might be considered harmful for satire, which usually desires reform. Yet, in modern satire, the intensity is heightened; the tone of the satirist's cry becomes increasingly shrill. There is no doubt that Orwell thought the situation was critical. Man with all his attributes and potential was at stake, he thought, and with the passing of man as he knew him, Orwell anticipated the passing of an entire civilization. True, his bleak prognosis, if prognosis it was, was based on his observation of the present; he could not be sure the future would be realized in the way sketched in satire; but his novel is a warning, a forceful cry designed to arrest even the possibility of such a fateful development. In this sense only, it can be called "prophecy." A prophecy in the Biblical sense, however, always contains a proviso: this and this will happen unless you do so and so. And between this "will" and this "unless" is a wide space of infinite variables that the satire aims to influence. Therefore, in order to stop the gradual sliding of civilization into barbarism, Orwell presents an essentially barbaric future. This barbarism is combated by a single civilized man.⁵⁹ Neither Bernard Marx

of Huxley, nor D-503 of Zamyatin is civilized in the same sense that Winston Smith is. By time and conditioning, both characters are far removed from our civilization. Smith is not: he remembers much, and his powers of introspection and analysis (both possibly the products of this civilization) help him. Civilization in this context, of course, refers to the heritage of both the Graeco-Roman and the Judeo-Christian traditions. This heritage is the basis of "Western Man," and it is this that flutters before it dies inside Winston Smith, the protagonist of 1984. The loss, the profound loss that attends this symbolic demise of civilization, is a loss not only of myths, not only of the entire intellectual panopticon, but of the morality that formed its core. Of course, the struggle and the eventual loss are expressed in Winston Smith only very indirectly. Nevertheless they are there. We are shown Smith's conscious struggle to remain in contact with and to learn about the culture of pre-revolutionary times which, as he instinctively feels, represented the civilization whose continuity the Revolution interrupted. The consequences of this interruption were frightful. But how does Orwell's satire deal with this interruption, and what are the stages or techniques used in the process of barbarization? First of all, the basic technique of transmitting knowledge from generation to generation is through tradition, for tradition presupposes attention to and respect for the past. To abolish the past is a stupendous idea. To effect instant modifications of the

collective memory of the immediate, recent, and distant past would require an enormous amount of work. But Orwell shows that such an achievement is not beyond the power of a totalitarian government. Winston tells Julia, his mistress:

Do you realize that the past, starting from yesterday, has been actually abolished? If it survives anywhere, it's in a few solid objects with no words attached to them, like that lump of glass there. Already we know almost literally nothing about the Revolution and the years before the Revolution. Every record has been destroyed or falsified, every book has been rewritten, every picture has been repainted, every statue and street and building has been renamed, every date has been altered. And that process is continuing day by day and minute by minute. History has stopped. Nothing exists except an endless present in which the Party is always right. I know, of course, that the past is falsified, but it would never be possible for me to prove it, even when I did the falsification myself. After the thing is done, no evidence ever remains. The only evidence is inside my own mind, and I don't know with any certainty that any other human shares my memories (pp. 126-127).

It is in the past that all the ideas that together make up an entire civilization are stored. And ready access to the past makes it possible to maintain the continuity that is the foundation of civilization. Without this access there can be no continuity and, without the continuity, no civilization. All that is left in Orwell's fictional world is the keepsakes, the "few solid objects with no words attached to them," such as the coral embedded in glass which Winston Smith picks up in an antique shop. Henceforth, the glass weight becomes an important symbol of the lost past, of an entirely different time, and of civilization as we know it. In particular, it becomes a symbol of the fragility of our

civilization:

There was another crash. Someone had picked up the glass paperweight from the table and smashed it to pieces on the hearth-stone.

The fragment of coral, a tiny crinkle of pink like a sugar rosebud from a cake, rolled across the mat. How small, thought Winston, how small it always was! (p. 177).

Smashed also, symbolically, is Smith's sexual rebellion, represented in the symbol as "a tiny crinkle of pink."

In choosing this particular target, the interruption of tradition, Orwell satirizes a myth common among revolutionaries, the myth of tabula rasa, or new beginning. They intend to break radically with the past, and to embark upon building the "new." This part of leftist mythology is so obvious and so central to the entire ideology that Orwell satirizes that, in order to satirize it successfully, he has to show the extreme to which the idea of new, "clean" beginnings might lead: to the total abolition of the past. In practice, as Orwell could see in the example of Russia, the abolition was not total, but selective. But in its selective application (for example, the notorious rewritings of the Soviet Encyclopedia and of history, the creation of "non-persons" of such leaders as Trotsky) the art was very highly developed. Orwell took this existing practice and carried it to its logical, if absurdly extreme, conclusion.

Orwell is not original in his evocation of the doom of civilization. The general idea of regress is indeed as old as civilization itself. Charles Van Doren in The Idea of Progress⁶⁰ lists Hesiod, Ovid, Rousseau, Flammarton,

Nordau, F. G. Juenger, Marcuse, Seidenberg, N. O. Brown, and J. Ellul as exponents of the idea of regress. For Spengler, too, the twentieth century is a period of decline of the West. Orwell depicts regress as the establishment of the antithesis of civilization, that is, barbarism; and, following the satiric practice, he does so indirectly. If Marcuse develops the thesis that "intensified progress seems to be bound with intensified unfreedom,"⁶¹ Orwell adds that such a "progressive" society will have a stagnant, even regressive technology. How does barbarism enter into this picture? Originally, in its classical meaning, the word denoted alien culture in a pejorative way. But since the nineteenth century, as least, one does not speak of "civilized" and "barbaric" cultures, but only of different, alternative civilizations. Orwell has written a satire about a once-civilized country that has become barbaric because of this "intensified unfreedom," thereby making a connection between civilization and the exercise of freedom. This connection, together with his description of the fatal consequences of the eclipse of freedom, echoes Macaulay's warning of 1857, when he wrote to a friend about the prospects of America in the twentieth century:

Either some Caesar or Napoleon will seize the reins of government with a strong hand; or your republic will be as fearfully plundered and laid waste by barbarians in the twentieth century as the Roman Empire was in the fifth;—with this difference, that the Huns and Vandals who ravaged the Roman Empire came from without, and that your Huns and Vandals will have been engendered within your own country by your own institutions.⁶²

Both Macaulay and Orwell foresee the internal origins of this new barbarism which, in any case, is a reversal of the ideas originating in Graeco-Roman antiquity and Judeo-Christianity. More than a mere reversal, barbarism is the wilful, deliberate destruction of those ideas; its end is an unchallenged, irreversible monopoly of power concentrated in the hands of an invisible leadership, an elite so remote as to seem non-existent to the oppressed. The final paradox of such a proposition is the possibility that the whole system is leaderless, and therefore automatic. And the nightmare of this proposition is that everyone is oppressed; that no one in the system has any advantage except perhaps the Inner Party members, who have a few limited privileges. All are victims. There is very little in Orwell's book to refute this possibility. O'Brien, Winston's torturer, asks him:

Do you begin to see, then, what kind of world we are creating? It is the exact opposite of the stupid hedonistic Utopias that the old reformers imagined. A world of fear and treachery and torment, a world of trampling and being trampled upon, a world which will grow not less but more merciless as it refines itself. Progress in our world will be progress towards more pain. The old civilizations claimed that they were founded on love and justice. Ours is founded upon hatred. In our world there will be no emotions except fear, rage, triumph, and self-abasement. Everything else we shall destroy—everything (p. 214; my italics).

Isaac Deutscher's label, "The Mysticism of Cruelty," seems very fitting for the discussion of the sadistic power-worship exhibited by O'Brien in his conversation with Smith. For Orwell certainly goes "beyond Tacitus, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Nietzsche in their speculation on the degrees and kinds

of pleasure men can take in wielding power."⁶³ But herein, according to George Kateb, lies the unacceptable: "common sense prevents acceptance of sadism as a constant and sufficient source of action on the part of millions of men, hour after hour, year after year."⁶⁴ How do we deal with this insane worship of power? How does it fit the satiric plan of the novel? If we compare Orwell's power-crazed Party to the political parties of the radical fringe, we at once note a common loathing of money and possessions: asceticism with an almost monastic simplicity of dress is common. Power is substituted for all the opulence and pleasures of the bourgeois statesman. The luxuries of the elite are of necessity very transitory: they depend on power. Therefore, Orwell's concept combines Marx with Nietzsche,⁶⁵ a frightful combination. For the concept of power in a totalitarian party makes the execution of a political opponent very simple; his existence and development are interesting (to the Party) only from the point of view of politics: man is exclusively a political animal and, when found unacceptable, he is "liquidated" (a word curiously drawn from the world of business), as one liquidates stocks. Orwell's view of "Power" is not essentially different from the totalitarian view as he could see it in his own day, and the same could be said of his view of sadism, which seems to go hand-in-hand with the absolute application of power. It is not even necessary, in this case, to point out the device of "satiric extension,"⁶⁶ or "the following of some idea

along ruthlessly logical lines to an absurd extreme or conclusion."⁶⁷ But where is the absurd? Orwell is writing about totalitarianism, and by now we know enough to realize that it is so evil it could hardly be exaggerated in a satire written expressly to stress that evil. As John O. Lyons says: "Things are evil, yes, but they hang together. This is not meaningless chaos."⁶⁸ This is "horror as an intrinsic part of the novel's satiric devices."⁶⁹

There is a system, then, in this fictional nightmare, and the reader—following the peripeteia of Winston Smith, and mindful of the entire Gestalt of the novel—becomes uncomfortably aware of the strong but hopeless opposition to this system by an individual in distress: he (Smith) is alone, and there, all around him, are the masses, the cheering crowds, the primitive proles, the watchful spies, the cunning Thought Police—and Julia.

What happens to the individual in the absence of love, friendship, and family is shown in the recurring thoughts that Smith has about his mother—thoughts that bring him to contemplation of tragedy:

The thing that now suddenly struck Winston was that his mother's death, nearly thirty years ago, had been tragic and sorrowful in a way that was no longer possible. Tragedy, he perceived, belonged to the ancient time, to a time when there was still privacy, love, and friendship, and when the members of a family stood by one another without needing to know the reason (p. 27).

This realization marks a step in Winston's awakening as an individual. He is exploring his inner space, something

which in Oceania is a rare and dangerous venture. He realizes the value of privacy, love, and friendship: three things integral to the identity of the individual. Privacy is necessary for his inner development, for personal stock-taking, for the development of interiority, which, John Lukacs tells us, is "the most precious heritage of the Western civilization of the last five hundred years."⁷⁰ In love and friendship the individual ventures outside himself, touching the outside world through the human beings with whom he shares these special relationships. Tragedy (used here, as in 1984, in a colloquial sense) is possible when these intense relationships are suddenly shattered by an event such as death. But in the absence of these relationships neither sorrow nor tragedy has the same impact. Smith is able to understand this better as his individualism, his interiority, stirs to life. It is characteristic of Orwell's understanding of totalitarianism that he should stress that Smith's budding individualism must develop simultaneously into political revolt against his enslavement. The absence of tragedy is, therefore, another feature of totalitarianism deplored by the satirist, albeit an unusual one.

In Oceania there are Community Centres where the people spend their time collectively:

In principle a Party member had no spare time, and was never alone except in bed. It was assumed that when he was not working, eating or sleeping he would be taking part in some kind of communal recreation: to do anything that suggested a taste for solitude, even to go for a walk by yourself, was always slightly dangerous. There was a word

for it in Newspeak: ownlife, it was called, meaning individualism and eccentricity (p. 69).

In forcing people to forsake their individuality, Big Brother is engineering a very significant change in human consciousness, the reverse of the change which, according to Jacob Burckhardt, created in Renaissance Italy uomo singolare (singular man), and uomo unico (unique man):

In the Middle Ages both sides of human consciousness—that which was turned within and that which was turned without—lay as though dreaming or half awake beneath a common veil. The veil was woven of faith, illusion, and childish prepossessions, through which the world and history were seen clad in strange hues. Man was conscious of himself only as a member of a race, people, party, family, or corporation—only through some general category. It is in Italy that this veil dissolved first; there arose an objective treatment and consideration of the State and of all things of this world, and at the same time the subjective side asserted itself with corresponding emphasis. Man became a spiritual individual, and recognized himself as such. In the same way the Greek had once distinguished himself from the barbarian, and the Arab had felt himself an individual at a time when other Asiatics knew themselves only as members of a race.⁷¹

Winston Smith tries to escape the reverse of the process described by Burckhardt. All around him the new dark age, "the Black Millennium,"⁷² is already in progress. Man is conscious of himself as a member of the Party, a citizen of Oceania, a prole. The proles, the primitive eighty-five per cent of Oceania's population, stand even lower, if possible, reminding one of the Wellsian Morlocks. But Smith is re-enacting the kind of psychological and intellectual discovery that took place in Europe more than five hundred years before his time. This period of five hundred years

marks the depth of regress. But Orwell intimates the possibility of such a drastic plunge within a few decades after the writing of the novel!

Smith learns about the abyss that separates his time from the time "before the Revolution" (a phrase which, for Winston Smith at least, fulfills in the new mythology of 1984 the same role as the phrase in illo tempore does for the old mythology⁷³). This revolution established Oceania as a dictatorship of "oligarchic collectivism," in the words of the fictional leader of the opposition, Emmanuel Goldstein (who is also the supposed author of the book written by the Thought Police). For Goldstein, the highest point of Western civilization was reached before 1914, a time when Britannia ruled the seas. In the satire of 1984, the period before 1914 plays the role of the norm: the barbarism, the regress, the horror is related to the period before 1914. It makes little difference that everything was not so rosy, to say the least, in this period. The fine discrimination of the historian in search of optimal objectivity is no good to the satirist. Consequently, the book informs Smith as follows:

The world of today is a bare, hungry, dilapidated place compared with the world that existed before 1914, and still more so if compared with the imaginary future to which the people of that period looked forward. In the early twentieth century, the vision of the future society unbelievably rich, leisured, orderly, and efficient—a glittering antiseptic world of glass and steel and snow-white concrete—was part of the consciousness of nearly every literate person. Science and technology were developing at prodigious speed, and it seemed natural to assume that they would go on developing. This failed to happen, partly because of the

impoverishment caused by a long series of wars and revolutions, partly because scientific and technical progress depended on the empirical habit of thought, which could not survive in a strictly regimented society. As a whole the world is more primitive to-day than it was fifty years ago (p. 153).

We can recognize in the "glittering antiseptic world" the Boston of Bellamy's Looking Backward, or any hedonistic utopia. The vision of such a future society is shattered, together with the myth of linear progress—one of the articles of faith of leftist intellectuals. But what can we say about the norm of this satire? Why is it that the Golden Age is again seen in the past? Adam Ulam does not find it incomprehensible:

For all the sufferings and imperfections of the pre-1914 Western civilization, the individual was less trammelled by the state and society. And for all his religious and superstitious fears, the average man was free of the fear: that the basis of civilized life, if indeed not its physical continuity, could be utterly destroyed. What are all our advances in comfort, in mechanical contrivances, and in social justice against this fear?⁷⁴

Some of the interpreters of 1984 seem to agree with the choice of 1914 as a cut-off point, notable George Woodcock⁷⁷ and Chad Walsh.⁷⁶ The historian A. J. P. Taylor in English History 1914-1945⁷⁷ shows that until 1914⁷⁸ an Englishman could pass through life hardly noticing the existence of the state beyond the post office and the policeman.⁷⁹ a personal predilection for the period also could have played a role. Cyril Connolly, who knew Orwell, tells us that "Mr. Orwell is a revolutionary who is in love with 1910."⁸⁰ This was written before 1984 appeared, and Connolly seemed to think

then that this "love" interfered with Orwell's political thinking: "Never before has a progressive political thinker been so handicapped by nostalgia for the Edwardian shabby-genteel or the under-dog."⁸¹ Yet Connolly is quick to admit that this "political sentimentality" is "from the literary point of view . . . his most valid emotion."⁸² Furthermore, Orwell is writing with the Second World War still fresh in his memory. The dinginess and the squalor of war-stricken London haunt the pages of this novel. But the squalor, unmistakable as it is, is not the major point of contrast between Oceania and England before 1914. Other developments, specifically the position of the individual vis-à-vis the masses, present a much more radical contrast.

The mass is nothing but a large group of individuals. If unorganized, it is even hard to define as such. But the art of organizing large numbers of individuals has become highly developed in this century. This process was promoted by two factors: legitimate governments which, by mobilizing citizens for such emergencies as war, created impressive state apparatuses that henceforth sharply limited the mobility and rights of individuals even after the emergencies had subsided; and political parties: socialists, national socialists, communists, fascists, and so on. These parties developed powerful ideologies that exploited the residual hatred of various associations of individuals as vehicles for the seizure of power from the legitimate governments. Whenever such a vigorous political group seized power (as,

for example, in Russia, Italy, and Germany), it fused its authority with the existing apparatus of the state, creating a vastly more dictatorial regime that further limited the rights of the individual. Orwell is concerned with this further limitation of freedom, and the gloominess of his satire serves as proof of his lack of optimism about future political developments. He saw the individual crushed. But his bleak vision of the future clashed with opposing views derived from the belief in progress, a belief amply justified by the enormous strides of science and technology. Orwell's satire is aimed at those of his contemporaries who betrayed the trust of the previous generation, a generation that had launched Progress in the name of all that was rational and moral. It is to that generation that he directs his nostalgia. Yet this generation also "brought into being a caste of men—the mass-man in revolt—who are placing in imminent danger those very principles to which they owe their existence."⁸³ And, anticipating Orwell, Ortega y Gasset wrote that should that human type continue to be master in Europe, "thirty years will suffice to send our continent back to barbarism"⁸⁴—the time-span adopted by Orwell for the flowering of Oceania. Not only Ortega y Gasset, but also Karl Jaspers, Nicholas Berdyaev, and Albert Schweitzer correctly analyzed the conflict between the individual and the mass and also pointed out the dangers of precisely the kind of dictatorship that we see in 1984. These thinkers—and not only these—wrote about the new violence, the new

barbarism which, they feared, was finding more and more acceptance in Europe. "Europe has been left without a moral code,"⁸⁵ complains Ortega y Gasset.

Even an articulated mass [says Jaspers] always tends to become unspiritual and inhuman. It is life without existence, superstition without faith. It may stamp all flat; it is disinclined to tolerate independence and greatness, but prone to constrain people to become as automatic as ants.⁸⁶

As a result, he feared the loss of "the essence of humanity."⁸⁷ Berdyaev states that dehumanization "has penetrated into all phases of human creativity. In making himself God, man has unmanned himself."⁸⁸ And Schweitzer feels that the individual is stifled by the mass and demoralized by it.⁸⁹

What is the predicament of Winston Smith as an individual? Unlike the proles, who form eighty-five per cent of Oceania's population, he is a Party member. He is privileged, educated, and theoretically "rules" the proles. Above him is the Inner Party, which rules the proles and the Party; in relation to the Inner Party he is a slave. The leader of the Inner Party is Big Brother, who may or may not be real. For all purposes, the relationship between the Party members and the proles is that of apartheid. The total segregation is "understood." But in what ways is Winston Smith circumscribed? Is he fighting the masses? No, he is trying to defend himself against the inquisitorial Thought Police. In doing so, he discovers that each man is an island, that there are barriers which make genuine communication impossible. These barriers, he feels, can be overcome only

by love. But this breakthrough is followed by dismay when he discovers that Julia is "only a rebel from the waist downwards" (p. 127), and, consequently, he is alone in his anti-totalitarian rebellion: he is living a curiously isolated life, a private life that precludes the consideration of the masses. If he has to fight anything, it is first and foremost that part of himself which is unaware of the truth. To achieve this awareness, he must combat his own instinct for survival, for the enemy is his own nervous system (p. 54). The slight exterior evidence of his inner opposition might prove fatal—as it finally did. So the demoralization of the individual is not affected by the sheer weight of the masses, which assaults the individual and crushes him. Instead, the totality of the environment designed to brainwash him combines with specific psychological attacks such as the Two Minutes Hate to do the job of demoralizing. It is not achieved simply by the pressure of the mass on the individual, but by engineered therapy:

The horrible thing about the Two Minutes Hate was not that one was obliged to act a part, but, on the contrary, that it was impossible to avoid joining in. Within thirty seconds any pretense was always unnecessary. A hideous ecstasy of fear and vindictiveness, a desire to kill, to torture, to smash faces in with a sledge-hammer, seemed to flow through the whole group of people like an electric current, turning one even against one's will into a grimacing, screaming lunatic (p. 15).

Here Orwell satirizes the agitprop, the Department of Agitation and Propaganda whose primary objective in the Communist and Nazi movements was to whip up feelings of hate against

any target deemed important at the time. This "therapy" illustrates the assault of the primitive, the barbaric on civilized man. We see that the Two Minutes Hate uses Goldstein as a scapegoat: it is, in the words of J. G. Frazer, a periodic "expulsion of embodied evils."⁹⁰ Goldstein is used in a similar way as the pharmakoi were used in the Greek festival of the Thargelia as late as the fifth century B.C.⁹¹ To the hate against Goldstein (to the exorcism of the evils) is appended a secondary target: either the Eurasian or the Eastasian army. The generation of hate in such a beastly manner, unseen since ancient times, justifies Orwell's powerful satire and his severe criticism of irrationalism. Here totalitarian techniques of manipulation are equated with primitive irrationalism. Not surprisingly, Winston Smith is filled with horror when he has to join in the chanting of "B-B!... B-B!"

The chanting harks back to primeval times, and signifies the barbarization of human speech: an outflow of base passion, it completely lack meaning. It represents the final debasement of logos:

Of course he chanted with the rest: it was impossible to do otherwise. To dissemble your feelings, to control your face, to do what everyone else was doing, was an instinctive reaction (p. 17).

That chanting has become an instinctive reaction is evidence of the automation of response achieved by this peculiar therapy. The result is the unlimited reign of the irrationalism that Orwell feared so much. He first discussed

this gradual process of deterioration toward such a reign of irrationalism in his essay "Politics and the English Language" (1946), in which he analyzed the decline of the English language. This decline then finds expression in Newspeak, an emasculated version of Basic English⁹² designed as a further limitation on attempts to think. But Newspeak is such a recent innovation that, at the time of the action of the novel, it is used only as the formal language of editorials. Newspeak is not a living speech, although individual Newspeak words have begun to appear in everyday usage (named Oldspeak). Smith's "friend" Syme, a specialist in Newspeak, boasts:

By 2050—earlier, probably—all real knowledge of Oldspeak will have disappeared. The whole literature of the past will have been destroyed. Chaucer, Shakespeare, Milton, Byron—they'll exist only in Newspeak versions, not merely changed into something different, but actually changed into something contradictory of what they used to be. Even the literature of the Party will change. Even the slogans will change. How could you have a slogan like "freedom is slavery" when the concept of freedom has been abolished? The whole climate of thought will be different. In fact there will be no thought, as we understand it now. Orthodoxy means not thinking—not needing to think. Orthodoxy is unconsciousness (p. 46).

It is not enough to say that Newspeak is an instrument of irrationalism, although it is that. One is reminded of G. K. Chesterton's definition of madness: "madness may be defined as using mental activity so as to reach mental helplessness."⁹³ Indeed, every element of Orwell's satire, including Newspeak, is designed to show this suicide of reason. In this respect the entire novel has a unity of purpose illustrated by each

of its constituent elements: "Newspeak, like 1984 itself, is a projection of existing tendencies toward the debasement of English when it is used in politics."⁹⁴

Newspeak is also a medium of doublethink,⁹⁵ another satiric target. Far from being only a brilliant fictional creation, it manifests itself in the mental acrobatics of totalitarian politics: it is a schizophrenic mental posture exhibiting a simultaneous acceptance of contradictory political stands. It is the formula for a permanently divided mind,"⁹⁶ and it is also a "moral disease, a sickness of the soul."⁹⁷ Doublethink is permanently locked in struggle with objective reality, and this struggle leads us to the examination of the doctrine of "collective solipsism," and the importance of the trivial equation $2+2=4$. Doublethink (the acceptance of two contradictory statements) would not work if the existence of objective reality were tolerated. But it is not tolerated. There is no absolute truth; there is, however, collective solipsism, that is, the belief that what is true is only what the Party proclaims to be true. Then what is the satiric function of this doctrine? On a practical level, it ridicules the Stalinist dictates (for example, the sharp turn of policies in 1939) and the Nazi concept of "German Science," which precludes the existence of "Science" as something objective, to give one example. On another level—the theoretical, or philosophical—the doctrine of collective solipsism is a satire of philosophical relativism, which started to compete seriously with the

rationalism inherited from the nineteenth century.⁹⁸ Both relativism and collective solipsism do away with the notion of an absolute standard, an objective truth. In fact, the doctrine of collective solipsism as explained by O'Brien is an exaggerated form of relativism: a very wild, undomesticated form, a truly satiric distorted mirror of relativism.

Furthermore, the abolition of the concept of freedom follows the abolition of the individual as an inviolable being. These two are fused, for the purpose of satire, by the powerful symbols of Newspeak and doublethink. "Newspeak," says Chad Walsh, in order to stress the continuity between We, Brave New World, and 1984, "is the Orwellian equivalent of lobotomy."⁹⁹ It will destroy the representatives of English literature, who at the same time represent the various influences that together make up the peculiar English cultural heritage. Elsewhere,¹⁰⁰ Orwell is more outspoken:

What is quite obviously happening, war or no war, is the break-up of laissez-faire capitalism and of the liberal-Christian culture. Until recently the full implications of this were not foreseen, because it was generally imagined that socialism could preserve and even enlarge the atmosphere of liberalism. It is now being realized how false this idea was. Almost certainly we are moving into an age of totalitarian dictatorships—an age in which freedom of thought will be at first a deadly sin and later on a meaningless abstraction. The autonomous individual is going to be stamped out of existence.

Here Orwell is very close to Oswald Spengler,¹⁰¹ except that one has to substitute the term Caesarism for totalitarianism. One can see how the idea of the disappearance of freedom and of the autonomous individual found its way into 1984. It is

made more persuasive in fiction—the indirection, the exaggeration, and the truly apocalyptic atmosphere all contribute to this persuasiveness. It is apocalyptic in the sense Paul Tillich gives to the word (apokalyptein—to uncover):

. . . "apocalyptic"—that is, the visionary unveiling . . . of something that is not within history but rather stands against history, "above" or "outside" history, and that makes itself known within history as a new creation.¹⁰²

Totalitarianism certainly was a new creation in the thirties, although its origin might date further back, and it is thoroughly unveiled as it is satirized. Yet the reader is left with a nagging feeling that something is missing. The gloom is never lifted. It accumulates gradually until it reaches its maximum, which coincides with the end of the novel. This in itself does not diminish the effectiveness of the satire, if we perceive it as a warning. "If there is hope, it lies in the proles," writes Smith. Subsequent events prove him wrong. The proles never have a chance, and against the mind-bending apparatus of the Thought Police they are helpless. What is missing, then? In his essay "Arthur Koestler"¹⁰³ Orwell adumbrates the problem of the individual: "The 'real problem' is still how to 'restore the religious attitude while accepting death as final'."

For Orwell it is out of the question to go back to medieval orthodoxy; he is as suspicious of that orthodoxy as he is of the one he finally satirizes in his novel. Yet he recognizes that without a religious attitude, the individual himself might cease to exist. But this religious alternative

is missing from 1984. We are left with a curious parody, so well described by Small:

To the reality which is expressed through myth, the oneness and supremacy of the divine, that which is everywhere and nowhere, and is only to be described in metaphors and fables, the lie bears the relation not of an opposite (although that is how the secular State is thought of by its devotees) but a gross, bad copy, a botched up manufacture, in fact a parody; for which reason the description of it is a parody of theology.¹⁰⁴

We are left to wonder, together with Small, how much of that parody is conscious and how much "has slipped in against the writer's will."¹⁰⁵ Thus we come full circle, to the myth of the Golden Age, which the utopian writer recreates and which the anti-utopian satirist tries to destroy. Perhaps it will be easier to see how (consciously or unconsciously) this satire parodies a myth which is itself hardly original:

Marx's classless society, and the consequent disappearance of all historical tensions, find their most exact precedent in the myth of the Golden Age which, according to a number of traditions, lies at the beginning and the end of History. Marx has enriched this venerable myth with a truly messianic Judaeo-Christian ideology; on the one hand, by the prophetic and soteriological function he ascribes to the proletariat; and, on the other, by the final struggle between Good and Evil, which may well be compared with the apocalyptic conflict between Christ and Antichrist, ending in the decisive victory of the former.¹⁰⁶

Smith believes that salvation lies in the proles who, according to Eliade, bear the "prophetic and soteriological function," but the satirist dissociates himself from his character, a fact that escapes even a serious reader.¹⁰⁷ In the last, the "misanthropic" section of the novel, concerned with torture and brainwashing, O'Brien tells Smith: "The

proletarians will never revolt, not in a thousand years or a million. They cannot. I do not have to tell you the reason: you know it already" (p. 210). George Woodcock considers this (O'Brien's discourse on the dialectic of power) to be a flaw.¹⁰⁸ But Smith's ordeal and the cellars of the Ministry of Love inspire Small to a somewhat poetic interpretation, which endows the Ministry of Love with symbolic pregnancy:

Miniluv is a dry-land parody of God's great fish, turned into a hard and glittering monster, the visible form of Leviathan; which after swallowing up Winston Smith and subjecting him to its unspeakable digestive and regenerative processes, vomits him forth again, if not exactly re-born, certainly transformed.¹⁰⁹

The gloom in this novel should be recognized for what it is: not a deficiency, but a conscious element of Orwell's satiric technique. While his satire can justify this gloom, there remains the question of whether or not this sort of gloomy literature can justifiably be called satiric at all. The opinion that it cannot has recently been voiced by Morton Gurewitch:

In any case satire, whether blistering or benign, is anger that has been alchemized into comedy. Much too often, unfortunately, the kind of bile that eats of levity and dissolves detachment is erroneously equated with satire.¹¹⁰

Gurewitch's definition would exclude 1984 and much of modern satire. Indeed, he excludes most of Juvenal's Satires on the same grounds.¹¹¹ But even 1984 is far from mirthless, even though no one would dare to pronounce it detached. The audacious paradoxes of naming the ministries in a manner so contrary to what they practice produce some mirth. And

consider this comic representation of the clash between the boastfulness of the Ministry of Plenty, and the reality of scarcity:

The announcement from the Ministry of Plenty ended on another trumpet call and gave way to tinny music. Parsons, stirred to vague enthusiasm by the bombardment of figures, took his pipe out of his mouth.

"The Ministry of Plenty's certainly done a good job this year," he said with a knowing shake of his head. "By the way, Smith old boy, I suppose you haven't got any razor blades you can let me have?" (p. 52).

This clash is paralleled on a larger scale by the boastfulness of the propaganda broadcasts and the dingy, decaying reality. But Orwell reserves high comedy for his pet concern: the saving of the English language. Thus he has Syme, the Newspeak specialist, state:

It's a beautiful thing, the destruction of words. Of course the great wastage is in the verbs and adjectives, but there are hundreds of nouns that can be got rid of as well. It isn't only the synonyms; there are also the antonyms. After all, what justification is there for a word which is simply the opposite of some other word? (p. 44).

The destruction of words is only natural in a system in which people are being destroyed without much fuss. The parallel between a man in opposition and a word in opposition could be accidental, but not so the humour. Syme is very proud of his work when he boasts: "When we've finished with it, people like you will have to learn it all over again" (Ibid.). The vocabulary of Newspeak is getting smaller every year, boasts Syme, connecting smallness to desirability: "The Revolution will be complete when the language is

perfect" (p. 45). Translated, this means when there will be no language. Death is perfection. This is as hilarious as it is macabre.

Understandably, Orwell did not produce a "funny" satire. His aim was to capture the characteristic features of modern life, which he found to be "its bareness, its dinginess, its listlessness" (p. 62). The reality of 1984 is "decaying, dingy cities where underfed people shuffled to and fro in leaky shoes, in patched-up nineteenth-century houses that smelt always of cabbage and bad lavatories" (p. 63). These cities are still with us, and totalitarianism is not a danger of the past but a movement which is still growing. Yet, because there would be little sense in ranting against broad historic movements, Orwell in 1984 does not aim his satire in that direction. As a leftist intellectual, he is appealing to his fellow leftist intellectuals. Conor Cruise O'Brien believes his effect on these intellectuals was comparable "to that of Voltaire on the French nobility: he weakened their belief in their own ideology, made them ashamed of their clichés, left them intellectually more scrupulous and more defenseless."¹¹² This is perhaps the main value of Orwell's satire. In his strange vision of the modern world, a world partly fictional and partly in existence already, he ridicules both the assumptions of his fellow leftist intellectuals and the kind of world that would result if those assumptions were put into practice. He shows in a practical way how impractical such a world would be. The

world of 1984 is conceivable: its torments are not. But Orwell does not distort as much as he projects already existing ideas. He admits: "I believe that totalitarian ideas have taken root in the minds of intellectuals everywhere, and I have tried to draw these ideas out to their logical consequence."¹¹³

Orwell did possess a norm according to which he measured the inadequacies of the satirized ideas. This norm was the "liberal-Christian culture," the product of Western civilization. The intensity of his satire is the measure of his commitment to this norm. Is he, in the age of revolutions, the victim with "hopes grotesquely betrayed," as Joseph Conrad said so incisively in his novel Under Western Eyes (1911)?

In a real revolution the best characters do not come to the front. A violent revolution falls into the hands of narrow-minded fanatics and of tyrannical hypocrites at first. Afterwards comes the turn of all the pretentious intellectual failures of the time. Such are the chiefs and the leaders. You will notice that I have left out the mere rogues. The scrupulous and the just, the noble, humane and devoted natures, the unselfish and the intelligent may begin a movement—but it passes away from them. They are not the leaders of the revolution. They are its victims: the victims of disgust, of disenchantment—often of remorse. Hopes grotesquely betrayed, ideals caricatured—that is the definition of revolutionary success. There have been in every revolution hearts broken by such success.¹¹⁴

"Hopes grotesquely betrayed, ideals caricatured"—these words also describe 1984. But in 1984 we see the final betrayal of hope.

Orwell has been compared to Tolstoy¹¹⁵ but Simone

Weil is a better comparison. Like Orwell, she was of middle-class origin; like him, she went beyond "slumming" and worked in a factory, although possessed of a superior education. Attracted by leftism, she went to Spain to take part in the Civil War on the Catalonian front, where Orwell fought too. She died in England in 1943 after a brief but intense life in which mysticism and an important study concerned with the relationship of the individual and the State (The Need for Roots, 1949) parallel Orwell's writing and his quasi-religious affirmation of man's freedom. Orwell was an outsider and, to some, a traitor. And Simone Weil was dubbed by André Gide the patron saint of all outsiders.

Winston Smith wondered about the future: "Either the future would resemble the present, in which case it would not listen to him: or it would be different from it, and his predicament would be meaningless" (p. 10). Orwell's satire shows the former in his fictional world, in order to achieve the latter in our world.

CHAPTER V

KURT VONNEGUT'S BREAKFAST OF CHAMPIONS:

ANTI-AMERICAN SATIRE

Powerful satirists are not lacking in American literature. Such brilliant and influential satirists as Mark Twain, Ambrose Bierce, and Sinclair Lewis supply fertile soil for the growth of modern American satire. As these three names suggest, American satirical writing displays a rich variety. The richness of this tradition is reflected in Kurt Vonnegut's satirical novels. The elements of science-fiction, the creation of new myths, humour, and satire are combined in extraordinary novels in which satire predominates. Still, the "tall story" of Mark Twain, exemplified by his frontier tale, "The Celebrated Jumping Frog of Calaveras County" (1965), can be detected in the modern, myth-like tales of the future found in Vonnegut's novels. And Vonnegut's passion for defining in satirical terms the world at large was anticipated by Bierce's Devil's Dictionary (1906), in which definition is used as a device for the satirical representation of reality. Finally, the exhaustive social satire of Sinclair Lewis's Babbitt (1922) can be detected in modern Babbitts found in Vonnegut's works.

Before writing Breakfast of Champions (1973),¹ Vonnegut wrote a number of successful works in which he developed his peculiar mixture of science-fiction, myth-making, and humour in the service of satire: Player Piano (1952), Sirens of Titan (1959), Mother Night (1961), Cat's Cradle (1963), God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater (1965), Welcome to the Monkey House (1968), Slaughterhouse-Five (1969), and Happy Birthday, Wanda June (1971). Although Vonnegut often

uses the same themes and even the same characters in a manner reminiscent of William Faulkner's imaginary Southern "Yoknapatawpha County," the stress in individual novels is on different topics. While Sirens of Titan and, even more, Slaughterhouse-Five deal with the satire of the militarist mentality, Breakfast of Champions poses the question of the survival of the planet and, among other topics, presents to us a tortuous self-examination of the narrator himself.

The central satiric targets of Breakfast of Champions are easily recognizable: the dehumanization of man (this target is the main theme which accommodates other targets); the state of the planet (satirized from the point of view of conservationists); and the capitalist system of the United States (attacked from the point of view of a communist sympathizer). Other targets, which also occur in his other novels, are the cultural poverty of the United States, the American way of life (in a general sense), the black problem, the literary profession, and several others that could be included in one or another of these categories. The narrator, who also calls himself the "Creator" of the characters he introduces (and finally meets inside his fictional universe), often merges with the author, and consequently is reliable as far as the satire is concerned. And, as a satiric persona, he methodically satirizes his targets. This type of narration represents a continuation of that adopted in Slaughterhouse-Five.²

The story of this complex work is actually quite

simple: Kilgore Trout, an unsuccessful science-fiction writer, meets briefly a successful Pontiac dealer, Dwayne Hoover, and acts as a catalyst that triggers Hoover's madness. It is the method of story development in the novel that complicates the simple story. All the characters, whether they are central or only supporting, are given almost equal attention. Furthermore, the author periodically shatters the illusion of satiric fiction to offer his comments in a way befitting an apologia. But it is an apologia in a perverted sense only: the narrator impresses the reader with a flow of nostalgic complaints that reveal the cantankerous side of his character.

The autobiographical introduction that appeared in Slaughterhouse-Five is also developed here, and Vonnegut uses it as a springboard for his leaps into the narrative: he "leaps back into the eighteenth-century temporal-form tradition, and almost like Fielding has a chummy chat with the reader."³ By adopting several avenues of communication with the reader, the satirist renders the direction of the satirical attack both diffuse and complex. The first avenue is the autobiographical narrator. The second is the alter ego of the narrator, Kilgore Trout, the other science-fiction writer, whose numerous short stories and novels are summarized within the frame of this novel. Finally, the third avenue is the culturally-moribund Midland City, with its gallery of all-American types.

The central image of the novel is that of human

beings as robots. The narrator goes so far as to apply the same image to himself, thereby stressing his central concern: the dehumanization of man:

I am programmed at fifty to perform childish—to insult "The Star-Spangled Banner," to scrawl pictures of a Nazi flag and an asshole and a lot of other things with a felt-tipped pen (p. 5).

This leads us to a better understanding of the identity of the narrator: he assumes a stance of typically juvenile rebelliousness, as practised in the United States in recent years (the 'sixties). But this stance is also a statement of purpose, a challenge, whereby the reader understands that the satirist is going to be a "bad boy" in that he will resort to satire. He will "prove" that the satire of the American flag and anthem is justifiable, deserved.

The robot (machine) image is used in two more ways. First, it actively contributes to the development of the story line. We are told that Kilgore Trout is the author of a science-fiction novel premised on a man's discovery that he is the only thinking human being with free will; the rest of humanity are robots programmed by the Creator of the Universe in a unique experiment. Secondly, it helps the author to satirize the behaviour he finds objectionable in our world. The Creator in the novel by Kilgore Trout addresses the only "free" human being in these words:

The Creator of the Universe would now like to apologize not only for the capricious, jostling companionship he provided during the test, but for the trashy, stinking condition of the planet itself. The Creator programmed robots to abuse it for millions of years, so it would be a poisonous,

festering cheese when you got there. Also He made sure it would be desperately crowded by programming robots, regardless of their living conditions, to crave sexual intercourse and adore infants more than almost anything (pp. 254-255).

This "science-fiction novel" is only one of many whose plots and premises are scattered throughout Breakfast of Champions. The passage just quoted does not operate simply as a motivational device that causes Dwayne Hoover's madness to manifest itself; it also puts forward the satirist's position as a conservationist, a man interested in the ecology of the planet. The planet is in a "stinking condition," it is a "poisonous, festering cheese," Elsewhere, the narrator, like Kilgore Trout, the fictional author of the descriptions of Earth, refers to it as a "damaged planet" (p. 5), a "wrecked planet" (p. 12), a "planet which was dying fast" (P. 7). The use of the past tense in the last example emphasizes the irrevocable nature of the process of dying. The imminent ecological death of the planet is symbolized by an event in Trout's childhood:

As a child, Trout had seen those Erns die, one by one. [Erns: white-tailed sea eagles, Haliaeetus albicilla.] His father had assigned him the melancholy task of measuring wingspreads of the corpses. These were the largest creatures ever to fly under their own power on the planet. And the last corpse had the greatest wingspread of all, which was nineteen feet, two and three-quarters inches.

After all the Erns were dead, it was discovered what had killed them. It was a fungus, which attacked their eyes and brains. Men had brought the fungus to their rookery in the innocent form of athlete's foot (pp. 30-31).

Human "innocence" and ineptitude are pernicious, deadly. The victim is an eagle, a symbol of freedom ever

since The Sirens of Titan (1959). The grotesqueness of this symbolic death, the tragedy of the extinction of erns are indicative of the grotesqueness of the whole satire. While the American flag and anthem are ridiculed, the eagle is left out: it has already gone the way of the last ern. The narrator emphasizes the importance of symbols in the final pages of the novel when he tells Trout:

We Americans require symbols which are richly colored and three-dimensional and juicy. Most of all, we hunger for symbols which have not been poisoned by great sins our nation has committed, such as slavery and genocide and criminal neglect, or by tinhorn commercial greed and cunning (p. 293).

In the last section of the book, the satirist, through the narrator, calls for a new symbol, which turns out to be an apple, a symbol of organic growth and health (ironically, not far removed from the proverbial "apple pie"), abandoning the old symbol of the eagle "poisoned" by the fatal fungus.

The catalogue of sins in the passage cited above can readily be taken as a catalogue of Vonnegut's satiric targets. "Slavery and genocide and criminal neglect" refer to the treatment of the blacks, as well as the American war effort (for example, in Indochina). While the author reminds the reader of the bad treatment of blacks in the past, he is more cutting in his descriptions of the present situation of the Negro population. The black problem is called the "reindeer problem" from the code word reindeer which a white couple employs in order to be able to speak freely about the

black person in his presence:

The reindeer problem was essentially this: Nobody white had much use for black people anymore—except for the gangsters who sold the black people used cars and dope and furniture. Still, the reindeer went on reproducing. There were these useless, big black animals everywhere, and a lot of them had really bad dispositions. They were given small amounts of money every month, so they wouldn't have to steal. There was talk of giving them very cheap dope, too—to keep them listless and cheerful, and uninterested in reproduction.

The Midland City Police Department, and the Midland County Sheriff's Department, were composed mainly of white men. They had racks and racks of sub-machine guns and twelve gauge automatic shot-guns for an open season on reindeer which was bound to come (p. 164).

The mechanics of satire in this passage (strongly reminiscent of Swift's A Modest Proposal) are not too difficult to follow: we are dealing with overt irony. The dehumanization of blacks by calling them "reindeer" has the same quality as calling policemen "pigs." The passage beginning with "the reindeer" is naturally concluded with an "open season on reindeer." The essential dehumanization is stressed by calling the blacks "useless, big black animals." This, surely, is satire by overkill. Such satiric overkill (in the manner of Swift) is the symptom of a heightened satiric fury, a new saeva indignatio that is quite distant from the desperate nihilism which Elkin believes to be the trademark of the modern satirist.⁴ (It is advantageous for such a satirist to ignore both the rise of the black consciousness movement and, more important, the swift growth of black capitalism and the black middle-class.)

The only two blacks in the novel who do not fit the

stereotype of "reindeer" are the black doctor (who is not an American, but an African), and a black pimp, Elgin Washington (p. 278), whose leg is amputated in the tradition of poetic justice by a useless Bengali doctor, Khashdrar Miasma (a recent immigrant). (Both names are playfully ironic.)

The fictional universe of this satire is populated, then, by blacks who conform to the stereotype of black-man-as-slave. It is nowhere else as apparent as in a memorable scene in which a young black, Wayne Hoobler, looks through a peephole into a cocktail lounge, a place the like of which he has never seen before. The cocktail lounge is transformed through the perception of this inexperienced observer and made strange⁵ to the reader:

Wayne wanted to remove his eye from the peephole after a few seconds, because he didn't have nearly enough background information for any sort of understanding of what was going on in the cocktail lounge. The candles puzzled him, for instance. He supposed that the electricity in there had failed, and that somebody had gone to change the fuse. Also, he did not know what to make of Bonnie MacMahon's [waitress's] costume, which consisted of white cowboy boots and black net stockings with crimson garters plainly showing across several inches of bare thigh, and a tight sequin sort of bathing suit with a puff of pink cotton pinned to its rear.

Bonnie's back was to Wayne, so he could not see that she wore octagonal, rimless trifocals, and was a horse-faced woman forty-two years old (p. 214).

Wayne Hoobler, the observer in this passage, is an ex-convict, a victim, an innocent. As a tool of satire, he is, like Gulliver, the ingénu through whose eyes the reader rediscovers the world which at times is too familiar to be perceived as an object of satire. The ingénu-Hoobler is

instrumental in satirizing the American predilection for kitsch seen in the waitress's attire (Bonnie is a caricature of the "Playboy bunny"). The narrator consistently employs this device of making things strange (a device, to be sure, frequently used by satirists) when explaining or defining the things we take for granted. In using the definition for satiric purposes, Vonnegut continues the tradition of Ambrose Bierce's Devil's Dictionary (1906):

Like everybody else in the cocktail lounge, he was softening his brain with alcohol. This was a substance produced by a tiny creature called yeast. Yeast organisms ate sugar and excreted alcohol. They killed themselves by destroying their own environment with yeast shit (p. 208).

The passage proceeds as follows: first, we have a humorous, unusual description of drinking—it is "softening of the brain"; second, we have an even more unusual definition of alcohol. This definition is, nevertheless, scientifically accurate, if vulgarized. The lexical shift from "excrement" to "shit" stresses the resemblance between the self-destructive activity of yeast and the self-destructive activity of humans.

Another example of the device occurs in the amusing description of the effects of the force of gravity:

All of us were stuck to the surface of a ball, incidentally. The planet was ball shaped. Nobody knew why we didn't fall off, even though everybody pretended to kind of understand it. The really smart people understood that one of the best ways to get rich was to own a part of the surface people had to stick to (p. 241).

There is something infantile, something text-bookish

about these ready and super-simple, though often truthful, explanations. They are the explanations one encounters in commercial pamphlets, television commercials, and so on. Explanations like these are a beautiful parody of the infantile explanations one encounters in the mass media. As a result, not only the object of this passage (greed), but also its tenor serve to satirize the society since the narrator assumes the voice of a typical member of his society. Bakhtin's concept of the word with double orientation⁶ fits this passage very well. Yet, fortunate as this device no doubt is for satiric purposes, it confuses a reader who does not read the novel as a satire. Thus, Peter B. Messent complains how "initially meaningless and confusing is Vonnegut's technique in this novel of explaining absolutely everything, of embarking upon what appear to be vast, textual irrelevancies and little else."⁷

But this device, together with the use of the past tense ("All of us were stuck to the surface"), also helps to create a distance between reader and narrator. The narrator here is a man from the future, a Creator who manipulates his (and our) world. Further, he is a being who can escape the limitations of time and space. In the final encounter between the narrator and Kilgore Trout (a character created by the narrator), Trout learns that he is in the presence of his Creator:

"Are you crazy?" he [Trout] said.

No, I said. And I shattered his powers to doubt me. I transported him to the Taj Mahal and then to

Venice and then to Dar es Salaam and then to the surface of the Sun, where the flames could not consume him—and then back to Midland City again (p. 292).

After this encounter, the Creator (narrator) dematerializes into the void that is his "hiding place" (p. 294). This science-fiction ending, like the science-fiction element that runs throughout the novel, makes it possible for the narrator to assume a superior point of view in regard to the problems of the planet: he can revile and deride everything earthly because he resides in the void, somewhere outside the planet. In this way, he continues the narrative strategy of Slaughterhouse-Five whose narrator "lives in the res extensa and controls events in the novel through the manipulation of the res extensa,"⁸ and thus "plays havoc with the spatial-form tradition."⁹ This unearthly characteristic of the narrator has tremendous advantages for his satirical perspective. While he ends by dematerializing, the narrator also has a close connection with his planet. He plays at being (and for all the reader knows he is) an autobiographical narrator: he is approaching his fiftieth birthday, like Vonnegut; his father and grandfather were architects, like Vonnegut's; he was born in the same city, and so on. He includes non-fictional details like Professor W. H. Stockmayer of Dartmouth College, the author Thomas Wolfe, the paraphernalia of the modern U.S.A.: Pontiac, Plymouth, Kentucky Fried Chicken, MacDonald's, Avis, Hertz, and so on. While his residence in res extensa makes him a superior

critic-satirist, his closeness makes him an instant, and indeed native expert on the subjects he criticizes. But in the clash of the two elements (the fictional and the autobiographical) some flippancy seems unavoidable:

"It's all like an ocean!" cried Dostoevski.
I say it's all like cellophane (p. 228).

Indirectly, the bathos (elemental versus man-made; awe-inspiring versus trivial) is a satire of the triviality of our world compared with the past. Yet this flippancy is also a defence mechanism of Modern Man who, in Vonnegut's fictional universe, is burdened to the breaking point. Such flippancy is also the playful element in the face of tragedy, a Vonnegutian variation of "whistling in the dark." After all, the action takes place on a "planet which was dying fast."

To resolve the tension between the natural and the supernatural characteristics of the narrator, he is made to doubt his own sanity:

There in the cocktail lounge, peering out through my leaks at a world of my own invention, I mouthed this word: schizophrenia.

The sound and appearance of the word had fascinated me for many years. It sounded and looked to me like a human being sneezing in a blizzard of soapflakes.

I did not and do not know for certain that I have that disease (pp. 193-194).

This hint comes late in the novel, after we have already formed our opinion as to the reliability of the narrator. As we saw earlier, although he engaged in comical explanations of the obvious, he actually did so in order to

satirize that which is so commonly accepted. But after the hint about schizophrenia, and especially toward the end, when the narrator asserts very strongly his supernatural power, our reconstructions of what we have been offered in the narrative (whether reconstructions of ironies, or of what we as readers think to be the likeliest thing that "really" happened) are modified, thrown open to question. The narrator becomes unreliable. How does this influence our understanding and acceptance of the satire? The answer is that it does not. We may not altogether agree with Vonnegut's choice of satiric targets, but we recognize the satire, because it is the most consistent and reliable element in the novel, and because we suspect that the satire has been the raison d'être of the novel from the outset. We already know how to orient ourselves when the narrator tells us the following in the last part of the book:

As I approached my fiftieth birthday, I had become more and more enraged and mystified by the idiot decisions made by my countrymen. And then I had come suddenly to pity them, for I understood how innocent and natural it was for them to behave so abominably, and with such abominable results: They were doing their best to live like people invented in story books. This was the reason Americans shot each other so often: It was a convenient literary device for ending short stories and books. . . .

Once I understood what was making America such a dangerous, unhappy nation of people who had nothing to do with real life, I resolved to shun story-telling. I would write about life. Every person would be exactly as important as any other. All facts would also be given equal weightiness. Nothing would be left out. Let others bring order to chaos. I would bring chaos to order, instead, which I think I have done.

If all writers would do that, then perhaps citizens not in the literary trades will understand that there is no order in the world around us, that we must adapt ourselves to the requirements of chaos instead.

It is hard to adapt to chaos, but it can be done. I am living proof of that: It can be done (pp. 209-210).

In general, this passage is very useful for analyzing the satirist's position: it exploits, on the surface, the literary perception and understanding (ordering) of the world. The literary conventions of beginning, middle, and end, the gradual development of themes and characters are satirized here. The purely literary procedures are projected unjustifiably on reality, which is chaotic, and which people begin to see through those conventions ("life imitates art"). The satirist objects to this mainly because this abstract, hypothetical order is made to stand for the real chaotic world, out there, outside the abstraction. Obviously, the satirist overlooks the paradox inherent in this type of thinking: by perceiving the reality, we endow it with order. We are able to observe chaos and organize it into an order "merely" by perceiving. Those who are totally unable to do so are the victims of disorderly perception, and are considered ill. However paradoxical this defence of Vonnegut's manner of writing, the "schizophrenic, telegraphic style of the planet Tralfmadore," announced in Slaughterhouse-Five, is used very productively in this novel. John Somer goes further:

With the invention of his schizophrenic manner, Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., created the technical

perspective that he needed to exorcise the distracting and consuming cloud of Dresden, to resolve the aesthetic problems he discovered in The Sirens of Titan, and to re-invent himself and his universe in his "lousy little book" that sings like the crystal goblet of the schizophrenic planet Mercury.¹⁰

However, Peter B. Messent disagrees, believing that Vonnegut "has taken a fictional cul-de-sac,"¹¹ that his stylistic approach "basically fails and comes close at times to mere childishness."¹²

The fact is, the satirist only feigns pity when he pretends to think that people are innocent despite their behaving "so abominably, and with such abominable results"; he does not satirize these "innocents" for nothing up to this point: the only possible emotion in this passage is that of rage: the narrator is enraged by the "idiot decisions made by [his] countrymen." This is the only part of the cited passage that is substantiated in the novel, apart from the authorial programmatic manifesto ("writing about life," "bringing chaos to order") whose success, as the disagreement of the critics suggests, is hard to judge.

The strategy that the satirist adopts is the exploitation of the narrator-persona technique. In this way the satirist can mention things that are not related to the plot of the novel; he gives us a piece of his mind—ironically. We reconstruct the irony, and find what he wants to say balanced between "the idiot decisions made by my countrymen" and the conviction that "we must adapt ourselves to the requirements of chaos." It is clear that traditional satire

fought against artificiality for naturalness of some kind. And the satirist in Breakfast of Champions continues this fight. But he does so on many levels, some of which contradict each other. The jarring clash between the two examples that occur in the passage just quoted attests to this complexity. We are dealing here with satire that exploits devices without any considerations for internal harmony. It is an attack on all fronts at once. But surely, even a fictional universe that can accommodate such variety and disharmony must have certain limitations. These limitations become evident in the blind automatism of life in Midland City.

Midland City is Sinclair Lewis's Zenith brought up to date. The jump from the 'twenties to the 'seventies is seen even in the protagonists, Babbitt and Hoover. Dwayne Hoover, unlike Babbitt, represents an advanced stage in the economic development of the United States. Babbitt, as a real estate agent, symbolizes the extensive economy of an expanding, though not fully developed, country. Dwayne Hoover, on the other hand, is a car dealer symbolizing the intensive economy of a fully developed country. But even by Babbitt's time, life has started to become mechanized. The idea of men as machines intrigued Sinclair Lewis, whose Babbitt is worried about this development:

Mechanical business—a brisk selling of badly built houses. Mechanical religion—a dry, hard church, shut off from the real life of the streets, inhumanely respectable as a top-hat. Mechanical golf and dinner parties and bridge and conversation.

Save with Paul Riesling, mechanical friendships—back-slapping and jocular, never daring to essay the test of quietness.¹³

Yet there were redeeming features in this "mechanical" life. The protagonist himself, inasmuch as he becomes conscious of this "mechanical" life, escapes it, as does Paul Riesling, his friend and, we suspect, others who do not belong to the same social world. Vonnegut, however, carries the idea of automatism to the limit by including himself, as the narrator, in the number of people who are "programmed" and therefore operating "automatically." This is how he sees the characters in Midland City:

It didn't matter much what Dwayne said. It hadn't mattered much for years. It didn't matter much what most people in Midland City said out loud, except when they were talking about money or structures or travel or machinery—or other measurable things. Every person had a clearly defined part to play—as a black person, a female high school dropout, a Pontiac dealer, a gynecologist, a gas-conversion burner installer. If a person stopped living up to expectations, because of bad chemicals or one thing or another, everybody went on imagining that the person was living up to expectations anyway.

That was the main reason the people in Midland City were so slow to detect insanity in their associates. Their imaginations were flywheels on the ramshackle machinery of the awful truth (p. 142).

It is not only that the narrator fosters the suspicion that people are robots programmed by some distant Creator; he removes all meaning from the life of the people of Midland City, a "real" place in the fictional universe of the novel (compared with the science-fiction automated world of Trout's novels). However, this theme of people-as-robots ultimately runs counter to the aims of the satire. And the narrator's

belief in a world apparently populated by automatons is paradoxical (the satire of robots incapable of change or moral improvement would be a meaningless exercise). Consequently, Vonnegut handles the theme of automatism carefully, but not carefully enough, as we can see in the cited passage. We are told that people can change drastically because of "bad chemicals," but even though they start to act in a different, unexpected way, nobody will notice it. How is this possible? Because "it didn't matter much what most people in Midland City said out loud." The people are, then, limited by the "clearly defined part they have to play." Outside of their roles, they cease to exist. This limitation is a useful convention which allows Vonnegut to take care of a number of things at once; his most forceful concern is, perhaps, the lack of culture.

What is the meaning of culture for Vonnegut? In one place he says, "I have no culture, no humane harmony in my brains. I can't live without a culture anymore" (p. 5). This, the narrator believes, comes about because

The things other people have put into my head, . . . do not fit together nicely, are often useless and ugly, are out of proportion with one another, are out of proportion with life as it really is outside my head (Ibid.).

Talking about his novel in an interview, Vonnegut said: "What passes for a culture in my head is really a bunch of commercials, and this is intolerable. It may be impossible to live without a culture."¹⁴ The commercials he speaks about find their way even into the title of the novel ("Breakfast of

Champions" is a registered trademark of General Mills, Inc., on a breakfast cereal product [p. 1]). Culture is equated here with "humane harmony," in the sense of harmony between education and experience, between man's conditioned perception of the world and the expectations that his conditioning causes him to project onto the world. Obviously, the narrator is in contradiction with his hortatory statement about the necessity of adaptation to chaos. Not only do these two statements clash, but they both spring from the paradoxical disagreement between reality and its perception. One is mystified and forced to ask: What is this world outside? How do we know it exists, outside? And finally, how can it be perceived outside our senses?

Although the shift from a yearning for harmony to an advocacy of chaos can be explained as the development of the narrator, both contrasting views are motivated by the same paradoxical philosophy.

Culture is at one point symbolized by the demolished building designed by the narrator's (and author's) father and grandfather in Indianapolis. Another symbol is the concert hall in Midland City, with its busts of famous composers, which has been converted into a furniture store-house by the local Mafia chapter.

"Progress," in this novel, is always a turn for the worse, as it is in Orwell's novel. Kilgore Trout, accepting the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1979, declares: "Some people say there is no such thing as progress. The fact that human

beings are now the only animals left on Earth, I confess, seems a confusing sort of victory" (p. 25). Yet there are possibilities open in the future: "now we can build an unselfish society by devoting to unselfishness the frenzy we once devoted to gold and to underpants" (Ibid.). On the other hand, the past is not entirely uncritically idealized, as can be seen from the satire of slavery and the attitudes toward Negroes after the Civil War.

The narrator chooses not to lampoon one important element of the past: a hope that the future would bring prosperity. And prosperity meant happiness for the people of the United States then, as it does now in under-developed parts of the world. The narrator's friend Phoebe Hurty "believed what so many American believed then: that the nation would be happy and just and rational when prosperity came" (p. 2). This materialistic equation which is at the heart of modern civilization, at least from the eighteenth century onwards, is not satirized. Neither is the belief that prosperity equals Paradise. The narrator sentimentalizes:

I never hear that word anymore: Prosperity. It used to be a synonym for Paradise. . . . But nobody believes anymore in a new American paradise. I sure miss Phoebe Hurty (p. 2).

But what happened between that promising time and the time of the action of the novel? It seems that the time of hope was in the 'thirties (or 'forties?), which coincide with the author's youth. The reader becomes aware that between those

dates something went wrong. What was it? The narrator offers an answer:

When Dwayne Hoover and Kilgore Trout met each other, their country was by far the richest and most powerful country on the planet. It had most of the food and minerals and machinery, and it disciplined other countries by threatening to shoot big rockets at them or to drop things on them from airplanes.

Most other countries didn't have doodley-squat. Many of them weren't even inhabitable anymore. they had too many people and not enough space. They had sold everything that was any good, and there wasn't anything to eat anymore, and still the people went on fucking all the time (p. 12).

Apparently the disappointed hopes have something to do with the United States becoming an Empire embroiled in "imperial wars." And whatever wrong the United States does, the repercussions on life in that country are terrible. The results are cultural suicide, ecological suicide, the mechanization of humans, and the kingdom of kitsch. America becomes a country where everybody "was supposed to grab whatever he could and hold onto it. Some Americans were very good at grabbing and holding, were fabulously well-to-do. Others couldn't get their hands on doodley-squat" (p. 13). But it seems that, as bad as the state of the planet is in general, some hope remains:

A lot of people on the wrecked planet were Communists. They had a theory that what was left of the planet should be shared more or less equally among all the people, who hadn't asked to come to a wrecked planet in the first place (pp. 12-13).

This attitude to Communism is different from that expressed in Cat's Cradle (1963), in which the Communist party shares the dubious distinction of being considered as a good example

of a "false karass," that is:

. . . a seeming team that was meaningless in terms of the ways God gets things done, a textbook example of what Bokonon calls a granfalloon. Other examples of granfalloons are the Communist party, the Daughters of the American Revolution, the General Electric Company, the International Order of Odd Fellows—and any nation, anytime, anywhere.¹⁵

Communists, then, are not a target of satire in Breakfast of Champions, and the description of the planet's political system is limited (in this example) to the Communist theory without reference to the Communist practice. This limitation is imposed on this work for the sake of plasticity and contrast, in order to achieve a degree of roughness and sharpness of contrast and, thereby, to increase the impact of the satire. The universe has to be simplified into a manageable model so that the satirist, to make his satire striking, can show his likes and dislikes. This simplicity, or naivety, in dealing with politics places the narrator for a brief time in the shadow of an ingénu whenever he engages in explanation of political phenomena. His otherwise correct explanation of Fascism follows the pattern with the understandable change of stressing the Fascist practice:

Fascism was a fairly popular political philosophy which made sacred whatever nation and race the philosopher happened to belong to. It called for an autocratic, centralized government, headed up by a dictator. The dictator had to be obeyed, no matter what he told somebody to do (p. 180).

This Fascism is the dominant philosophy at the Prairie Military Academy, where Dwayne Hoover enrolls his son Bunny.

The robot-like automatism of life in Midland City has

already been mentioned, but the effect of this life on people has yet to be assessed. When the Paradise of Prosperity does not materialize, people are left without values. Their hopes are taken away from them. Their despair is expressed in a plea voiced by the hotel clerk, Milo:

Oh, Mr. Trout, . . . teach us to sing and dance and laugh and cry. We've tried to survive so long on money and sex and envy and real estate and football and basketball and automobiles and television and alcohol—on sawdust and broken glass! (p. 233).

The plea is tragicomic. On one hand it is an expression of the spiritual sterility of modern materialistic life whose only value is sensual gratification. Singing, dancing, laughing, and crying as alternatives have immaterial, emotional qualities, expressive of individual personality. The satirist undercuts this message, probably because he is reluctant to identify himself totally with it. (This satire lacks alternatives that look at least half-reasonable; but it is not the duty of a satirist to offer alternatives.) He undercuts it by having it communicated by a "graduate of the Cornell Hotel School," who is a "homosexual grandson of Guillermo 'little Willie' Maritimo, a bodyguard of the notorious Chicago gangster, Al Capone" (p. 229). But even the person who receives this message, Kilgore Trout, is an unlikely subject—an old, unsuccessful, science-fiction writer, whose novels, as described here, are parables of human self-destructiveness. Already in Slaughterhouse-Five, we have learned that "Kilgore Trout's unpopularity was deserved. His prose was frightful. Only his ideas were

good."¹⁶ And his ideas concern a fatal, almost innate tendency toward suicide, manifested in a creative variety of methods. Vonnegut admits that "suicide is at the heart of the book."¹⁷ But also, the book is his attempt (so far successful) to free himself of his obsession with suicide, which he used to think of "as a perfectly reasonable way to avoid delivering a lecture, to avoid a deadline, to not pay a bill, to not go to a cocktail party."¹⁸

In Milo's plea, we notice a negative appraisal of sex.¹⁹ It is placed in the same category as money and envy, a curious association. This banishment of sex is even more curious in light of the great fuss that modern society makes about it. The "new" permissiveness, the availability of pornography (also a target in the novel), the new ideas on sex resulting from the rise of the Women's Liberation movement are synonymous with the modern idea of real, positive progress. Only conservative (and clerical) elements would maintain a counter-attack. Yet Vonnegut satirizes some of these cherished ideas as well:

There was a sexual revolution going on in the country, and women were demanding that men pay more attention to women's pleasure during sexual intercourse, and not just think about themselves. The key to their pleasure, they said, and scientists backed them up, was the clitoris, a tiny meat cylinder which was right above the hole in women where men were supposed to stick their larger cylinders.

Men were supposed to pay more attention to the clitoris, and Dwayne had been paying a lot more attention to Francine's, to the point where she said he was paying too much attention to it. This did not surprise him. The things he had read about

the clitoris had said that this was a danger—that a man could pay too much attention to it.

So, driving out to the Quality Motor Court that day, Dwayne was hoping that he would pay exactly the right amount of attention to Francine's clitoris (pp. 150-151).

How does this sophisticated satire work so successfully? A brief reconstruction of the irony that serves as the tool of satire²⁰ in this passage should provide the answer.

At the beginning of the passage we are unaware of the way it will climax, and so we accept the expression "sexual revolution" quite innocently as referring to the women's movement in general. Images of discrimination, of exploitation, and so on, fleetingly cross our minds. When we come to "women's pleasure," we already know that the innocuous beginning contained an ironic charge, and from this point on, we read with anticipation of irony. Our attention is not concentrated on the irony as such (for we have already recognized it) but more on the way in which the narrator develops the topic of sex in ironic discourse.

What follows is a very good example of the ironist's turning a subject against itself by exaggerating its essential qualities.

The target is obviously the mechanistic view of sex in general, and the subject of clitoral orgasm in particular. The satirist seems to object to the clamour raised by a significant number of Women's Liberation activists. Whether or not the controversy between the "vaginal" and the

"clitoral" orgasm is important to the cause of women's rights, and whether or not it is resolved either way, is really immaterial for the satirist. For him, this whole discussion and the view of sex it entails are preposterous and ridiculous. Yet, with all the support of the medical profession, of "sex researchers" (such as Masters and Johnson, and Shere Hite), and of prominent figures of the movement, the issue has to a great extent been treated as legitimate. The satirist is after this legitimacy. He is after the dehumanization of sex through analysis, detailed study, and mechanization. Consequently, by choosing his best weapon, irony, he takes over the movement's own beliefs and uses them to the movement's disadvantage. He beats the sex-revolutionaries at their own game by being even more "anatomical." When he says "tiny meat cylinder," he becomes only anatomically more precise, with the result that sexual activity begins to resemble, of all things, plumbing. When he makes Dwayne Hoover think about the attention he must show to Francine's clitoris, he, the satirist, appears to pay too much attention to the melancholy subject. If what Dwayne goes through is consistent with the modern approach to sex (where love is not even mentioned)—and we feel that it is—then the satirist makes "the particular attention one should not forget to pay" the exclusive feature of sex. The feigned seriousness is finally revealed as a satiric attack on the sort of serious approach that has clinically dissected the subject to its detriment. The narrator is using for this

once the persona of an "objective reporter," a particularly suitable mask for the job: a "touchy," shocking subject is neutralized only to shock as satire.

Vonnegut is aware of the tension stemming from the contradiction between the requirements of satire and the fictional universe inhabited by robot-like beings. He tries to relieve the tension by stating that his beliefs are based on empirical observation of the effect of chemicals on human behaviour and the effects of certain diseases on human locomotion (his "robots" are likened to victims of an advanced stage of syphilis, locomotor ataxia). He says that seeing these afflicted people in his youth induced him to think of people as machines subject to the whimsy of chemicals (pp. 3-4). This explanation represents a development, a change from the ideas presented in Slaughterhouse-Five. There, the much more advanced beings, the Tralfamadorians, know better:

Tralfamadorians, of course, say that every creature and plant in the Universe is a machine. It amuses them that so many Earthlings are offended by the idea of being machines.²¹

In Breakfast of Champions, we learn that this Tralfamadorian belief is held by the narrator himself:

I had come to the conclusion that there was nothing sacred about myself or about any human being, that we were all machines, doomed to collide and collide and collide. For want of anything better to do, we became fans of collisions. Sometimes I wrote well about collisions, which meant I was a writing machine in good repair. Sometimes I wrote badly, which meant I was a writing machine in bad repair. I no more harbored sacredness than did a Pontiac, a mousetrap, or a South Bend Lathe (pp. 219-220).

The retreat from this position is effected in two ways:

first, in laying bare the device (man = machine) by referring to locomotor ataxia; second, by introducing a counterpoint to the robot image in the assertion of the sacred element in the closing pages of the novel. The introduction of this sacred element is foreshadowed in an unlikely scene taking place in a public washroom:

There was a message written in pencil on the tiles by the roller towel. This was it: What is the purpose of life?

Trout plundered his pockets for a pen or pencil. He had an answer to the question. But he had nothing to write with, not even a burnt match. So he left the question unanswered, but here is what he would have written, if he had found anything to write with:

To be
the eyes
and ears
and conscience
of the Creator of the Universe,
you fool.

When Trout headed back for his seat in the theatre, he played at being the eyes and ears and conscience of the Creator of the Universe. He sent messages by telepathy to the Creator, wherever He was. He reported that the men's room had been clean as a whistle (pp. 66-67).

Evidently, the reader is not allowed to take the "message" too seriously. The whole passage can indeed be read as one reads a stable irony. The banality of the message, the telepathy, and primarily the setting of the scene (the men's room), all work to prevent the reader from attaching significance to the incident. However, the bleakness of the fictional universe of this novel is alleviated by the inclusion of an almost mystical item. It cures the narrator

of considering all animals (human and others) as merely machines. Rabo Karabekian, a painter, cures the narrator by insisting that "Our awareness is all that is alive and maybe sacred in any of us. Everything else about us is dead machinery" (p. 221). Having changed his mind, the narrator is able to see inside the "writing meat machine" (himself) "something sacred, which is an unwavering band of light" (p. 225). Certainly, this element is too fragile and too brief to serve as the backbone of an entire philosophy able to animate the satire. Without submitting models of a perfect universe, satire is satisfied by cutting down the wrong, the phony, the dead.

It is characteristic that in this satire, as in much of modern satire, the positive elements, the "unwavering band of light," is presented in a manner that invites (or at least does not discourage) ironic interpretation: Is the narrator serious, reliable (un-ironic) this time? We are instantly reminded of the schizophrenia that haunts the narrator. We have to back up and give up. The satire will be the only thing we are going to take away with us when we take leave of the novel. And not because of our own choice. The satirist has "programmed" us to do so.

Vonnegut is satisfied not to go beyond criticism of the damage men do to their environment and to their fellow men; the examination of the reasons behind this suicidal behaviour takes second place. In this age of psychology—and, even more, pseudo-psychology—he still adheres to the

behaviourist doctrine. The bleakness of Midland City is not ultimately explainable by the fact that it is inhabited by robots. Both the robots and the dying environment in which they live are effects of a cause that is intimated but never openly declared. We can only guess at it. The device of dealing with men suspected of being merely machines relieves the satirist of the necessity of searching their psyche, as well as the narrator's own psyche. This is a danger that Vonnegut avoids by letting his narrator be influenced by the action of his novel. Thus, we have a curious situation where feed-back from the fictional characters influences the narrator so much that it causes his conversion. Hence, Robert Merrill believes that "in a rather zany way, it is a Bildungsroman about a fifty-year-old artless artist and facile philosopher. It is also a novel about the regeneration of this sorry figure."²² According to this view, Dwayne Hoover's thematic function is to "point up the disastrous consequences of adopting a deterministic view of man."²³ And this suggests a kind of sentimental traditionalism, an essential conservatism that slowly emerges from under the veneer of adolescent prankishness affected by the narrator. He never questions the correctness of Phoebe Hurty's belief that Prosperity equals Paradise. He only wishes it to be so in spite of the wealth of evidence to the contrary that he himself compiles. The narrator's nostalgia for the culture of the past (symbolized by architecture and music) and his distaste for the fashion of exhibitionism evidenced in the

contemporary treatment of the sex problem are both symptoms of his conservatism. Paradoxically, the ostensible effort of the narrator to sneer at and ridicule some of the remaining vestiges of tradition, primarily in the area of politics, is not enough to cover up this essential conservatism.

If this analysis and interpretation are correct, the satire of Vonnegut can be seen to be both complex from the point of view of contemporary satire and consistent with the traditional position that satirists have taken ever since the time of Juvenal: resistance to change (while at the same time describing an interior change, the conversion of the narrator). But as we have seen, Vonnegut does not resist change indiscriminately. As James Sutherland says: "The satirist is now concerned to save the human race, either from complete extinction, or from a change so fundamental that its essential humanity would be lost."²⁴ Accordingly, Vonnegut forestalls the loss of "essential humanity" by tracing the features of this fundamental change in his satiric picture of Midland City, in his gallery of characters. He gives us a sneak preview of this fundamental change: where human values perish, men are replaced by robots. And he is asking us, through the medium of satire, if we like what we see.

Finally, there remains the issue of the critical response to this novel as a satire. It is disappointing to see how unimportant the fact that the novel is satirical

seems to be to the scholars studying the work. It is not a problem of inability to identify satire: Peter B. Messent, for example, notes that in Breakfast of Champions "American institutions are mercilessly satirized,"²⁵ but this to him is clearly of secondary importance, as indeed it seems to be for American critical response in general. What is, then, of primary importance to the American interpreters of Vonnegut? First of all, it is his role as "a myth-maker and fabulist rather than as a dramatic and narrative novelist,"²⁶ —or as a satirist, one might add. What fascinates them is his "structural discontinuities (which are really a new continuity) and radical juxtapositions of space fantasy and homely everyday existence . . . his version of what I call social surrealism."²⁷ Robert Scholes identifies Vonnegut as "a vulgar sentimentalist—a quality he shares with Dickens, for instance. He is also a crude humorist—a quality he shares with Mark Twain."²⁸ Karen and Charles Wood look at Vonnegut as a man who legitimizes science-fiction: "If anyone can pull science-fiction into the mainstream of literature, Vonnegut can."²⁹ They also try to account for his success:

By now man knows that the universe is absurd. Perhaps he may, however, let Kurt Vonnegut explore the idea of absurdity further in terms of time travel, space travel, man's ultimate destiny, and all the motifs which fit his time so well because they grew out of and were created within it.³⁰

And Glenn Meeter, concentrating on the narrator, finds that Vonnegut's "deadpan" narrator is related to deadpan tall-tale narrators from Swift's Gulliver to Twain's Jim Baker.³¹

Furthermore, "Vonnegut like Borges has imagined an 'alternative world' to which his stories allude; and like Borges he makes his fictions out of such allusions."³² Referring to the satire of Slaughterhouse-Five, which was originally "one book" with Breakfast of Champions,³³ Meeter says that the kind of satirical passages

. . . whose portrayal of America as a merely secular agglomeration of individuals is familiar in writers like Eliot, Auden, and Waugh, is rare in Vonnegut. For the most part his work accepts the loss of tradition rather gladly as a fact, and even demands that it become a fact.³⁴

With all the qualifications, when Glenn Meeter speaks about "satirical passages," his approach also supports the view that satire is truly regarded as only of secondary importance in Vonnegut's work. And it runs counter to what I have called Vonnegut's essential conservatism, an observation supported not only by my interpretation of the text of the novel, but also by some observations of Vonnegut's earlier work voiced by Jess Ritter:

While his techniques may be hip, his morality is strictly sober middle class. In this respect, he greatly resembles George Orwell, the Orwell who returned to a solid assertion of basic middle-class values in Keep the Aspidistra Flying.³⁵

J. Klinkowitz echoes this approach when he says that "when Vonnegut criticizes middle-class American life, he does not do it from a position of superiority."³⁶

Thus, the enormous interest generated by the work of Kurt Vonnegut leads scholars to examine the varied facets of his challenging prose without a consensus about satire. But

the fact that they do mention Dickens, Twain, Swift, Eliot, Auden, Waugh, Orwell, and others³⁷ is certainly significant, because it alerts us precisely to the significance of the novel as a satire. It is therefore much more than a mere curiosity to encounter the overwhelming enthusiasm and sensitivity toward Vonnegut's work which marks its reception in the Soviet Union. Donald M. Fiene, who studied this reception,³⁸ reports that none of the Soviet critics "dissent from the view that Vonnegut is a master novelist—at the very least, the best contemporary writer of satire in America."

This is remarkable [Fiene adds] since ordinarily there is a rather sharp disparity in the views of the most conservative and most liberal Soviet critics, especially where the touchy problem of American literature is concerned.³⁹

They consider him also "a genuine dissident writer,"⁴⁰ and "the closest thing to an American counterpart to Solzhenitsyn."⁴¹ It may be objected at this point that such extraordinary praise may be due quite simply to political expediency, but this is clearly not the case since, as Fiene proves, there is a firm consensus among Soviet critics to regard Vonnegut as a satirist without any reservations. They see his laughter as the Gogolian "laughter through tears,"⁴² and "mention him with Saltykov-Shchedrin as a master satirist."⁴³ Soviet critic S. Vishnevsky notes the use of ostranenie in his commentary on Breakfast of Champions.⁴⁴ While doubting that a genuine Russian influence can be proved in Vonnegut's case, Fiene notes that it is Fyodor

Dostoevsky, "of all Russian writers, with whom Vonnegut has the greatest affinity."⁴⁵ However, Fiene finds an important difference between Dostoevsky and Vonnegut. He characterizes Dostoevsky as "a believer who was able to feel in the depths of his being the despair of the atheist, while Vonnegut is a despairing atheist who is able to feel in the depths of his soul the life-saving faith of the believer."⁴⁶ Nevertheless, when Fiene says that Vonnegut's books represent an effort to prove Dostoevsky wrong by insisting that "good may exist without God,"⁴⁷ he illustrates his point by including, as an example of Dostoevsky's competitive idea, Ivan Karamazov's statement, "if God does not exist, then all is lawful."⁴⁸ And yet, it is precisely this conclusion of Ivan Karamazov that drives Dwayne Hoover insane, when he goes on a rampage certain that everybody except him is an unfeeling machine. He can kill anyone: they are all machines; he alone is human. This certainly sounds like a variation of the superman philosophy that underlines Ivan Karamazov's conclusion. And what does Vonnegut do with Dwayne Hoover? He uses him as an illustration to prove Ivan Karamazov's conclusion wrong, which makes him prove Dostoevsky right, not wrong—as Fiene believes.

Robert Merrill has noticed that Dwayne Hoover, this modern Babbitt, compares himself to Job: "I couldn't help wondering if that was what God put me on Earth for—to find out how much a man can take without breaking" (p. 166).⁴⁹ Because Hoover goes berserk, he shows us that there is a

limit to what he can take. Also, Hoover provides an example for Vonnegut himself: he "rescues" Vonnegut from his own despondency⁵⁰ in this satirical Bildungsroman. That this reading is not mistaken, that it is not farfetched, is obvious in the motto of the novel. It can be easily overlooked. In no uncertain words, it signals to us the success of this satire as therapy for the author:

When he hath tried me,
I shall come forth as gold.

—JOB

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Surveying some representative statements about satire, one becomes particularly aware of the tentative nature of these pronouncements. They are, to use a traditional phrase, "saving the appearances." The area of satire criticism where this becomes most apparent, as I have tried to show in my introduction, is the area of definition of satire and a discussion of whether or not satire is a genre. I agreed with Gerald O'Connor, who said that satire is a genre that is more difficult to define than to identify. It would be only too easy to attribute these difficulties to the peculiarities of satiric literature exclusively. And it would also be an error. Suffice it to mention in this respect the learned polemic on the theory of genres that we can find in Tzvetan Todorov's The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre.¹ If there is anything except the arbitrary and professedly hypothetical nature of the theory of genres, their taxonomy, that one can glean from this polemic, it must be the strong case for the existence of genres:

. . . failing to recognize the existence of genres is equivalent to claiming that a literary work does not bear any relationship to already existing works. Genres are precisely those relay-points by which the work assumes a relation with the universe of literature.²

I hope to have sufficiently demonstrated the satiric nature of the four novels discussed here. But the fact that I have approached them from the perspective of genre has left me open to a slight danger of discovering "a principle operative in a number of texts, rather than what is specific

about each of them."³ To correct this inherent handicap of the procedure, I have not only assumed that I was dealing with satire, but I have also made it clear that each of the four novels is a part of a sub-genre. Hence, I have tried to find out what is specific about those satires. But more of this later.

Now, accepting those characteristics of satire that figure in most definitions: criticism ("censure," "attack," "vituperatio") and humour ("wit," "comedy," "gallows humour"), I would like to suggest a diagram of satire based on these two essentials. This will enable me to relate the four satires to the so far implicit definition of satire in a formal way. In doing so, I realize that: first, "works need not coincide with categories, which have merely a constructed existence; a work can, for example, manifest more than one category, more than one genre,"⁴ and second, the aim of this exercise is description, not prescription.

The horizontal axis of this diagram is the axis of humour, containing a progression from wit to gallows humour, or from Comedy to Tragedy. The vertical axis is the axis of criticism, with progression from Reality to Fiction, and it is designed to include the characteristic which distinguishes satirical literature from other types of literature on the one hand, and from non-literature on the other. Satire is the meeting-point of criticism and humour in a literary work. This meeting-point is already expressed in the concept of ridicule, but ridicule does not always equal satire. Finally,

satire is also situated somewhere between literature proper (Fiction), where the literary text does not enter into referential relationship with the world, and non-literature (Reality), where, as in everyday speech, there is a clear referential relationship. An ideal satire should be situated closer to, rather than farther from the intersection of the two axes. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that a formally "ideal" satire will be superior to a formally inferior one.

Granted this diagram of satire is sufficient for my purpose, the question now arises: How close to the ideal satire are the four novels?

The Good Soldier is known predominantly as a work of humour. That is, on my horizontal axis, it will be situated close to the pole of Comedy. At the same time, the criticism of war is accompanied by a wealth of material of documentary character: actual names of people, their communications, newspaper clippings, and so on, and this places the novel close to the pole of Reality on the vertical.

The Master and Margarita shows a clear balance between Comedy and Tragedy; it is less humorous than The Good Soldier, and so close to the centre on the horizontal. The heavy dose of fantasy places it on the side of the pole of Fiction on the vertical.

1984 is closer to Tragedy than any of the other works and it maintains a balance on the criticism axis. Instead of the boisterous type of humour found in the other three

works, this offers mostly painful irony and sarcasm. But this is no reason to deny this darkest of comedies its place in the genre of satire.

Finally, Breakfast of Champions, when compared to the other three works, comes very close to the middle on both axes, and therefore close to the formally "ideal" satire. There is a balance of Comedy and Tragedy as the often spontaneous humour combines with the record of destruction on many levels: the destruction of the environment, of the culture, of human beings themselves. The familiarity with America of yesterday (and partly of today) is balanced, on the criticism axis, with the fantastic, science-fiction element. The shifting masks of Vonnegut's narrator also contribute to the balance of this satire, as they invest it with suspenseful ambiguity.

By relating the four satires to the diagram which illustrates the implicit definition of satire, I have only pointed out their satirical nature without any reference to the fact that they actually represent different kinds of satire; that is, that they represent different sub-genres. My next concern, then, is the specificity of the four novels as examples of four sub-genres of satire.

When we speak of satire today, ". . . we usually have no sense of formal specification whatever," says R. C. Elliott.⁵ But if formal specifications are not forthcoming, this does not mean that all attempts at classification should be abandoned. Conscious of the modern handicap, I

characterize the four satires discussed here under headings that suggest thematic groups of similar satirical works (anti-militarist, metaphysical, anti-utopian, and anti-American).

These groups have historical precedents; they are "open" in the sense that they can accommodate future satires. They are also, however, to use Wittgenstein's expression that has been accepted and adopted by Elliott,⁶ "a concept with blurred edges"; that is, they are open to an unlimited variety of satirical works providing these works share the attack on the military, concern themselves with metaphysical problems, criticize utopianism, or attack the American way of life.⁷ But do those four categories exhaust twentieth-century satirical writing, particularly its variety? Clearly they do not. I doubt if any system could. Conceivably, there could be satires that share nothing with these four categories, and one could add further groups to supplement them. The value of the four categories should, then, be assessed not as limiting the conditions for the future affiliation of satires, but, on the contrary, as fulfilling O'Connor's suggestion that some kind of framework should be provided for encouraging critical interest, particularly in contemporary satire.

Some of the themes of the four satires that represent larger thematic groups are as follows: the preoccupation with insanity, expressed at times in the character of a madman; the concern with the workings of political systems, shown not

only in the criticism of totalitarianism through the medium of anti-utopia, but also in anti-militarism and in the outright rejection of American capitalism in the guise of the American way of life, as well as the Conquest of Nature; the continuing criticism of the idea of Progress; the exposé of the dehumanization of man; and the changing attitudes to human nature.

Not all these themes are shared by all four satires. However, none of the four ignores the theme of mental illness. Hašek's Švejk is a certified idiot; Bulgakov's Master is locked up in an asylum until he starts to doubt his sanity; Orwell's Winston Smith is forced, by torture, to abandon his rationality in an irrational world; the madness of Vonnegut's Dwayne Hoover is the climax of the novel, a climax into which the reader is led through a preparatory stage that includes a peculiar chemico-biological theory of mental illness. Consequently, mental illness and individual breakdown become common characteristic themes in modern satire:

The protagonist in Pirandello's Henry IV prefers a world of illusion to the horror of the real world. In Paul Green's Johnny Johnson the only sane man in a warring world is kept in an insane asylum which seems considerably more rational than conventional society. Mad generals run the war of Johnny Johnson, mad colonels control lives in Catch 22, . . . mad dreamers take over the mad world of Genêt's Balcony.⁸

In Günter Grass's The Tin Drum, the world is "insane, distorted, illogical. . . . mad characters are harmless, while the sane people create horrors."⁹

In contrast to such a shared theme, there is the particular topic of the American way of life that appears only in Breakfast of Champions. On the other hand, the far more general and all-embracing theme of the dehumanization of man could, possibly, include the theme of mental illness as an illustration of this dehumanization; the same could be said of other themes as well. Apart from Hašek's work, anti-militarism, for example, appears in the works of Orwell and Vonnegut. But in Orwell it illustrates the totalitarian nature of the Oceanic government, and in Vonnegut, the potential fascism of an American military academy. Only in Hašek's novel is it a thorough criticism of both the political system and the military mentality.

These differences point to the unusually rich inventiveness of the satirists' narrative strategy. Hašek, for example, uses as the main vehicle the "pub story," which gives the novel a polyphonic¹⁰ quality, which is further heightened by the use of letters, documents, newspaper articles, and so on. Bulgakov uses a number of narrative styles, among which the dominant contrast is between the styles of the Moscow and Jerusalem narratives; in the first, one can detect journalese, substandard expressions, colloquialisms, and, in the second, the rhetorically-balanced prose with its exotic lexicon and all the dignity of the high style. Orwell offers us a mixture of description and introspection: the documentary quality of the first is supplemented by the revelatory quality of the diary, and a

political pamphlet. Smith's inner development as captured in the diary is "foregrounded" by the greyness of the dispassionate reportage that forms the unchanging background. Vonnegut experiments ambitiously with what one could call a "democratic" novel: each character is invested with the importance traditionally associated with principal characters; in addition, since one of the characters is a writer, we have a number of plots of "science-fiction novels" that provide a further thematic contribution.

In the various narrative strategies represented here, one can detect a unifying element which, from the point of view of the satiric plan of the novel, one could call the device of the "clash of worlds." This is also understood when we talk about contrast or inversion, although I prefer to use these terms in a particular way, as distinct from the more general "clash of worlds." How is this device represented in our satires?

Hašek uses it in the following manner: the world of the Austrian Imperial Court, of international politics, and of the Church, clashes with the world of lumpenproletariat, represented by Švejk. The difference in this representation is crucial. Švejk's feigned idiocy is really the cunning of a man who draws from the reservoir of folk wisdom in order to defeat the pathetic and degenerate aristocracy.

In Bulgakov's novel, the clash occurs on several levels. The most profound of these is the clash of the sacred with the profane world,¹¹ which, moreover, is mirrored

by the clash between the official ideology and reality. The ideology proclaims the birth of the New Man; the reality shows the continued corruption and depravity. The clash between the sacred and the profane confronts us with the notion of metaphysical satire, the ancient predecessor of which is The Golden Ass of Apuleius.

In 1984, Winston Smith discovers, both in "Goldstein's" historical notes and in his own sketchy memory of the past, the existence of a world radically different from the one he knows and in which he finds himself. He pursues this other world, learns more and more about it and, in the process, becomes estranged from the world of the present. This is coupled with the theme (also an almost metaphysical one) of the struggle between the rational (symbolized by the equation $2+2=4$) and the irrational ($2+2=5$): a struggle that is the modern counterpart, or figura, of the mythical struggle between good and evil as represented in the battle between St. George and the Dragon.

In Breakfast of Champions, the science-fiction "novels" of Kilgore Trout clash with the fictional reality of the automated, deterministic world of the updated Zenith, Midland City. This is paralleled by the narrator's dawning discovery of the fallacy of fatalism: human beings are not robots; they possess awareness: an "unwavering band of light."

The existence of the essential unity demonstrated by this device may be due to the requirements of satiric writing: that is, to the implicit opposition that any satire

exemplifies. However, the means whereby this clash is expressed differ. The list of devices is not short: besides irony, parody, grotesque and caricature, I have often mentioned contrast, inversion, transposition, figura, symbol, indirection, humour (including black comedy), the particular use of names, and adaptation. Here, too, one should point out the specific use of a term that could otherwise be subsumed under a more general term. Parody, for example, can be delightfully ironic, and thus, in turn, can be quite humorous. But the use of the terms is justified by a particular situation or episode: for example, when I analyze Hašek's story about Mr Karlík and Mr Mikeš, I first speak about the reconstruction of irony, and then about the fact that the story is a parody of an oral contract. However, what interests me here in particular is the exclusive use of a device, or its absence, in a given satire.

Given the lack of uniformity on the level of these satiric devices, and the further lack of unity in the choice of targets, it must come as a surprise that modern satire, with the manifestations of which this work is concerned, has earned quite a bad reputation. P. K. Elkin, speaking about twentieth-century satire as opposed to traditional, locates the heart of the problem within the satirist himself:

The twentieth-century satirist sees himself as completely alienated from society and, for this and other reasons, he is fundamentally unsure of himself and his standards—less reasonable and judicial than Dryden or Johnson, more pessimistic than Juvenal or Swift. His tone may be cynical, or hysterical, but

it is unlikely to be hortatory, and for saeva indignatio he may substitute a despairing nihilism.¹²

According to Elkin, alienation, the faithful whipping horse, together with pessimism, nihilism, a cynical, hysterical tone, and a low regard for reason are the identifying features of the twentieth-century satirist.¹³ The extreme example he chooses to prove his case is Nathanael West, who once admitted that "there is nothing to root for in my work and what is even worse, no rooters."¹⁴ It is true that the approach of the modern satirist has profoundly changed the character of satire. For example, it is unthinkable for a modern satirist to satirize poverty. Pope was perhaps the last great satirist who could afford to do so, yet even he felt the need to justify this target:

Poverty becomes a just subject
of satyr, when it is consequence
of vice, prodigality, or neglect of
one's lawful calling.¹⁵

Could we prove that the twentieth-century satirist is more alienated from society than, say, Juvenal or Pope? Are Elkin's allegations correct? The evidence of the four satires discussed in these pages does not point to such a conclusion. Of the four, the only satire accused of nihilism is The Good Soldier; and even in that work the accusation rests on the identification of Marek as Hašek's spokesman. But the satire is optimistic, not pessimistic. Vonnegut's satire represents actually a case against nihilism, and the same can be said of the satires of Orwell and Bulgakov. As for the low regard for reason, 1984 is one of the most moving

affirmations of rationality; The Master and Margarita is a defence of the search for gnosis; The Good Soldier extolls popular wisdom; and Breakfast of Champions, for all its ambiguities, ridicules unreason. Consequently, with very few exceptions, the evidence of the four satires studied indicates that Elkin's allegations are not correct. On the contrary, the opposite holds true in most cases.

I realize that my selection cannot possibly account for all the attitudes, approaches, beliefs, and philosophies that the entire corpus of modern satiric literature communicates. But if this selection indicates, in any representative fashion, modern satire's views of the human situation (and there is no reason why these novels should not), then its message might be of some value. "We are in a bad way," is one way to put it. Modern satire's diagnosis of the human situation points to a serious disease; there is no lack of dark colours in its depiction: the perversions of human nature, the stupidity, the new forms of slavery, the lack of love. But there is also a prescription: overcoming the disease through popular wisdom (Hašek), love (Bulgakov), sacrifice (Orwell), and awareness (Vonnegut). Such is the message of the four satirical novels.

NOTES

¹James Sutherland, English Satire (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1967), p. 108.

²Sutherland, p. 132. The term "nihilism" crops up frequently in discussions of twentieth-century satire, and I use it too. I subscribe to R. Olson's definition of "nihilism" as moral skepticism, "a disbelief in the possibility of justifying moral judgements in some rational way," and, further, "if philosophers reflect the intellectual climate of the times in which they live, then our age is truly nihilistic. At no period in Western history, with the possible exception of the Hellenistic age, have so many philosophers regarded moral statements as somehow arbitrary." "Nihilism," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), V, 515.

³Sutherland, p. 132.

⁴Northrop Frye, "The Nature of Satire" (1944), rpt. Satire: Theory and Practice, eds. C. A. Allen and G. D. Stephens (Belmont: Wadsworth Publ. Co., 1962), p. 29.

⁵Ibid.

⁶R. C. Elliott, The Power of Satire: Magic, Ritual, Art (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1960), p. 223.

⁷Ibid. Although Joyce, Proust, Musil, Kafka, and others are often discussed as satirists. The key word here, apparently, is "preeminently."

⁸The Anatomy of Satire (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1962), p. 3.

⁹Introduction to Satire (Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State Univ. Press, 1967), p. 17.

¹⁰R. Paulson, ed., in the Introduction to Satire: Modern Essays in Criticism (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1971), p. ix.

¹¹Ibid., p. xiii.

¹²Ibid.

¹³"Four Approaches to Satire: the Archetypal, the Historical, the Rhetorical, and the Anthropological." Diss. Boston Univ. Graduate School, 1968.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 192.

¹⁵Ibid.

- ¹⁶Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, trans. R. W. Rotsel (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1973).
- ¹⁷In Probleme des Realismus I (Berlin: Luchterhand, 1971).
- ¹⁸Ibid., p. 107.
- ¹⁹O komizmie (Warszawa: Książka i wiedza, 1967).
- ²⁰Komicheskoe (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1970).
- ²¹Problemy stylizacji w satyrze (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1966).
- ²²Satirischer Stil: Zur Satire Robert Musils in "Man ohne Eigenschaften" (Bonn: H. Bouvier, 1960).
- ²³Verkehrte Welt: Vorstudien zu einer Geschichte der deutschen Satire (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1963).
- ²⁴Satire: Studien zu Niedhart, Wittenwiler, Brant und zur satirischer Schreibart (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1967).
- ²⁵Ibid., p. 450.
- ²⁶This "revival" is enthusiastically described in the Introduction to Modern Satire, ed. Alvin B. Kernan (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1962), p. iv.
- ²⁷Ibid., p. v.
- ²⁸Ibid.
- ²⁹Ibid.
- ³⁰Ibid., p. iv.
- ³¹O'Connor, p. 220.
- ³²Patricia Meyer Spacks, "Some Reflections on Satire" (1968), rpt. Satire: Modern Essays, p. 377.
- ³³O'Connor, p. 72, n. 17.
- ³⁴Ibid.
- ³⁵O'Connor does not seem to be aware of S. J. Greenblatt's Three Modern Satirists: Waugh, Orwell, and Huxley (New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1965).
- ³⁶Satire (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), p. 13.

³⁷Feinberg, p. vii.

³⁸The Art of Satire (1940; rpt. New York: Russell & Russell, 1960), p. 3.

³⁹Gaier, p. 329, and n. 2.

⁴⁰O'Connor, p. 216.

⁴¹"Satire," Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, eds. A. Preminger, F. J. Warnke, O. B. Hardison, Jr. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965), p. 738.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Feinberg, p. 19.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 18.

⁴⁵Frye, "The Nature of Satire," p. 15.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 16.

⁴⁷From A Treasury of Satire (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), rpt. in Satire: Theory and Practice, p. 31.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 32.

⁵⁰From Swift and the Satirist's Art (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1963), rpt. Satire: Modern Essays, pp. 317-318.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 323.

⁵²That is, in his article "The Nature of Satire" (1944), quoted earlier.

⁵³Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957), p. 310.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵The Plot of Satire (New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1965) p. 13, n. 9.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 105.

⁵⁹Kernan, The Plot of Satire, p. 105.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, p. 106.

⁶¹*Ibid.*

⁶²*Ibid.*

⁶³Sutherland, p. 5.

⁶⁴M. Mack, "The Muse of Satire" (1951), rpt. The Practice of Criticism, eds. Zitner et al. (Glenview: Scott, Foresman, 1966), p. 15.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁶⁶Spacks, p. 360.

⁶⁷Elliott, The Power of Satire, pp. viii-ix.

⁶⁸Feinberg, p. 228.

⁶⁹Hodgart, p. 214.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*

⁷¹Wyndham Lewis, "The Greatest Satire Is Nonmoral," Satire: Modern Essays, p. 77.

⁷²Rosenheim, Swift, p. 305.

⁷³*Ibid.*

⁷⁴Frye, "The Nature of Satire," pp. 15-16.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁷⁶B. Gray, The Phenomenon of Literature (The Hague: Mouton, 1975), p. 288.

⁷⁷Elliott, The Power of Satire, p. 185.

⁷⁸A Rhetoric of Irony (Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 276.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, p. ix.

⁸⁰Worcester, p. 73.

⁸¹*Ibid.*

⁸²Frye, "The Nature of Satire," p. 23.

⁸³Pirandello, On Humor, trans. A. Illiano and D. P. Testa (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1974), p. 131.

⁸⁴Booth, A Rhetoric of Irony, p. xiv.

⁸⁵Ibid., pp. 233-277.

⁸⁶Robert P. Falk, "Burlesque," Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, p. 88.

⁸⁷R. P. Falk and W. Breare, "Parody," Princeton Encyclopedia, p. 600.

⁸⁸Worcester, p. 41.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 60.

⁹⁰Highet, p. 67.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²For a discussion of the movement and its contribution, see Victor Erlich, Russian Formalism: History—Doctrine, 2nd ed. (The Hague: Mouton, 1969).

⁹³Ibid., p. 248.

⁹⁴Yu. Tynianov, Gogol' i Dostoevsky: K teorii parodii (Petrograd, 1921), rpt. Arkhaisty i novatory (Leningrad, 1928), pp. 412-455.

⁹⁵In his Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, Ch. V.

⁹⁶Arkhaisty i novatory, p. 413.

⁹⁷Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, p. 153.

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹A. Morozov, "Parodia kak literaturny zhanr (K teorii parodii)," Russkaya literatura, No. 1 (1960), 49.

¹⁰⁰J. G. Riewald, "Parody as Criticism," Neophilologus 50 (1966), 125.

¹⁰¹H. Markiewicz, "On the Definitions of Literary Parody," To Honor R. Jakobson: Essays (The Hague: Mouton, 1966), II, 1271.

¹⁰²Feinberg, p. 68.

¹⁰³Ibid.

¹⁰⁴Feinberg, p. 68.

¹⁰⁵B. Eichenbaum, "How 'The Overcoat' Is Made" (1924), in Gogol from the Twentieth Century: Eleven Essays, ed. and trans. Robert A. Maguire (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1974), p. 288.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 289-290, n. 33.

¹⁰⁸That Gogol, in "The Overcoat," wrote without satirical intent is alleged by V. Nabokov, Nikolai Gogol (New York: New Directions, 1944), pp. 140-149. Nabokov decisively rejects (not without some justification) the view of Gogol as a satirist.

¹⁰⁹W. Kayser, The Grottesque in Art and Literature, trans. U. Weisstein (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 28.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 180.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 188. Kayser's emphasis.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, p. 189.

¹¹³*Ibid.*

¹¹⁴Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. H. Iswolsky (Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 1968), p. 46.

¹¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 47.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 49.

¹²⁰Kayser, p. 37.

¹²¹Feinberg, pp. 116-117.

¹²²Kernan, "A Theory of Satire," Modern Satire, p. 174.

¹²³Feinberg, p. 238.

¹²⁴Kayser, p. 30.

¹²⁵Elliott, The Power of Satire, p. ix.

¹²⁶P. K. Elkin, The Augustan Defence of Satire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 200.

¹²⁷Rosenheim, Swift, p. 25.

¹²⁸Ibid.

¹²⁹Quoted in Twentieth Century Interpretations of 1984: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. S. Hynes (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1971), p. 108.

¹³⁰The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), last chapter.

¹³¹Satire Newsletter, 4 vols. Oneonta, New York: State University College, 1963-1967. Henceforth SNL.

¹³²"Norms in Satire: A Symposium," SNL, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Fall, 1964), 2-25.

¹³³Ibid., p. 7.

¹³⁴Ibid., p. 25.

¹³⁵Ibid., p. 9.

¹³⁶Ibid., p. 23.

¹³⁷A Rhetoric of Irony, p. 210. Other writers come to mind for this category: H. Miller and L.-F. Céline, for example.

¹³⁸SNL "Symposium," p. 21.

¹³⁹For some provocative essays on Roman satire, see Satire: Critical Essays on Roman Literature, ed. J. P. Sullivan (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1968).

¹⁴⁰SNL "Symposium," p. 21.

¹⁴¹Ibid.

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³Ibid., pp. 12-13.

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

¹⁴⁵Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁴⁶Ibid.; my emphasis.

¹⁴⁷Frye, The Critical Path: An Essay on the Social Context of Literary Criticism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971).

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 126.

¹⁴⁹Booth, A Rhetoric of Irony. !. 169.

¹⁵⁰Booth's The Rhetoric of Fiction supplies numerous examples.

¹⁵¹"Anti-American" should be distinguished from "un-American." Vonnegut attacks the "American way of life" (as Sinclair Lewis did in a different way before him), and is "anti-American" in that sense; this leaves him free to be an American patriot, should he wish to be one.

¹⁵²Greenblatt, Three Modern Satirists, p. 105.

¹⁵³*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.*

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

¹The first four volumes of Jaroslav Hašek's unfinished novel titled in the original Osudy dobrého vojáka Švejka za světové války (literally, The Fortunes of the Good Soldier Švejk during the World War) came out between 1921 and 1923. Švejk appears as a character already in Dobrý voják Švejk a jiné podivné historky (Prague: Hejda a Tuček, 1912), and Dobrý voják Švejk v zajetí (Kiev: Slovanské nakladatelství, 1917). The quotations are from Cecil Parrott's admirable translation (London: William Heinemann, 1973). The Czech quotations come from an annotated edition of Osudy (Prague: Odeon, 1968).

²Under Fire (1916).

³All Quiet on the Western Front (1929), Journey to the End of Night (1932).

⁴Musil satirized Austria-Hungary in his monumental Man Without Qualities (1930-1942).

⁵See J. P. Stern, "War and the Comic Muse: The Good Soldier Schweik and Catch 22," Comparative Literature, 20 (1968), 193-216.

⁶Of the many reviews that appeared after the publication of Chonkin in 1975, here is a representative sample: "Comparisons with The Good Soldier Švejk are inevitable." R. C. Porter, "Thinking Differently," Index, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Winter 1976), 89.

⁷Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, p. 48.

⁸R. Pytlík, "Švejk jako literární typ," Česká literatura, 21 (1973), 131-153. The following list of comparisons is taken from Pytlík's article. Unacknowledged translations are my own.

⁹See also N. Georgiev, "Parodie obsahu a parodie struktury ("Švejk" a antiromán)," Česká literatura, 14 (1966), 328-334.

¹⁰Pertinent information about the German reaction to The Good Soldier comes from the excellent book by Pavel Petr, Hašeks "Švejk" in Deutschland (Berlin: Rutten & Loening, 1963).

¹¹In "Der gute Soldat Schwejk," Sternenhimmel, Musik- und Theatererlebnisse (Prague-Munich, 1923), pp. 212-215.

¹²See Petr, pp. 81-83. This German success was followed by the novel's success in other countries (notably the Soviet Union, during and after World War II).

¹³Ibid., p. 30.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 100.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 144.

¹⁶Brecht was supposed to have ranked The Good Soldier among the three literary works of this century that would "become part of world literature." John Willett, The Theatre of Bertolt Brecht (London, 1959), p. 102, quoted by Petr. p. 143.

¹⁷Staročeské satiry Hradeckého rukopisu a Smilovy školy, ed. J. Hrabák (Prague: Nakladatelství ČAV, 1962).

¹⁸Satira na čtyřry stavy, ed. Z. Tichá (Prague: SNKL, 1958).

¹⁹Nekrvavé obrázky z vojny, see J. Janáčková, Český román sklonku 19 století (Prague: Academia, 1967), p. 84.

²⁰Petr, p. 182, n. 42.

²¹Ibid., p. 17.

²²I. Olbracht, O umění a společnosti (Prague: Čs. Spisovatel, 1958), p. 179.

²³I. Olbracht, "Osudy dobrého vojáka Švejka za světové války," Rudé Právo, 15.11.1921.

²⁴Of course, Švejk goes further: with mad automatism (an expression of his cunning), he fulfills orders even in changed circumstances, when the individual's judgement would call for modification of the original order. Thus, he delivers Lieutenant Lukáš's love letter to a lady in the presence of her husband.

²⁵Max Brod paints an intriguing picture of a "very thin and very young" Kafka, with "great gray gleaming eyes" and "thick, coal-black hair." A cool man ("kliďas"), Kafka took part in the gatherings of the "Klub Mladých" (Young People's Club), to which Hašek also belonged. Franz Kafka: A Biography (New York: Schocken Books, 1960), p. 86.

²⁶F. Langer, Byli a bylo (Prague, 1963), p. 55. Also Pytlík, op. cit., p. 146, and M. Jankovič, "K otázce komiky Haškova Švejka," O České satirě: Sborník statí (Prague: SPN,

1959), p. 274, where he cites B. Václávek concerning Švejk's "popular dadaism."

²⁷"Nedokonalost Haškových 'Osudů'," Podoby: Literární sborník, ed. B. Doležal (Prague: Čs. Spisovatel, 1967), p. 180.

²⁸Doležal's provocative study points out Hašek's "downright unbelievable slovenliness," as it catalogues the many instances of his "imperfections," concluding that it is a work of genius despite or perhaps because of them.

²⁹Pytlík, "Švejk jako literární typ," p. 146.

³⁰Jaroslav Hašek (Prague: Čs. Spisovatel, 1962), pp. 100-101.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 102.

³²Uprostřed hromadných výjevů lidových a řízných ač hrubých karikatur se zvedá pravdivý, byť politování hodný typ šaška a zbabělce, idiota a požívačnicka, cynika a sprostáka, jenž docela tvrdošíjně a s úspěchem popírá nejen válku, ale i stát, mužnou čest, hrdinství a vlastenectví. Dějiny české literatury, Československá Vlastivěda, VII (Prague: 1933), 191-192.

³³*Ibid.*

³⁴*Ibid.*

³⁵Such is the view of M. Jankovič, found in his study of Hašek's novel, Umělecká pravdivost Haškova Švejka (Prague: NČAV, 1960), Rozpravy ČAV, 70, 10.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 62.

³⁷*Ibid.*

³⁸Essays on Czech Literature (The Hague: Mouton, 1963), p. 41.

³⁹*Ibid.*

⁴⁰*Ibid.*

⁴¹*Ibid.*

⁴²Quotations come from R. W. Rotsel's translation of the Second Edition (1929) (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1973).

⁴³*Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 102.

⁴⁵Identified by M. Jankovič in his superb study "Hra s vyprávěním," Struktura a smysl literárního díla, eds. M. Jankovič, Z. Pešat, and F. Vodička (Prague: Československý spisovatel, 1966), pp. 180-197.

⁴⁶These were studies by B. Doležel (see note 27 above), in which he uses the term "imperfection" (nedokonalost).

⁴⁷Jankovič, "Hra s vyprávěním," p. 181.

⁴⁸Hašek, The Creator of Schweik (Prague, Artia, 1965).

⁴⁹Jankovič, "Hra s vyprávěním," pp. 181-182. In his theory of anecdote, Jankovič relies on M. Głowiński, Al. Okopień-Sławińska, and J. Sławiński, Zarys teorii literatury (Warszawa, 1962), p. 342.

⁵⁰Jankovič, "Hra s vyprávěním," pp. 181-182.

⁵¹Psů, kerej by vo sobě moh říct: „Já jsem čisto-krevná potvora," je vopravdu málo. Buď se mu zapomněla máma s nějakou vobludou, nebo jeho babička, nebo měl těch tatínků víc a voď každyho něco zdědil. Po tom uši, voď toho vocas, voď jinýho zas chlupy na držce, voď třetího čumák, voď čtvrtýho pajdavý nohy a voď pátýho velikost, a když měl takovejch tátů dvanáct, tak si můžete, pane obrlajtnant, pomyslit, jak takovej pes vypadá. [I-II, 160]

⁵²I nejohratnější politické rozhovory Švejka převedl na léčení psinky u štěňat a nejbystřejší záluďné léčky končily tím, že si Bretschneider odváděl s sebou od Švejka opět novou nemyslitelně kříženou obludu.

A to byl konec slavného detektiva Bretschneidra. Když měl již ve svém bytě sedm takových ohav, uzavřel se s nimi v zadním pokoji a nedal jim tak dlouho nic jíst, dokud ho nesežraly. [I-II, 54]

⁵³A vskutku, poď náspem válel se vyzývavě nočník s potlučeným emailem, rozekraný rzí, mezi střepinami hrnců, kteréžto všechny předměty, nehodící se již pro domácnost, ukládal zde přednosta nádraží, patrně jako materiál k diskusím archeologů budoucích věků, kteří, až objeví toto sídlisko, budou z toho magoři, a ve školách budou se děti učit o věku emailovaných nočníků. [III-IV, 145-146]

⁵⁴. . . „to je zrovna to samý, vo čem vždycky vyprával medik Houbička, že je to jedno, rozřezat v patalogickým ústavě nějakýho člověka, který se voběsil nebo votrávil. [III-IV, 148-149]

55 „. . . . Nebo takovejhle případ, co se stal v naší ulici před pěti šesti lety. Tam bydlel nějakej pan Karlík v prvním patře. O poschodí vejš moc hodnej člověk, nějakej konzervatorista Mikeš. Von měl moc rád ženský a taky mezi jinejma počal chodit za dcerou toho pana Karlíka, kterej měl špeditérství a cukrářství a taky měl někde na Moravě knihařství pod nákou docela cizou firmou. Když se ten pan Karlík dověděl, že ten konzervatorista mu chodí za dcerou, tak ho navštívil v bytě a řek mu: ‚Vy si mou dceru nesmíte vzít, vy jeden votrapo. Já vám ji nedám!‘ ‚Dobrá,‘ vodpověděl mu pan Mikeš; ‚když si ji nesmím vzít, co mám dělat, mám se roztrhat?‘ Za dva měsíce přišel pan Karlík znova a přived si svou manželku a voba mu řekli jednohlasně: ‚Vy pacholku, vy jste připravil naši dceru vo čest.‘ ‚Zajisté,‘ odpověděl on jim na to, ‚dovolil jsem si ji zkurvit, milostivá paní.‘ Ten pan Karlík začal na něj zbytečně řvát, že mu přece říkal, že si ji nesmí vzít, že mu ji nedá, ale von mu docela správně vodpověděl, že si ji taky neveme, a tenkrát že nebyla vo tom žádná řeč, co s ní může dělat. Že se vo tom nejednalo, von že drží slovo, aby byli bez starosti, že von ji nechce, že je charakter, že není kam vítr, tam plášť, a že drží slovo, že když něco řekne, že je to svatý. A jestli bude kvůli tomu pronásledovanej, tak že si z toho taky nic nedělá, poněvadž má svědomí čistý a jeho nebožka maminka ještě na smrtelný posteli ho zapřisahala, aby nikdy v životě nelhal, a von že jí to slíbil rukoudáním a taková přísaha že je platná. V jeho rodině že vůbec nikdo nelhal a von měl taky vždycky ve škole z mravnýho chování nejlepší známku. Tedy tady vidíte, že se leccos nesmí, ale může, a že cesty můžou býti rozličné, jenom vůli mějme všichni rovnou.“ [III-IV, 153-154]

56 Afterword to the Czech 1968 Odeon edition of The Good Soldier, p. 306. Also, "Hra s vyprávěním," where the title itself ("Play with the narration") suggests the critic's concern.

57 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, p. 89.

58 „Poslušně hlásím, pane obrlajtnant, že nemáme žádný patrony a že ho půjde těžko sestřelit se stolu. Já si dovo-
lím podotknout, pane obrlajtnant, že je to Mikulášek, burš od pana majora Wenzla. Ten vždycky ztratí řeč, když vidí někoho z pánů oficírů. Von se vůbec stydí mluvit. Vono je to vůbec takový, jak říkám, upocený mládě, utahaný. Pan major Wenzl nechá ho vždy stát na chodbě, když jde někam do města, a ono se to žalostivě potlouká po burších v baráku. Kdyby mělo příčinu se leknout, ale vždyť vlastně nic nevyvedlo.“ [I-II, 319]

59 „Tak se podívejte na mapu," vpadl do toho jednoroční dobrovolník, „že opravdu je země našeho nejmilostivějšího mocnáře císaře Františka Josefa. Podle statistiky je tam samý led a vyváží se odtud na ledoborcích patřících pražským

ledárnám. Tento ledový průmysl je i cizinci neobyčejně ceněn a vážen, poněvadž je to podnik výnosný, ale nebezpečný. Největší nebezpečí panuje při dopravě ledu ze Země císaře Františka Josefa přes polární kruh. Dovedete si to představit?"

Voják z eskorty cosi nejasně zabručel a kaprál provázející eskortu přiblížil se a naslouchal dalšímu výkladu jednoročního dobrovolníka, který vážně pokračoval: "Tato jediná rakouská kolonie může ledem zásobit celou Evropu a jest znamenitým národohospodářským činitelem. Kolonizace pokračuje ovšem pomalu, poněvadž kolonisti dílem se nehlásí, dílem zmrznou. Nicméně úpravou klimatických poměrů, na které má velký zájem ministerstvo obchodu i zahraniční ministerstvo, je naděje, že budou náležitě využítkovány velké plochy ledovců. Zařízením několika hotelů přivábí se spousta turistů. Bude ovšem třeba vhodně upravit turistické stezky a cesty mezi ledovými kry a namalovat na ledovce turistické značky. Jedinou obtíží jsou Eskymáci, kteří znemožňují našim místním orgánům jich práci...— Chlapi se nechtějí učit německy," . . . [I-II, 281]

⁶⁰ "Ministerstvo vyučování, pane kaprále, zbudovalo pro ně s velkým nákladem a obětmi, kdy zmrzlo pět stavitelů..."

"Zedníci se zachránili," přerušil ho Švejk, "poněvadž se vohřáli vod zapálený fajfky."

"Ne všichni," řekl jednoroční dobrovolník, "dvěma stala se nehoda, že zapomněli táhnout a dýmky jim uhasly, . . ." [I-II, 281]

⁶¹ Kousek dál hrál si jeden maďarský četník s jedním popem. Uvázal mu provaz kolem levé nohy, který držel v ruce, a nutil ho kolbou, aby pop tančil čardáš, přičemž trhal provazem, takže pop upadl na nos, a maje ruce svázané dozadu, nemohl vstát a dělal zoufalé pokusy obrátit se na záda, aby se snad tak mohl zvednout se země. Četník se tak tomu upřímně smál, až mu slzy tekly z očí, a když už pop se zvedal, trhnul provazem a pop byl opět na nose. [III-IV, 119]

⁶² Celé údolí na Medzilaborce bylo rozryto a přeházeno, jako kdyby zde pracovaly armády obrovských krtků. Silnice za říčkou byla rozryta, rozbita a bylo vidět zdupané plochy vedle, jak se vojska valila.

Přívaly a deště odkrývaly na pokraji jam způsobených granáty roztrhané cáry rakouských stejnokrojů.

Za Novou Čabynou na starě ohořelé borovici ve spleti větví visela bota nějakého rakouského pěšáka s kusem holeně. [III-IV, 136]

⁶³ "... Když jsem sloužil na vojně, byla nás někdy zavřená polovina kumpačky. A co nevinnejch lidí bejvávalo odsouzeno. A nejen na vojně, ale i soudama. Jednou se

pamatuji jedna ženská byla odsouzena, že uškrtila svoji novorozená dvojčata. Ačkoliv se zapřísahala, že nemohla uškrtit dvojčata, když se jí narodila jen jedna holčička, kterou se jí podařilo uškrtit docela bez bolesti, byla odsouzena přece jen pro dvojnásobnou vraždu. Nebo ten nevinnej cikán v Záběhlicích, co se vloupal do toho hokynářského krámu na Boží hod vánoční v noci. Zapřísáhl se, že se šel vohřát, ale nic mu to nepomohlo. Jak už něco soud vezme do ruky, je zle. . . ."

[I-II, 22-23]

64 „. . . Tak stoupala moje drzost, že jsem myslel, že mně nikdo nemůže nic udělat, až došlo k osudnému omylu v noci na náměstí pod podloubím, k omylu, který jasně dokázal, že všechny stromy nerostou do nebe, kamaráde. Pýcha předchází pád. Všechna sláva polní tráva. Ikarus si spálil křídla. Člověk by chtěl být gigantem, a je hovno, kamaráde. Nevěřit náhodě a fackovat se ráno i večer s připomenutím, že opatrnosti nikdy nezbývá, a co je příliš moc, že škodí. Po bakchanáliích a orgiích dostaví se vždy morální kocovina. To je zákon přírody, milý příteli. Když povážím, že jsem si zkazil supravizitu, superarbitraci. Že jsem mohl být felddienstunfähig. Taková ohromná protekce! Mohl jsem se válet někde v kanceláři na doplňovacím velitelství, ale má neopatrnost mně podrazila nohy."

Svou zpověď zakončil jednoroční dobrovolník slavnostně:

"Došlo i na Kartágo, z Ninive udělali zříceniny, milý příteli, ale hlavu vzhůru! Ať si nemyslí, že když mne pošlou na front, že dám jednu ránu. . . ."

[I-II, 258]

65 "Vy za nic nemůžete," chlácholivým tónem mluvil dál jednoroční dobrovolník, „při mnohých rodech a družích odepřela příroda živočichům všechnu inteligenci, slyšel jste někdy vypravovat o lidské hlouposti? Nebylo by rozhodně lepší, kdybyste se byl zrodil jako jiný druh savce a nenosil to blbé jméno člověk a kaprál? Je veliká mýlka, že si o sobě myslíte, že jste nejdokonalejším a nejvyvinutějším tvorem. Když vám odpárou hvězdičky, tak jste nula, která se odstřeľuje beze všeho zájmu po všech zákopech na všech frontách. Když vám ješně jednu frčku přidají a udělají z vás živočicha, kterému se říká supák, pak ješně to nebude s vámi v pořádku. Váš duševní obzor se vám ješně víc zouží, a když složíte někde na bojišti své kulturně zakrnělé kosti, po vás v celé Evropě nikdo nezapláče."

"Já vás dám zavřít," vykřikl zoufale desátník.

Jednoroční dobrovolník se usmál: „Vy patrně byste mě chtěl dát zavřít proto, že jsem vám nadával. To byste lhal, poněvadž váš duševní majetek nemůže vůbec vystihnout nějakých urážek, a kromě toho vsadil bych se s vámi, o co byste chtěl, že si nepamatujete vůbec ničeho z celé naší rozmluvy. Kdybych vám řekl, že jste embryo, tak to zapomenete řív, ne

snad než přijedeme na nejbližší stanici, ale dřív, než se kolem nás mihne nejbližší telegrafní tyč. Jste odumřelý mozkový závin. [I-II, 297]

⁶⁶Discussed in Wolfgang Kayser, The Grottesque in Art and Literature, trans. U. Weisstein (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 58.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 60.

⁶⁸"... Co jste vlastně proti vesmíru, když povážíte, že nejbližší nám stálice je od tohoto vojenského vlaku vzdálena 275 000krát, než je slunce, aby její paralaxa tvořila jednu obloukovou vteřinu. Kdyby vy jste se nacházel ve vesmíru jako stálice, byl byste rozhodně příliš nepatrným, aby vás mohly postřehnout nejlepší hvězdářské přístroje. Pro vaši nepatrnost ve vesmíru není pojmu. Za půl roku udělal byste na obloze takový maličký oblouček, za rok maličkou elipsu, pro vyjádření kteréž číslicemi není vůbec pojmu, jak je nepatrná. Vaše paralaxa byla by neměřitelnou." [I-II, 304]

⁶⁹I. Turgenev, Fathers and Sons, trans. R. Edmonds (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 208-209.

⁷⁰Anonymous review of Catch 22, Daedalus, XCII (1963), 164.

⁷¹Stern, p. 196, where he says that Hašek did not condemn war as such, but believed in the possibility of a just war: "What he condemns. throughout his book, is this war." One could opine, of course, that it is difficult not to condemn war as such, especially in an anti-militarist satire.

⁷²A zatímco zde přebíjeli krále kočičákem, daleko na frontě králové mezi sebou přebíjeli se svými poddanými. [III-IV, 22]

⁷³Nevím, podaří-li se mně vystihnout touto knihou, co jsem chtěl. Již okolnost, že slyšel jsem jednoho člověka nadávat druhému: „Ty jsi blbej jako Švejk," právě tomu nenasvědčuje. Stane-li se však slovo Švejk novou nadávkou v květnatém věnci spílání, musím se spokojit tímto obohacením českého jazyka. [III-IV, 283]

Hand-in-hand with this discouraging misunderstanding of Švejk goes the unholy flood of kitsch that the novel inspired. Attributed to Švejk, a sign "to chce klid" ("take it easy" or "easy does it") decorates many a dwelling, an unlikely quantity of beer steins, and appears as a standard wherever graffiti are found. Tasteless little figurines of Švejk swing from rear-view mirrors in cars; and plaques,

plates and posters with characters and maxims culled from the novel pollute the otherwise pleasant environment of a country whose size makes it dangerously easy for a thriving kitsch industry. This kitsch is also a good indicator of the popularity of the novel.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

¹M. Bulgakov, "Pis'mo M. Bulgakova sovetskomu pravitel'stvu," Grani, No. 66, 1977, 158. Bulgakov's emphasis. My translation. There were some doubts about the authenticity of this important letter, but these were laid to rest by M. Chudakova, "Tvorcheskaya istoriya romana M. Bulgakova Master i Margarita," Voprosy literatury, 1, 1976, 219, 228.

²It appeared first in a censored edition: Master i Margarita, Moskva, 11, 1966, 7-127; 1, 1967, 56-144. I have used M. Glenny's often criticized translation (London: Collins and Harvill Press, 1968) with caution, relying on the unexpurgated Russian edition: Romany (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1973). The Russian quotations come from this edition. Glenny's translation is of the unexpurgated original and is adequate for my purpose.

³Ellendea Proffer's An International Bibliography of Works by and about Bulgakov (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1976) lists almost thirteen hundred entries.

⁴V. Lakshin, "Roman M. Bulgakova Master i Margarita," Novy Mir, 6, 1968, 284-311; trans. "Mikhail Bulgakov's The Master and Margarita," in Victor Erlich, ed., Twentieth-Century Russian Literary Criticism (New Haven and London, 1975), pp. 247-283.

⁵E. Proffer, "On The Master and Margarita," Russian Literature Triquarterly, No. 6, 1973, 533-567.

⁶M. Jovanović, Utopija Mihaila Bulgakova (Beograd: Institut za književnost i umetnost, 1975).

⁷L. Milne, The Master and Margarita: A Comedy of Victory, Birmingham Slavonic Monographs No. 3 (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 1977).

⁸Lakshin, p. 310.

⁹Ibid., p. 309.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 287. Lakshin is beginning to sound like Berlioz here, and this will be crowned by his sarcastic introduction to the "demonology" of the novel.

¹¹A. Vulis, "Posleslovie," Moskva 11, 1966, 127-130.

¹²Lakshin, p. 286.

¹³Ibid., p. 291. The reference is to Koroviev-Faggot, a member of Woland's suite.

¹⁴Lakshin, p. 289. In "Student" (1894), Ivan Velikopol'sky, a student of theology, beside an open fire in the countryside, is reminded of the apprehension of Jesus Christ. Time is obliterated and he feels what it was like for Peter to wait in the courtyard by the open fire, and how easy it was for him to deny Christ. The action takes place in the same season as does that of The Master and Margarita. Although this chapter is not a search for sources, I would like to mention Chekhov's "Black Monk" (1893) too: Professor Kovrin takes a rest on a country estate on the advice of his doctor. There he remembers the ancient legend of the Black Monk, an apparition reputed to roam the universe only to return at regular intervals to earth. Kovrin witnesses the Monk's return and converses with him about eternal questions, but particularly about Kovrin's usefulness and genius. The conversations are repeated until Kovrin's young wife is aroused from her sleep, only to see her husband talking to an empty armchair. He is then forced to take a cure and stops seeing the Monk. However, he becomes profoundly unhappy. The dilemma: on one hand there is the Black Monk, happiness, and illness; on the other, normalcy, but unhappiness. In The Master and Margarita this dilemma is acutely felt, but not resolved, by Ivan Bezdomny ("Homeless").

¹⁵Lakshin, p. 293. This is now a well-travelled avenue: E. Stenbock-Fermor, "Bulgakov's The Master and Margarita and Goethe's Faust," Slavic and East European Journal, XIII, 1969, 309-325; Ralph Schroeder, Gorkis Erneuerung der Fausttradition: Faustmodelle im russischen geschichtsphilosophischen Roman (Berlin, 1971), pp. 274-317, 318-354; Justina Karaš, "Z problemů groteski w Mistrzu i Małgorzacie Michała Bułgakowa," Studia rossica posnaniensia, zeszyt 4 (Poznań, 1973), 79-91; the notion of the "travesty" of Faust was advanced by M. Očadlíková, "Básník a jeho stíny," M. Bulgakov, Mistr a Markétka (Prague, 1969), pp. 353-361.

¹⁶Lakshin, pp. 284-285. In the same year: L. Skorino, "Litsa bez karnaval'nykh masok: Polemicheskie zametki," and "Otvét opponentu," Voprosy literatury, No. 6, 1968, 25-42 and 76-81; and M. Gus, "Goryat li rukopisy?" Znamya, No. 12, 1968, 213-220; these are works that exemplify a more dogmatic approach. For a more sympathetic approach see: I. Vinogradov, "Zaveshchanie Mastera," Voprosy literatury, No. 6, 1968, 43-75; Oleg Mikhaylov, "Proza Bulgakova," Sibirskie ogni, 9, 1967, 183-186; and G. Makarovskaya and A. Zhuk, "O romane M. Bulgakova Master i Margarita," Volga, 6, 1968, 161-181.

¹⁷Lakshin, p. 309.

¹⁸Proffer, RLT, p. 559.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 558.

²⁰Proffer, RLT, p. 536.

²¹E. Proffer, "Bulgakov's The Master and Margarita: Genre and Motif," Canadian Slavic Studies, III, No. 4, 1969, 615-628.

²²Proffer, RLT, p. 539.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Jovanović, p. 17.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 78-81, and elsewhere.

²⁶V. Shklovsky, "Tekhnika romana tain," LEF, No. 4, 1924, 125-155; Also Khudozhestvennaya proza: Razmyshleniya i razbory (Moscow, 1961), pp. 367-410.

²⁷Jovanović, p. 116.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 117-118. Jovanović published earlier an article concerned with the same topic: "Demonološka koncepcija Mihaila Bulgakova," Savremenik, No. 38 (1973), 5-31.

²⁹Jovanović, Utopija, pp. 120-121.

³⁰Ibid., p. 131.

³¹René Guénon, "Hermes," in The Sword of Gnosis, ed. Jacob Needleman (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 370-371.

³²Ibid., p. 370.

³³Ibid., p. 371.

³⁴The term "metaphysical" was used by Arkhiepiskop Ioann S. F., "Metafizichesky realizm, Master i Margarita," in Moskovsky razgovor o bessmertii (New York, 1972), p. 35. Also, Yu. Terapiano, "Metafizika 'Mastera i Margarity'," Russkaya Mysl', 22 May 1969, 8-9.

³⁵Jovanović, pp. 159-161.

³⁶The concept of poetic justice is mentioned by Lakshin and Milne, but Jovanović deals with it extensively.

³⁷Jovanović, p. 234.

³⁸A. S. Pushkin, Stikhotvoreniya (Moscow, 1965), p. 207. My translation.

³⁹Jovanović, p. 235.

⁴⁰Milne, p. 4.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 33.

⁴²Ibid., p. 1.

⁴³Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. W. Trask (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1968).

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 73.

⁴⁵Milne, pp. 5-6.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 6. Milne refers to The Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, trans. R. Daglish (Moscow, 1974), p. 154.

⁴⁷Milne, p. 13.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 11; but also Ewa Thompson, "The Artistic World of M. Bulgakov," Russian Literature, No. 5 (1973), 61; W. J. Leatherbarrow, "The Devil and the Creative Visionary in Bulgakov's Master and Margarita," New Zealand Slavonic Journal, No. 1 (1975), 31.

⁵⁰Milne, p. 31; also Anatoly Bely, "O Mastere i Margarite," Vestnik russkogo khristianskogo dvizheniya, Nos. 112-113 (1974), 180.

⁵¹Milne, p. 22; also Chudakova, "Tvorcheskaya istoriya," pp. 230-231.

⁵²Milne, p. 22.

⁵³Makarovskaya and Zhuk, p. 172.

⁵⁴Milne, p. 20.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 25.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 26; Lakshin, p. 309.

⁵⁷Milne, p. 26.

⁵⁸When an informed reader such as Hedrick Smith characterizes Bulgakov's novel, he says that it is a "satire of Stalinist Russia." The Russians (New York: Ballantine Books, 1976), p. 119. While scholars do not ignore the satire, they are less likely to talk about the novel as a satire. There are a few exceptions: Vulis, Proffer ("Genre

and Motif"), Jovanović, partly Milne, but also Stenbock-Fermor. Later Proffer changed her mind (RLT). In general, scholars treat the satire as one element among many. With few exceptions, the kind of satire mentioned is a topical satire of everyday life (byt), of the literary establishment, of the dramatic world, and of politics.

⁵⁹Nadezhda Mandelstam, Hope Abandoned (New York: Atheneum, 1974), p. 117.

⁶⁰"The revolutionary process, the opposition to the Great Evolution so beloved of the same process..." Bulgakov, "Pis'mo," p. 158.

⁶¹Val Bolen, "Theme and Coherence in Bulgakov's The Master and Margarita," Slavic and East European Journal, 16, No. 4 (1972), 427-432, finds a number of allusions to Il'f and Petrov's Twelve Chairs and The Golden Calf.

⁶²Bolen, p. 429.

⁶³"The 'cryptography' in this most extraordinary novel demands further, more attentive work on the text, new discoveries and interpretations of the author's design." L. Rzhnevsky, "Pilate's Sin: Cryptography in Bulgakov's Novel, The Master and Margarita," Canadian Slavonic Papers, 13, No. 1 (1971), 18. This article is useful because it points out the differences between the censored (Moskva) text of the novel and the full text used by Glenny.

⁶⁴Bulgakov's The Master and Margarita: The Text as a Cipher (New York: Vantage Press, 1975).

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, "Introduction."

⁶⁶*Ibid.*

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, p. 187.

⁶⁹Nabokov defined this notoriously difficult term in Nikolai Gogol (1944; rpt. New York: New Directions, 1961), pp. 63-74. He lists, among others, "cheap, sham, common, smutty, inferior, trashy, tawdry, etc." (Nabokov also found "a dreadful streak of poshlost" running through Goethe's Faust" [p. 64]. Gretchen?)

⁷⁰Milne, p. 8.

⁷¹Especially useful, in the study of sources, is Jovanović on the influence of Gogol and Dostoevsky. Having acknowledged this, I will refer mostly to Bulgakov's earlier work.

⁷²M. Bulgakov, "The Adventures of Chichikov" (1925), in Diaboliad and Other Stories, eds. Ellendea Proffer and Carl R. Proffer, trans. Carl R. Proffer (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1972), pp. 159-160.

⁷³But it too could have come from Gogol; particularly informative in this respect is Merezhkovsky's "Gogol and the Devil" (1906), in Gogol from the Twentieth Century, ed. and trans. Robert A. Maguire (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1974), pp. 57-102.

⁷⁴Milne tells us that Hellae are "girl vampires on the island of Lesbos" (p. 50, n. 130). Also, Faust received from Mephistopheles a harem of mortal women, and many succubae, one of whom was Helen of Troy (E. M. Butler, The Myth of the Magus [Cambridge: At the University Press, 1948], p. 134). The beautiful corpse mentioned is one with a scar that engirdled her "like a red ribbon" (Bulgakov, Romany, p. 243).

⁷⁵Shklovsky, p. 133. The Moscow sections are also compared to the "novel of detection" (Jovanović, p. 203).

⁷⁶Shklovsky, p. 131.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 145.

⁷⁸Proffer, RLT, p. 533.

⁷⁹The Great Terror (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

⁸⁰The Origin of Totalitarianism (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1966).

⁸¹The Gulag Archipelago (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), The Gulag Archipelago Two (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).

⁸²N. Mandelstam, op. cit.

⁸³"Literaturny protsess v Rossii," Kontinent, 1 (1974), 159.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵The original German is:

—Nun gut, wer bist du denn?

— Ein Teil von jener Kraft,
Die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft.

⁸⁶Stenbock-Fermor, p. 315.

⁸⁷The novella Pontius Pilate was written in 1928, and it is the Master's "lost" manuscript. It was published in Czech: "Pilát Pontský," Světová literatura 6 (1967), 85-119.

⁸⁸Stenbock-Fermor, p. 317.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, p. 320. The statement about cowardice was one of the censor's targets. It appears in the novel four times: pp. 322, 336, 347, 400. Milne missed the last reference.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 323.

⁹¹"Kazn' Pontiia Pilata: O romane M. Bulgakova 'Master i Margarita'," Grani, No. 80 (1971), 163-176.

⁹²*Ibid.*, 166.

⁹³*Ibid.*, 163.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, 168.

⁹⁵M. Bulgakov, Beg (rpt., Letchworth: Prideaux Press, 1970), p. 37.

⁹⁶Bulgakov, "Pis'mo," p. 158.

⁹⁷Edyth C. Haber, "The Mythic Structure of Bulgakov's The Master and Margarita," Russian Review, 34 (1975), No. 4, 408.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*

⁹⁹The worship of "quantity" rather than "quality" satirized here is the theme of René Guénon's The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of Times, trans. Lord Northbourne (1945; rpt. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972). This is an exposé of the errors of modernism from the point of view of traditional metaphysics.

¹⁰⁰Lakshin, p. 305.

¹⁰¹The Gulag Archipelago, p. 7.

¹⁰²"Sometimes arrests even seem to be a game—there is so much superfluous imagination, so much well-fed energy, invested in them." Gulag, p. 10.

¹⁰³See also J. Karaś, "Z problemów groteski."

¹⁰⁴В них заключались мольбы, угрозы, кляузы, доносы, обещания произвести ремонт на свой счет, указания на несносную тесноту и невозможность жить в одной квартире с бандитами.

В числе прочего было потрясающее по своей художественной силе описание похищения пельменей, уложенных непосредственно в карман пиджака, в квартире № 31, два обещания покончить жизнь самоубийством и одно признание в тайной беременности.
[p. 510]

¹⁰⁵Lakshin, p. 309.

¹⁰⁶Proffer, RLT, p. 540.

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹A. Krasnov discusses Soviet propaganda's view of Jesus in "Khristos i master—o posmertnom romane M. Bulgakova 'Master i Margarita'," Grani, 71-73 (1969).

¹¹⁰This seems to be the point of view of Lakshin, Skorino, and Vinogradov, to name only a few. These writers stress the human, not the divine quality of the character; indeed they exclude the latter despite evidence to the contrary offered in the conclusion of the novel. Perhaps this is why Lakshin termed the conclusion "purely illusory."

¹¹¹Bodalsya telenok s dubom: Ocherki literaturnoy zhizni (Paris: YMCA Press, 1975), p. 259.

¹¹²Lakshin, pp. 299-300.

¹¹³D. G. B. Piper, "An Approach to Bulgakov's The Master and Margarita," Forum for Modern Language Studies, 7, No. 2 (1971), 139.

¹¹⁴Haber, p. 395.

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 396.

¹¹⁶It is possible that Bulgakov is reacting to a number of works about Jesus. He mentions Strauss (p. 17), who could well be David Strauss, author of The Life of Jesus (1835-36) and a Protestant theologian who applied the "myth theory" to the life of Jesus and denied all supernatural elements in the Gospels. See also M. Martin, Jesus Now (Toronto: Popular Library, 1973), p. 141. Bulgakov also consulted Ernest Renan's The Life of Jesus (London, 1864), as well as F. W. Farrar's The Life of Christ (London, 1897). Milne, p. 39, nn. 34, 35.

¹¹⁷Твоя жизнь скудна, игемон, . . . [p. 442]

¹¹⁸. . .—как по-твоему, ведь московское народонаселение значительно изменилось? [p. 537]

119 . . . изменились ли эти горожане внутренне?
[p. 538]

120 — Голову ему оторвать! — сказал кто-то сурово на галерке.
[p. 540]

121 This black cat, Behemoth's prototype, appears in the unfinished Theatrical Novel (also translated as Black Snow). Its name refers both to a satirical magazine of the same name (Begemot = The Hippopotamus), Milne, p. 21; and to the Biblical beast (Job Chaps. 40, 41) that "makes men bestial." Malleus Maleficarum, trans. Rev. Montague Summers (London: The Pushkin Press, 1951), p. 30.

122 . . . голова эта отчаянно крикнула на весь театр:
— Доктора!

— Ты будешь в дальнейшем молотъ всякую чушь? — грозно спросил Фагот у плачущей головы.

— Не буду больше! — прохрипела голова. [p. 541]

123 . . . они — люди как люди. Любят деньги, но ведь это всегда было... Человечество любит деньги, из чего бы те ни были сделаны, из кожи ли, из бумаги ли, из бронзы или золота. Ну, легкомысленны... ну, что ж... и милосердие иногда стучится в их сердца... обыкновенные люди... в общем, напоминают прежних... квартирный вопрос только испортил их...
[p. 541]

124 It is very fitting that Bengalsky's time is up while he is on stage. This theatre is packed with symbolism and allusions, from the idea of microcosm to the theatrum mundi, of which E. R. Curtius tells us that it is "a theatrical metaphor, nourished on the antique and the medieval tradition, it reappears in a living art of the theatre and becomes a form of expression of a theocentric concept of human life"; that is, a concept that we can find in Bulgakov's novel. European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. W. Trask (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1973), p. 142.

125 See Butler on the "Faustbooks" and elsewhere.

126 According to Malleus Maleficarum, the role of the devil is traditionally twofold: "the temptation of men and the punishment of the damned" (p. 29). While the audience is tempted, Bengalsky is punished.

127 Milne, p. 11; Milne also notes the symbolism of the roses. If we look at the happenings of the novel through the prism of Christian symbolism, such as G. Ferguson compiled in Signs and Symbols in Christian Art (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976), we will learn the significance of the presence

of two birds: the dove (cooing of doves, p. 26) and the swallow. The first is a symbol of purity, peace, and the Holy Spirit, the other is a Renaissance symbol of the Incar-nation of Christ as well as of resurrection. Ferguson, pp. 15-16, 25-26.

¹²⁸The anonymous author of "The Execution of Pontius Pilate" calls Margarita "the echo of the Master," p. 170.

¹²⁹Milne, p. 12.

¹³⁰Ibid.

¹³¹R. Pletnev, "O Mastere i Margarite," Novy Zhurnal, Book 92 (1968), 154. Much of what concerns witchcraft could have come through de Coster: for example, the use of magic ointment, the flight, and so on.

¹³²Pletnev, p. 160. The reference is to The Invisible Man.

¹³³The anonymous critic says that Banga is "Pilate's Sancho Panza," p. 170. "Banga" was also "the term of endearment used by Bulgakov to his second wife," Milne, p. 41, n. 58.

¹³⁴Milne, p. 8, only exemplifies an error shared by many interpreters of the novel.

¹³⁵. . . странный, как будто живой и освещенный с одного бока солнцем глобус. [p. 669]

¹³⁶Ferguson, p. 175. The globe usually symbolizes divine attributes.

¹³⁷. . . сделанный столь искусно, что синие океаны на нем шевелились, а шапка на полюсе лежала, как настоящая, ледяная и снежная. [p. 672]

¹³⁸Bulgakov's letter to V. Veresayev, Milne, "K biografii M. A. Bulgakova," Novy zhurnal, 111, June 1973, 161.

¹³⁹Pletnev, p. 160.

¹⁴⁰Неужели вы не хотите, подобно Фаусту, сидеть над ретортой . . .? [pp. 798-799]

¹⁴¹Рукописи не горят. [p. 703]

¹⁴²Milne, p. 16.

¹⁴³Curtius, p. 394.

¹⁴⁴Stenbock-Fermor, p. 323.

¹⁴⁵D. G. B. Piper, "Introduction," M. Bulgakov, Belaya gvardiya (rpt., Letchworth: Bradda Books, 1969) p. v.

¹⁴⁶Bulgakov, "Pis'mo," p. 158.

¹⁴⁷Ibid., p. 159.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

¹Twentieth Century Interpretations of 1984: a Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Samuel Hynes (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 62. Hereafter cited as 1984: A Collection of Essays.

²George Orwell's real name was Eric Blair (1903-1950). The edition cited here is Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975. For the sake of brevity, the title will be cited as 1984.

³"Varieties of Literary Utopias," in Utopias and Utopian Thought, ed. F. Manuel (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), pp. 28-29.

⁴Gleb Struve, "Novye varianty shigalevshchiny: o romanakh Zamyatina, Khaksli i Orvella," Novy Zhurnal, 30 (1952), 152-163; G. Woodcock, "Utopias in Negative," Sewanee Review, 64 (1956), 81-97; D. Richards, "Four Utopias," Slavonic and East European Review, 40, No. 94 (Dec. 1961), 220-228; R. A. Gregg, "Two Adams and Eve in the Crystal Palace: Dostoevsky, the Bible, and We," Slavic Review, 24, No. 4 (1965), 680-687; E. J. Brown, Brave New World, 1984, and We: An Essay on Anti-Utopia. (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1976).

⁵Frye, "Varieties of Literary Utopias," p. 39.

⁶Looking Backward (London: George Routledge & Sons, n.d.), p. 245.

⁷News from Nowhere: Or Epoch of Rest (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 78.

⁸J. Redmond, Introduction to News from Nowhere, p. xxxviii.

⁹From Utopia to Nightmare (1962, rpt. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975), p. 107.

¹⁰Spender, 1984: A Collection of Essays, p. 62.

¹¹"Climax and Change," in 1984: A Collection of Essays, p. 106.

¹²Stephen J. Greenblatt, "Orwell as Satirist," in George Orwell: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Raymond Williams (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 117. Henceforth cited as Orwell: A Collection of Essays.

¹³George Orwell and the Origins of 1984 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1975), p. 6. This seems to be the definitive study of both the sources and the influences of 1984.

¹⁴Quoted by Steinhoff, p. 11.

¹⁵Steinhoff, p. 18.

¹⁶Steinhoff is, of course, concerned with a detailed discussion of the influence of these works on Orwell. He particularly stresses the influence of James Burnham, with whom Orwell disagreed at first, but whose vision of the future he adopted in 1984.

¹⁷Orwell in the Preface to the Ukrainian edition of Animal Farm, quoted by A. Zwerdling, "Orwell and the Techniques of Didactic Fantasy," in 1984: A Collection of Essays, p. 91.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Orwell's letter to Francis Atkinson (June 16, 1949), quoted by Zwerdling, p. 98.

²¹Ibid., p. 100.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid., p. 99.

²⁴In George Orwell (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954).

²⁵Greenblatt, 0. 106.

²⁶Brander, p. 171; quoted by Greenblatt, p. 106.

²⁷Frye, "Varieties," p. 29.

²⁸Glenn Negley, "Utopia and Dystopia: a Look Backward," in Utopia/Dystopia, ed. P. E. Richter (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing, 1975), p. 22. The pattern Utopia-Dystopia is shown here in a historical context.

²⁹Frederick Warburg, "Publisher's Report" (1948), in George Orwell: The Critical Heritage, ed. J. Myers (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 247. Hereafter cited as Orwell: Critical Heritage.

³⁰Orwell: Critical Heritage, p. 257.

³¹Ibid., p. 264.

³²Ibid., p. 265.

³³To be sure, some of these reviews deal with the obvious anti-totalitarian satire, but they also advance some other views.

³⁴Orwell: Critical Heritage, p. 281.

³⁵Struve, p. 163.

³⁶The Captive Mind (London: Secker & Warburg, 1953), p. 42. Rpt. in Orwell: Critical Heritage, p. 286.

³⁷The Last Man in Europe: An Essay on George Orwell (London: Macmillan, 1974). Long before this trend, critics noted the evident parallels to religion in 1984 ("God is Power").

³⁸Quoted by Steinhoff, p. 213.

³⁹The Road to Miniluv: George Orwell, the State, and God (London: Victor Gollancz, 1975).

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 160.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 165.

⁴²Canadian Forum (Dec. 1946), rpt. in Orwell: Critical Heritage, p. 208. Orwell was notoriously opposed to the Catholic Church, which he equated with the Inquisition. Could it be that he took the hint?

⁴³Paul Tillich, "Critique and Justification of Utopia," Utopias and Utopian Thought, p. 302.

⁴⁴George Orwell, "Inside the Whale" (1940), Inside the Whale and Other Essays (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 17.

⁴⁵Harold J. Harris, "Orwell's Essays and 1984," Twentieth Century Literature, 4, No. 4 (Jan. 1959), 156.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 158.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 159.

⁴⁸"1984: The Mysticism of Cruelty," in Orwell: A Collection of Essays, p. 130.

⁴⁹Emanuel Edrich, "George Orwell and the Satire in Horror," Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 4 (1962-63), 99.

⁵⁰Deutscher, op. cit., 1984: A Collection of Essays, p. 34.

⁵¹Spender, p. 64.

⁵²Zwerdling, p. 92.

⁵³Woodcock, p. 93.

⁵⁴Aldous Huxley, "Letter to George Orwell," rpt. in 1984: A Collection of Essays, p. 102.

⁵⁵Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), II, Chap. 24.

⁵⁶Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels and Other Writings, ed. L. A. Landa (Boston, The Riverside Press, 1960), p. 494.

⁵⁷A. Zwerdling, Orwell and the Left (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 83.

⁵⁸Quoted by Steinhoff, pp. 183-184.

⁵⁹Orwell wanted to title the novel The Last Man in Europe: Steinhoff, p. 221.

⁶⁰The Idea of Progress (New York: Frederick A. Prager, 1967), p. 9.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, p. 127.

⁶²Quoted by W. H. G. Armytage, Yesterday's Tomorrows: A Historical Survey of Future Societies (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), p. 232.

⁶³George Kateb, "The Road to 1984," in 1984: A Collection of Essays, p. 74.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁶⁵"They signify the end and the destruction of humanism." Nicholas Berdyaev, The Fate of Man in the Modern World, trans. D. A. Lowrie (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1935), p. 31.

⁶⁶Edrich, p. 98.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*

⁶⁸"George Orwell's Opaque Glass in 1984," Wisconsin Studies in Contemporary Literature, 2, No. 3 (Fall 1961), 37.

⁶⁹Edrich, p. 96.

⁷⁰The Passing of the Modern Age (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 207.

⁷¹The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore, ed. I. Gordon (New York: The New American Library, 1960), p. 121.

⁷²Deutscher, p. 39.

⁷³See, for example, M. Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, trans. W. Trask (New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1954), p.4.

⁷⁴"Socialism and Utopia," in Utopias and Utopian Thought, p. 118.

⁷⁵Woodcock, p. 85.

⁷⁶Walsh, p. 20.

⁷⁷Quoted by Lukács, pp. 32-33.

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰In a review of Animal Farm written for Horizon (Sept. 1945), rpt. in Orwell: Critical Heritage, p. 199.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³J. Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (1932; rpt New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1957), p. 52.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 187.

⁸⁶Man in the Modern Age, trans. E. and C. Paul (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951), p. 43.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 52.

⁸⁸Berdyayev, p. 29. This sentiment reappears in a recent analysis of the spiritual crisis of modern man: "There is no way for man to defend his humanity and not be dragged through his own inventions and machinations to the infra-human, except by remaining faithful to the image of man as a reflection of something that transcends the merely human." Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis of Modern Man (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1968), p. 14.

⁸⁹The Decay and the Restoration of Civilization
(London: Adam & Charles Black, 1950), pp. 33-34.

⁹⁰The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion
(1922; rpt. abridged, London: Macmillan, 1957), p. 736.

⁹¹Quoted by R. C. Elliott, The Power of Satire,
p. 59n. Also, Frazer, p. 758.

⁹²Orwell wrote about Basic English and was associated
with W. Empson, who also wrote about it. Steinhoff, p. 167.

⁹³Orthodoxy (1908; rpt. New York: Image Books, 1959),
p. 77.

⁹⁴Steinhoff, p. 169.

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Small, p. 208.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 209.

⁹⁸For a discussion of this phenomenon (the emergence
of relativism and its competition with rationalism), see
J. Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses.

⁹⁹Walsh, p. 108.

¹⁰⁰In an essay quoted by Zwerdling, Orwell and the
Left, p. 83.

¹⁰¹The Decline of the West (1918, 1922), trans. C. F.
Atkinson (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1971).

¹⁰²Tillich, p. 303.

¹⁰³The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of
George Orwell, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus (Harmonds-
worth: Penguin Books, 1968), V, 244.

¹⁰⁴Small, p. 212.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 165.

¹⁰⁶M. Eliade, Myths, Dreams, and Mysteries, trans. P.
Mairet (London: Fontana Library, 1968), p. 26.

¹⁰⁷Thus, Wyndham Lewis complains that the "hero's
Orwellian enthusiasm for the 'Proles' . . . imports a silli-
ness into this book which is rather a pity." p. 107.

¹⁰⁸George Woodcock, "Prose Like a Window Pane," The Crystal Spirit, rpt. in Orwell: A Collection of Essays, p. 171.

¹⁰⁹Small, p. 204.

¹¹⁰Comedy: The Irrational Vision (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), p. 45.

¹¹¹Ibid.

¹¹²Quoted by Jack Chatfield, "Orwell's Achievement," National Review, 29 August 1975, 947.

¹¹³Quoted by Steinhoff, p. 3.

¹¹⁴Quoted in M. J. Lasky, Utopia and Revolution (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 68.

¹¹⁵By John O. Lyons, "George Orwell's Opaque Glass in 1984," p. 39.

¹Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations refer to Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Breakfast of Champions: or, Goodbye Blue Monday! (New York: Delacorte/Seymour Lawrence, 1973).

²It is no accident that such studies as Peter B. Messent's "Breakfast of Champions: The Direction of Kurt Vonnegut's Fiction," Journal of American Studies, 8, No. 1, 101-114; and Robert Merrill's "Vonnegut's Breakfast of Champions: The Conversion of Heliogabalus," Critique: Studies in Modern Fiction, 18, No. 3, 99-109, point out the similarities and differences of the two novels.

³John Somer, "Geodesic Vonnegut: Or If Buckminster Fuller Wrote Novels," in Jerome Klinkowitz and John Somer, eds., The Vonnegut Statement (New York: Delacorte Press, 1973), p. 249. These leaps remind Somer of "Hemingway's abuse of this posture in The Torrents of Spring." Ibid.

⁴More of this in Chapter VI.

⁵Making strange or ostranenie is a device studied by Russian formalist critics (V. Shklovsky's study of ostranenie in Tolstoy's War and Peace; see V. Erlich, Russian Formalism [The Hague: Mouton, 1965], p. 177). A definition of ostranenie with examples from world literature appears in B. Tomashevsky, Teoriya literatury (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1928), pp. 150-152.

⁶Mentioned in Chapter II.

⁷Messent, p. 111.

⁸Somer, p. 249.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 252.

¹¹Messent, p. 113.

¹²Ibid., pp. 113-114.

¹³Babbitt (1922; rpt. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1950), p. 234.

¹⁴Wampeters, Foma & Granfalloon (New York: Delacorte Press, 1974), p. 281.

¹⁵Cat's Cradle (1963; rpt. New York: Dell, 1970), p. 67.

¹⁶Slaughterhouse-Five (1969; rpt. New York: Dell, 1975), p. 95.

¹⁷Wampeters, p. 281

¹⁸Ibid., p. 283.

¹⁹Not exclusively there, but also in his many negative references to love-making and procreation.

²⁰In reconstructing the irony in this passage I have followed the procedure developed by W. C. Booth in A Rhetoric of Irony (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), pp. 10, 33-44.

²¹Slaughterhouse-Five, p. 133.

²²Merrill, p. 99.

²³Ibid., p. 106.

²⁴English Satire (Cambridge: University Press, 1958), p. 21.

²⁵Messent, p. 104.

²⁶Jess Ritter, "Teaching Vonnegut on the Firing Line," in The Vonnegut Statement, p. 38.

²⁷Ibid., p. 35.

²⁸"Chasing a Lone Eagle: Vonnegut's College Writing," in The Vonnegut Statement, p. 46.

²⁹"The Vonnegut Effect: Science Fiction and Beyond," in The Vonnegut Statement, p. 156.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹"Vonnegut's Formal and Moral Otherworldliness: Cat's Cradle and Slaughterhouse-Five," in The Vonnegut Statement, p. 206.

³²Ibid.

³³Wampeters, p. 281.

³⁴Meeter, p. 213.

³⁵Ritter, p. 39.

³⁶"Why They Read Vonnegut," in The Vonnegut Statement, p. 24.

³⁷In fact, many others: Voltaire, Anatole France, Ring Lardner, Sinclair Lewis, Norman Mailer, William Golding, Joseph Heller, Jack London, Ray Bradbury, Isaac Asimov, Shirley Jackson, Richard Brautigan, J. P. Donleavy, John Hawkes, John Barth, Walker Percy, Ken Kesey, Stanley Elkin, Thomas Pynchon, Peter S. Beagle, Jerzy Kosinski, Ralph Ellison, Alain Robbe-Grillet, Jorge Luis Borges, Günter Grass, Donald Barthelme, J. D. Salinger, John Updike, Vance Bourjaily, Hunter Thompson, Don Wakefield, Kafka, Shakespeare. This (incomplete) list was compiled by Donald M. Fiene, "Kurt Vonnegut's Popularity in the Soviet Union and His Affinities with Russian Literature," Russian Literature Triquarterly, No. 14 (Winter 1976), 183.

³⁸See the reference to Fiene in the note above.

³⁹Fiene, pp. 169-170. The emphasis is mine.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 171.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 172.

⁴²Ibid., p. 173.

⁴³Ibid., p. 175.

⁴⁴"Kogda real'nost' absurdna . . .," Inostrannaya literatura, 2 (1975), 209-213, quoted by Fiene, p. 175.

⁴⁵Fiene, p. 177.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 180.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 181.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 180-181.

⁴⁹Merrill, p. 105.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 106.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

¹The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, trans. Richard Howard (Cleveland/London: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1973).

²Ibid., p. 8.

³Ibid., p. 3.

⁴Ibid., p. 22.

⁵R. C. Elliott, "The Definition of Satire: A Note on Method," Yearbook of Comparative and General Literature, XI (1962), 20.

⁶Ibid., 23. Elliott actually uses Wittgenstein's theory of the definition of the word "games" for a comparison with the definition of satire.

⁷Incidentally, anti-American satire can also be interpreted as an attack on the final phase of western civilization, if it can be argued that America represents, or symbolizes, the most developed western country (or, in the Marxist jargon, an "Imperialist" country). This would widen both the importance and the scope of anti-American satire.

⁸L. Feinberg, Introduction to Satire, p. 45.

⁹Ibid., p. 44.

¹⁰This term is used by Bakhtin in Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics.

¹¹Milne's "comedy of spiritual victory over the material world and death." p. 33.

¹²Elkin, p. 198.

¹³L. Feinberg, The Satirist: His Temperament, Motivation, and Influence (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State Univ. Press, 1963), also looks at satire by studying the satirist.

¹⁴Elkin, p. 198. West could have been stating only a simple fact.

¹⁵Quoted by Max Byrd, Visits to Bedlam: Madness and Literature in the Eighteenth Century (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1974), p. 22.

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